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An Apologie,
or Defente, of those
Englishe Writers &
Preachers which Cerberus
the three headed dog
of Hell, chargeth wth
Atheisme, under
the name of Athe-
ism.

Written by Robert Crouley
Clarke, and Wicart of Mount
Giles without Crut-
ch in London.

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by Henry Broomer.

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¶ To the Reader.



Being overcome
with shame in writing of
this booke by one that
hath no name, I have
used the same, long time
to delite himself in his
own blindness, and to
boast himself among
his secrets, maintain-
ing, being in the measure
while better occupied,
than in wrestling with
such a one as is asha-
med to set his hand to

the booke he wisteth, and causeth to be imprinted.

I thought that the writings of such one, could not
have bene hurtfull to the estimation that I and others of
my calling, should of right have among the true profes-
sors of Gods Gospell: because such have ynough already
in print, and in the English tong, to answer all such
blind barking dogs as this is. But perceiving that some
men which profess the Gospell, will rather credit such a
flatterer, than take the paynes to reade that, wherein they
might have wherewith to be able to answere sayes that
are rayled upon, because the same was written, before
this Bell Dogge began to barke: I have now written
a short Apologie, or defense of my selfe and others of my
calling, inhom this Bell hound doth so eagerly barke at:
willing the Christian reader, to reade it with indifferent
iudgement, neyther inclining to the one nor the other,
till he have read both. And because none shall have cause
to complaine: I have set doونه in writing all that this
Dogge

To the Reader.

Dogge hath written, and then desired that which he first fault withall, so that euerie matter hath it manifest defence ioyned vnto it, that the Christian Reader, may haue wherewithall to bring himselfe out of doubt. And least any should be offended, for that I terme mine aduersarie by þe name of Cerberus, or Hell dogge: I wold all men should consider the cause. He hath take vpon him to reprehend the teachers of the truth, and those, which are or should be, the light of the worlde: and yet, as one that would not be called to an account of his doings, he hideth his name. Wherefore, I haue given him suche a name, as is mete for him: till he put his name to that he writeth in the reproche and discredite of such as feare not openly to teach the truth, and when they write it, to subscribe their names to the same. When this Hel bound therefore shall set his name to his booke: I will vse none other name but that which by his owne writing shal appeare to be his. In the meane while, let him & his friends be contented that he beare such a name, as his doings do deserue. Cerberus as þe Poets do saie, is a Dogge with thre heaves, which watcheth Hell gates, whose barking is horrible, for he barketh with thre mouthes, and his haire is snakes. His name by interpretation doth signifie a deuourer of bodies. Wherefore, it is not a name vile enough for this Hel dogge, whose propertie is to deuoure soules; and the good names of such as he is not able to excuse of any crime. And with his barking he goeth not about to trouble the Kingdome of Hel (as Cerberus did) but the Kingdome of Heauen, which is the Church of Christ, which by faith in Christ, is assured of his eternall predestination to euermore glorie after this life, and in this life to deliuerance from all euill. Of which comfort this Cerberus labourerh by his barking to spoile vs; as shall more plainly appeare in the Apologie of those,

those, whom he seeketh by his barking to dash out of countenance.

But least I should trouble thee Christian Reader, with ouer manie wordes before the matter: I cease to write any more. Farewel in Christ Iesus. And pray to God for the presence of his holie spirite, to leade thee in the reading of this Apologie. Amen. Finished the first of March Anno. 1565.

Roman. 8.

Those whom God knew before: them hath he predestinated to be made like vnto the Image of his sonne, that he might be the eldest among many brethren.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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An Apologie of Crowley 1 and others.

Cerberus.



TH E Copie of an Aunswere, made vnto a certaine letter: wherein the Aunswerer purgeth himselfe and other, from *Pelagius* errours, and frō the errour of free will or iustification of workes: wherewithall he semeth to be charged, by the sayde letter: And further he sheweth, wherin he differeth in iudgement, from certaine Englishe writers and Preachers, whome he chargeth with the teaching of false doctrine, vnder the name of Predestination.

Crowley.



I had bene very well done of Cerberus to haue set downe in wryting the copie of the letter that he sayth he Aunswereth, and the name of him that wrote it: so might those that he nameth in hys aunswere, haue had some waye to haue founde out the Auctour of the Aunswere, that this matter being debated p̄uatelye betwene them, a meane might haue bene founde so: the ending of the controuerisie and the satisfiing of suche as by this aunswere are not onely brought into doubt, of the truth of Gods euerlasting Predestination: but also haue conceived an euill opinion of such as be the teachers thereof. But if I shall speake that I thinke: I muste needs saye, that I thinke there was no such letter wrytten. But Cerberus

A.I.

hath

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hath sayned this, as a ground to set his foundation upon. For otherwise it shoulde haue seemed too maliciously done, upon none occasion to write and set abrode in print to the diffamation of publique Preachers and writers: such matter as in this aunswere he chargeth them withall. But graunt there were such a letter written: yet was not that a iuste occasion for Cerberus to charge by name, mee or anye other, which knewe not of the writing of it. Well, he purgeth himselfe and other, he sayth, of diuers errours wherewith he seemeth to be charged in that letter. It had bene well, he had not in purging himselfe charged other, that muste fall to purging too. But that was to shewe what spirite he is of. Not of that spirite which in loue seeketh the reformation of other mens errours: but of that spirite that in malice seeketh to maintaine his owne errours by the defacing of other, which neuerthelesse, will in the ende, be the defacing of himselfe. For such as vse to digge pittes for others to fall into: doe commonly fall into the same themselves first of all.

Cerberus.

I desire of God by his grace and mercy, to settle, strength, and stablishe you in the truth of his holye Worde for euer. Dearely beloued, where you write vnto me, that you haue often hearde, that I and other, shoulde holde the errours of *Pelagius*: whose errours you say are almost vnknown vnto you what they are. And where further it is reported of vs (as you saye) that we shoulde denie the predestination of God: and seeke a iustification by free will, and by deseruing of workes, which matter you do both vnderstande, and haue also founde good proufe (as you suppose) that we are guiltie in the same, laying the

the whole foundation of your proufe, vpon this saying set forth in print.

Although there be but fewe on earth, that rightly thee deserue:

Yet thou, O Lord, for their good lyfe, the residue preserve.

With which filthy saying, to burden me and other whome ye name: I maruell greatly that you could be so much abused, not considering by whom it was written, and set forth in print: for by the titling you see, it was printed beyonde the seas, in Queene Mariess time, for that it is entituled, A prayer to God for his afflicted Church in Englande, and as it there appeareth manifest, it is the worke of W. Samuell, which is a mā vnto me of very small acquaintance: but a Preacher he is. And as for his saying, that a man may deserue God. &c. Which you desire me to proue if I can: it is a doctrine so abhominable and blasphemous: as I am sure neither Papist, nor Pelagian, nor any other Heretike, eyther olde or newe, hath written or maintained, a more filthy, and execrable saying. For it is the flatte and manifest deniall both of God the Father & of his Sonne Christ Iesu: neither doth it require any confutation to him that doth but confesse, that there is a God: and as for my selfe, I assure you: I doe not loue my lyfe so dearely, as I hate this vile saying deadlye. But wonder it is, that such a sentence, conteyning the very filthy dregs, of all *Pelagius* errors, could so long stande printed, and neither be forbidden, nor by any man written against.

Crowley.

I lyke very well, the prayer that Cerberus beginneth his Oracion withall: but his purpose in praying

A. y.

(which

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(which appeareth to be, to deceine the simple) I doe lyke nothing at all. The foundation of his friendes pꝛoufe of that he chargeth him with (as he sayth) is but slender: for it is but a fault in the print, as euery mā may see that will reade but two verses going before in þe same pꝛayer, and five immediately following. And that the indifferent reader may be satisfiꝛed, I will write downe those verses, bicause it will be harde for men to finde the booke wherein the pꝛayer is printed.

Of all the Sonnes that thou hast had but one thou doest regarde:

And for his sake thou art content, that we shall be pꝛeserue.

So, though there be but fewe on earth, that rightly thee deserue:

Yet thou, O Lorde, for their good lyfe, the residue pꝛeserue.

If ten in Sodome had bene founde, the Citie still had stande:

And had remained without fall as did the other lande.

And let not now thy mercies slacke, but be thou alwayes one:

And haue respect vnto all those, that trust to thee alone.

Those, whome thou hast in prison layde, for breaking of thy lawe.

Deliver them and giue them grace to liue in better awe.

If any of Cerberus friendes had bene Autour of this pꝛayer: he woulde sone haue espied the printers fault, and woulde haue read those two verses thus.

So, though there be but fewe on earth, that rightly thee doe serue:

Yet thou, O Lorde, for their good lyfe, the residue pꝛeserue.

And so should the saying haue bene no more filthy, than was the saying of Abraham to the Aungell, when he entreated for the Citie of Sodome, and sayde: What if there lacke five of fiftie, wilt thou destroy the whole Citie for lack of five? W: the saying of the Aungell, when aunswering Abraham he sayde: If I finde but ten iust men in the Citie, I will spare it for their sakes. But Cerberus was so bent to barke at the pꝛeachers of pꝛedestination, that he coulde not haue leysure to reade more than þe title and those two verses, which being corrupted

by printing, seemed to serue his purpose. And surely, I doe not yet beleue that any man coulde be so madde as to charge him with those verses. But this I beleue, that he hath written them otherwise than they were printed. For the first verse beginning thus: *Soe though &c.* he hath written it thus. *Although &c.* which argueth that either he neuer sawe the booke that Samuell made, or else, he supposed that none shoulde come to the sight of it, but such as doe fauour his faction. And in very deepe some of them haue made verie straunge to shew that booke. But how so euer þ matter go other wise, he hath shamefully deceiued himselfe in triumphing ouer poore Samu-ell, as ouer him whome he compareth with the moste wicked Heretiques that euer were.

Cerberus.

And although I denie not but some other there are, which (maintaining the power of mans freewill, & the meritorious worthinesse of mans deserving) doe denie the free gift of Gods grace in Christ Iesu, and for his only sake, comprehended in the eternall predestination, and foreordinaunce of God, and declared vnto vs in his moste holy Worde, yet because I see, there are many in these dayes, wrongfully and falsely, accused to be enemies of that blessed Predestination, to be Pelagians, iustificiers of themselves, and such lyke: And with those bitter termes, are in open Auditories defaced, and brought into contempt, emong the multitude (who being deceiued with giuing ouerhastie credite, vnto such men, not throughly vnderstanding the matter, doe vse to giue sentence, before the cause be hearde,) I haue thought it good therfore, most dearely beloued, not

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to them, which take more delight in the defamation of other, than in knowing the truth themselves, but to thee, which art willing to vnderstande the matter, before thou iustifie or condemne either partie: in as fewe wordes as I possible can, to shewe what shamefull doctrine, vnder the name and colour of Gods Predestination, is now adayes set forth and taught of many, which both I and many other mislike, and haue diuers times with some of them in priuate and friendly talke, perswaded to leaue, both by cause we iudge the doctrine to be false, and also the destruction of all vertue to followe therevpon. For which cause, as the maner is of them that feare not so much the shipwrack of a good conscience, as they doe the losse of worldly estimation, least any such disfauorers of their fantasie, shoulde hap to haue some credit among the people, with boytrous breath, they blowe abroad, that the mislikers of this their doctrine, are enimies to Gods holy Predestination. But right well knowe they, that those whome they nowe so specially accuse, to be such haters of Gods Predestination, are in dede, most intire louers of the same. And many of those whom they accuse to be popishe Pelagians and Iustificers of themselves: haue bestowed both their goodes and lyues, against that filthy and detestable sect. And as for those errours which *Pelagius* that olde heretike, with *Celestinus* and *Iulianus* his adherentes, did hold, and also reuoked the same in the Iudiciall counsell of *Palestine*: I think it good to rehearse them: first in Latine & after in Englishe, as they are gathered together by *Augustine*. And the to shewe, according to your request, what parte of their doctrine which they teache vnder the name of Predestination, my selfe and other doe mislyke. To
the

the ende that you and other may the better iudge, who are in deede worthy to be called Pelagians: and whether some parte of their doctrine, be not for iust cause misliked.

Crowley.

Here Cerberus bleseth all his Rhetorique at once, to persnade his dearely beloved friend, whose letter he sayth he aunſwereth, that he and other of his minde be falsely and wrongfully accused so be enemies of Gods holy predestinatio. &c. And to this ende he will in as fewe wordes, as possibly he can, set forth what shamefull doctrine is now taught. &c. But first he will set forth both in Latine and in Englishe, those errors which the olde Heretike Pelagius, with other did holde and also reuoke. &c. That men may the better iudge, who are in deede worthy the name of Pelagians, (so he thinketh that he hath proued that we against whom he writeth, are those that should be called Pelagians) and whether some parte of oure doctrine be not for iust cause misliked. Now let vs see how he noteth Pelagius errors out of Augustine, first in Latine, and then in Englishe. Which when we haue weighed, we shall see who are moste lyke Pelagius, he & his, or I and mine. For this is his purpose, I am sure, so that he toucheth me first by name, and setteth himself and such as he is against al such as I am, affirming that whereas we accuse them as enemies of Gods Predestination, they are in deede & most intire loners and we the enemies therof. My chief labor therfore in this Apologie, shall be to make the truth hereof to appeare playnely to all the indifferent hearers.

Cerberus.

Cerberus.

The wordes of Austen are these. *Epistola. 6. tomo. 2.*
Obiectum est enim eum dicere. Quia Adam siue peccaret, siue non peccaret, moriturus esset. 1. Et quod peccatum eius, ipsum solum laeserit, non & genus humanum. 2. Et quod infantes, in illo statu sunt, quo Adam fuit ante prauaricationem. 3. Et quod neq, per mortem vel prauaricationem, de deo, omne genus humanum moriatur, neq, per resurrectionem Christi, omne genus humanum resurgat. 4. Et diuites baptizatos nisi omnibus abrenuntiant, si quid domi visi fuerint facere, non reputari illis, nec eos habere posse regnum Dei. 5. Et gratiam Dei atq, adiutorium, non ad singulos actus dari, sed in libero arbitrio esse, vel in lege atq, in doctrina. 6. Et dei gratiam secundum meritum nostrum dari. 7. Et filios Dei non posse vocari, nisi omnino absq, peccato fuerint effecti. 8. Et non esse liberum arbitrium, si Dei indiget auxilio, quoniam in propria voluntate habet vnusquisq, facere aliquid vel non facere. 9. Et victoriam nostram, non ex Dei adiutorio esse, sed ex libero arbitrio. 10. Et quod penitentibus remissio non detur secundum gratiam & misericordiam Dei: sed secundum meritum & laborem eorum, qui per penitentiam, digni fuerint misericordia. Hac omnia Pelagius anathematizauit.

The first of Pelagius errors which Augustine here citeth is, that Adam shoulde haue died whether he had sinned or not sinned. This is as you heare, one of Pelagius wicked errors, that sinne is not the cause of Reprobation, or casting away, death sprong out of Gods ordinance, or some other way & came not of mans sinne (saith he) whether man had sinned or not sinned, yet should he haue dyed, contrary to the manifest Scripture which sayeth, that by one man sinne entred into the worlde, & death by the meanes of sinne. *Rom. 5. b.* And the wyle man sayth, that God created

created mā to be vnderdestroyed. And againe he saith, *Sapi. 6.*
 God hath not made death, neither hath he pleasure
 in the destruction of the liuing, he created al things
 that they might haue their being, yea all the people
 of the earth hath he made, that they shoulde haue
 health, that there shoulde be no destruction in them,
 and that the Kingdome of Hell shoulde not be vpon
 earth, for righteousnesse is euerlasting and immor-
 tall, but vnrighousenesse bringeth death. Wicked
 and abhominable therfore was this error of *Pelagius*
 which affirmeth, that whether man had sinned or
 not sinned: he shoulde haue dyed.

And here in the very beginning of *Pelagius* errours:
 I reporte me to themselues; euen to themselues. (I
 saye) that blowe the trumpet of defamation against
 other, with the termes of pestilent *Pelagians*, whe-
 ther those, whome they so accuse nowe to be *Pela-*
gians, holde this error, or whether they themselues
 which would take some mote of error out of other
 mens eyes, haue not this *Pelagian* beate sticking fast
 in their owne, let they themselues be iudges, or let
 their owne doctrine iudge, both in print and prea-
 ching, whereof some parte shall be hereafter rehear-
 sed. Yea let all the worlde iudge, which haue hearde
 the doctrine of both parties: who they are that in
 this point ought worthily to be called *Pelagians*.

Crowley.

After Cerberus hath let dolone in Latine certaine of
Pelagius errours, to þ number of xi. he repeteth þ first in
 Englishe, that is, that Adam shoulde haue dyed, though
 he had not sinned. And because his purpose is to proue
 that we are those that holde this *Pelagian* heretic: he

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vnderstandeth Pelagius meaning to be, that sinne was
not the cause of Reprobation, or casting away, but that
death spring out of Gods ordinance: And so at the last
he concludeth, that Pelagius and we are all one in this
point: for we teache the same doctrine. What moued
Pelagius to teache that doctrine, I knowe not, neither
did I at any time so much as once thinke to holde or de-
fende it. And I thinke I may be bolde to say in the name
of all that haue written or preached the doctrine that
Cerberus misliketh: that not one eithor hath or will
teache it. Although Cerberus doe boast, that hereafter
some parte of our doctrine shall be shewed, whereby all
men may be able to iudge that we are al one with Pela-
gius in this point. For mine owne parte I will put all
men out of doubt, that I beleue, and haue, doe, and will
(if God permit) teache, that if Adam had not sinned, he
had neuer dyed. And that God did create man to be vi-
destroyed. And that God made not death as the wise
man writeth. But by one man sinne entred into the
the worlde, and by sinne, death. And I can not see that
any of my brethren haue or doe teache any otherwise,
eithor in writing or preaching. Wherefore Cerberus
doth vs open wounding to wone vs with Pelagius in this
errour. As for the doctrine that I haue written, and
Cerberus opposeth to his purpose against me and my
brethren: shall (by Gods helpe) be defended in the place
where it is produced against vs.

Cerberus.

The seconde errour which Austen rehearseth, is,
that Adams sinne did onely hurt himselfe, and not
the whole generation of man: This is an other vile
and detestable errour which Pelagius helde, that the
sinne

sinne of Adam brought not miserie and death vpon
all his posteritie, contrarye to the open Scripture,
which sayth, that by the sinne of one, condemnati-
on came vpon all men. And the holy man Esdras
sayth: O Adam, what hast thou done: for though
it was thou that sinned, yet thou arte not fallen al-
lone, but all we that come of thee.

Roma. 5.
4. E. dr. 6.

The thirde, depending also vpon the seconde, is
this: That Infantes being newe borne, are in that
state, that Adam was in, before his transgression,
which errorr semeth onely, or chiefly to extende to
the innocencie of children. For if his minde were,
that in all pointes infantes were in Adames estate,
then shoulde it be ouer brutishe. For who seeth not,
that babes newe borne, suffer oftentimes payne and
griefe, which Adam did not before his transgression.
But to affirme, that Infantes are not borne and con-
ceiued in sinne, is to denie Originall sinne, which is
an olde and a diuelish errorr, and vtterly against the
Scripture, which sayth plainly: Beholde, I was
borne in wickednesse, and in sinne hath my mother
conceyued mee.

Psalm. 51.

Crowley.

In these two Articles can Cerberus finde nothing
to burden he withall. For we teach that by their first
birth all Infantes are inheritours of that pollution that
our common father Adam purchased by his first trans-
gression of sinne. What is, of bodily transiue and mis-
erie in this life, and everlasting death after this life. And
that even as the children of borne sinners, can enjoy no
other thing by birth than that bondage which their pa-
rents are in: so the children of Adam can by nature be

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top none other thing but that which belonged to their
first father, who by his first transgression, made both
himselfe and all his posteritie, bond slaves to death, hell,
the diuell and damnation. Well therefore we shall not
be Pelagians in this point: But if I would deale as
straightly with Cerberus, as he doth with Samuell:
I could charge him with breaking of Priscians heade,
in the seconde Article, where he writteth *lesoies* for *leserit*.
Which though it be but a small fault, yet is it as great a
fault as that which Cerberus maketh so much of in Sa-
muels rymes. And the printers were to blame for both,
I am sure. And therefore I would not yetther Samuell
as Cerberus, should beare any blame with them. Who
so lusteth to conferre the copie of this ameswre which
was first cast about in the streets of Londō, with this
is written in this Apologie: shall easily see that I haue
amended many such faultes, without noting of them to
any mans reproche.

Cerberus.

The fourth errour is, that neither by the death &
transgressiō of Adā, all the generation of mā dyeth,
nor that by the Resurrection of Christ, all the ge-
neration of man doth rise againe. I doe not vnder-
stande that *Priscian* did here speake of the last Refur-
rection at the day of iudgement, as though he had,
after the maner of the Saduceis, denied the Refur-
rection of our soules and bodies in the last daye; for
then were all their disparagement in vaine, of the ma-
ner how we should be saued; whether by the grace
of God, or by the deserving of man, if saluation or
Resurrection had on either parte bene denied also-
gether. Neither doth the Scripture attribute the last
Refur.

Resurrection vnto Christ, as though the soules and bodies of men, shoulde haue died lyke beastes and not haue risen againe vnto iudgement, if Christ had not come. Yea no doubt, all men shoulde haue risen againe, and that to the iudgement of euerlasting damnation, if Christ had not come. But I vnderstande that *Pelagius* in this Article, denied the generalitie of Redemption by the death of Christ, by which we doe, as it were arise from death, bycause of the state of lyfe and saluation, wherevnto we are bought in Christ by Redemption, lyke as we were in the state of death and damnation in Adam by sinne. Not that any man is purged from the corruption of sinne, vnto the innocencie of Adam: but bycause the sinne is conered in Christ, and pardoned for his sake. And further here is to be noted, that the first parte of this errour, is manifestly, the very same, which is in the seconde and thirde errour, before rehearsed, and by the same Scriptures plainly condemned. But to make the latter part of this errour more aparant, it was necessarie and thought good of Augustine, to rehearse the first againe: that by the comparison of condemnation in Adam, and Redemptiō in Christ, it might the more plainly be perceiued that Christ was not inferiour to Adam, nor grace inferiour to sinne. And that, as all the generation of man is condemned in Adam: euen so is all the generation of man, Redemed in Christ. And as general a Sauour is Christ by redemption: as Adam is a condemner by transgression. Which comparison is taken out of St Paule his Epistle to the Romanes, where he saith: Likewise then as by the sinne of one, condemnation came vpon all men: euen so, by the iustifying of one, commeth the righteousnesse that

Roma. 5.

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bringeth lyfe vpon all men. Yet shall not all men be cōdemned by Adam eternally: for there is ordained of God againe away vnto lyfe, which way is Christ. Neyther shall all be eternallye saued by Christ: for there is of God declared a waye againe vnto death, which waye is sinne, and the wilfull contempt of Gods mercy in Christ. But this appeareth to be one of *Pelagius* damnable errours: That Christ was not a generall Sauour, that Christ offered not vp the sacrifice of redemptiō for al the whole world, contrarye to the manifest Scripture which sayeth. He it is that obtayned grace for our sinnes, and not for our sinnes onely, but also, for the sinnes of the whole world. The same is also manifestly declared in these Scriptures folowing, and many other. *Iohn. 1. 4. 6. f. & 12. f. Rō. 5. 1. & 14. 1. 1. Cor. 2. 2. 1. Cor. 3. 1. Hebr. 2. 1. & 1. 2. Pet. 2. 2.* And here it is worthy to be noted againe, how iustly this errour of *Pelagius*, reboundeth into the bosome of those, which so falsely accuse other to be gilty in the Pelagians errours. Be indifferent, dearly beloved in the Lorde, I beseeche thee, and way the matter as it is. I desire no more.

Crowley.

When Cerberus hath framed this fourth Article of *Pelagius* to his purpose, and perswaded himselfe that it reboundeth into the bosomes of those that accuse him & his say to be gilty of *Pelagius* errours: he concludeth that he saitheth no more, but that his dearly beloved: whose letter he aunswereth, would be indifferent and loose: waight the matter as it is. Truly, if I maye doe any thing with the same partie, my hartie request to him shall be, that he will graunt Cerberus his request.

And

And further, I will be an humble sutter to all that shall
 reade this Apologie, that they setting all assercion aside,
 will weighe both his answers, and this Apologie, even
 as they are, and none otherwise, & then haue I enough
 also. The Article is, that all the generation of man, both
 neyther die by the sinne and transgression of Adam, nei-
 ther rise againe by the Resurrection of Christ. That is,
 that neither Adam was by his sinne, a generall con-
 demner of himselfe and all his posteritie: neither Christ
 by his Resurrection, a generall collector of all mankind.
 For so both Cerberus interprete Pelagius meaning. I
 will not dispute about Pelagius meaning. For I know
 it can be not be good, although he denieth a truth, plainly as-
 sermed by St. Paule and Chrysostome both, as Cerberus hath
 truly assermed upon the second Article. But that St.
 Paule ment in that place, as Cerberus both understand
 him: I doe flatly denie. And will by Gods helpe proue,
 both by the Scriptures & iudgement of ancient writers.
 And that the matter I go about may be the more plaine
 to the reader: I will first set downe in plaine wordes,
 what meaning Cerberus gathereth of those wordes of
 Paule. He gathereth, that Paule shoulde munde to teach
 by those wordes, that Christ rescued as many, as Adam
 losse. Which gathering is very false; and that may be
 proued by the verie circumstance of the place it selfe.
 First, Paulus purpose is, by comparing Christ with A-
 dam, to shewe that as Adam was able by disobedience,
 to make himselfe and all his posteritie bonds slaues to
 Satan: so was Christ able by obedience, to deliuer the
 same from that bondage, and to make them the free chil-
 dren of God. Now for the manner of speache that he useth
 in comparing these two together, we must beware that
 we vnderstande it not so, that we make Christ & Adam
 lyke in all pointes. For then shall we be enforced to
 graunt

Roma. 5.
 4. E/ dr. 6.

graunt many incommeniences, whereof this is one. That as Adam lost himselfe by disobedience: so Christ restored himselfe by obedience. Wherof shoulde folloſue that filthy error of them that affirme that Christ dyed for his owne finnes as well as for the finnes of the people, contrary to the whole course of the Scriptures, which teache that he was without spotte of sinne, and therefore was able to satisfie to God & Father for sinne. Another inſconuenience is, & there shoulde be repugnacie betweene this place of Scripture & other, (wherein both S. Paule & our Sauour Christ, doe teache, that not all mankind, that is, not every particular person of mankind, but a certaine elected and chosen number, are by Christ restored into & fauour of God) which thing may not be graunted. For in the Scripture there is no repugnance at all. And the third inſconuenience shoulde be, that only original sinne, (that is & sinne that we haue of our parents, euen in our conception) is put alwaye by the blood of Christ, and not our actuall sinne. So that we must eithersatisfie for that our selues, or else perishe, notwithstanding Christs death and sufferance. Which is such an inſconuenience as cutteth of from Christ as many as dye not in Infancie, before they commit any actuall sinne. These incommeniences considered, we must seeke to finde another meaning in S. Pauls wordes, when he compareth Christ with Adam, than that which the bare wordes seeme to giue. His meaning is not to make Christ lyke vnto Adam, but to preferre Christ before Adam, & to shewe that grace is more abundant in Christ, than sinne was in Adam. Which thing appeareth in Pauls very wordes in the same chapter, where he saith.

Roma. 5. Sed non sicut delictum ita & donum. Si enim minus delicto multo maius sunt: multo magis gratia Dei & donum, in gratia minus hominis Iesu Christi, in plures abundauit. That is to saye,
But

But the gifte was not lyke vnto the sinne, for if many dyed by þe sinne of one: much moze hath the mercy & gifte of God, in the grace of one man Iesus Christ, abounded vnto many. If these wordes of Paule should be vnderstand of the number that were losse by Adam, and restozed by Christ: then muste we graunt, þe moze were restozed by Christ, than lost by Adam. For he saith that the grace or mercy hath abounded vnto moe. Which wordes, being vnderstand of þe number restozed, must be spoken in comparison, of the many that were lost by Adam: & so must it follow that moe were restozed by Christ, than were lost by Adam. Which can not be, vnlesse we will saye that Christ restozed moe than all. For Adam losse all. The meaning of Paule is therefore, that as þe sinne of Adam being but one man, was a sufficient condemnation to himselfe and all his posteritie which are many: euen so, yea and much moze was the grace or free mercy, and gift of God, in Christ being but one, a sufficient restitution of all the chosen Childzen of God, although þe same were neuer so many. And that this is the meaning of Paule, doth well appeare by his wordes that follow in the same chapter, where he sayth. *Et non sicut per vnum qui peccauit, ita & donum. Nam condemnatio quidem ex vno, in condemnationem: gratia autem ex multis delictis, in iustificationem. Si enim vnus delicto, mors regnauit per vnum: multo magis, abundantiam gratia & donationis & iustitia accipientes, in vita regnabunt, per vnum Iesum Christum.* What is to saye. And the gift is not so, as is that which entred in by one that sinned. For the condemnation came by one sinne, into condemnation: but the grace or free mercede, was of many sinnes into righteousnesse. For if by the sinne of one man, death haue reigned, by the meanes of one man: much moze, shall they which haue receiued abundance of free mercede or grace, and of the gifte and righteousnesse:

nesse: raigne in lyfe, thowso one, which is Iesus Christ. Here doth Paule plainly expresse his meaning. Which is, that they which haue receiued abundaunce of grace, and of the gyft and righteousnesse, are those many, that are restored by Christ Iesu, in whome, through the same Christ, lyfe shall raigne. Those are not the whole posteritie of Adam. For the same Paule sayth in the .xj. chapter of this Epistle, *Quod quarebat Israel non est consecutus, electio autē consecuta est.* Israel hath not obtayned þ thing that he sought for: but the election hath obtained. Meaning that the carnall Israelites obtained not righteousness, much lesse did þ whole offsprig of Adā obtaine it. But the election, that is the elected and chosen children of God, whether they be of the stock of Israel or no, haue obtayned righteousness through Christ, which is forgiveness of al their sinnes by his blood shedding, & righteousness, & euerlasting lyfe by his resurrectiō. According to þ saying of Paul, *Traditus est propter delicta nostra, & resurrex* in proper iustificationē nostrā. He was deliuered vnto death for our sinnes: and he rose againe for our iustification.

Rom. 4.

But Cerberus and his fellows, do bzge the vniuersall signe, *Omnes. All. Sicut per vnius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem: sic & per vnius iustitiam in omnes homines, in iustificationem vite.* That is. Euen as by one mans fault, sinne entred into all men, to condemnation, so by the righteousness of one man, is righteousness entred into all men, to the iustification of lyfe. This vniuersall signe must needs streatche it selfe to all Adams posteritie, and therfore all must be made righteous by Christ. These men will not see how suche vniuersall signes are bled in the Scriptures. They can not perceiue how this vniuersall signe shoulde in the first sentence streatche it selfe to all the generation of the first Adam that sinned, and in the seconde sentence to all the genera

generation of the seconde Adam, which is Christ. The generation of þ first are all that haue or shall be bozne of fleshe and bloud, and the generation of the seconde, are all they that be bozne of God. If we shoulde in all places of Scripture, streatche this vniuersall signe all, so farre as Cerberus doth streatche it here: we shoulde make as good a piece of worke as þ Sonne did, which reade in S. Paule *Omnia probate, proue all things*. And therfore hauing a minde to sir John, the Chaplen of the house, the proued what it was to lye with a man. And being with childe, the matter came to the knowledge of the Abbas: the excused hir selfe by Saint Paule, who biddeth vs proue all things. If a theefe that taketh another mans goods, shoulde excuse himselfe with *Omnia mihi licent*, I may doe all things, or *Omnia vestra sunt*. All things are yours: It would not be founde that these vniuersall signes shoulde either make it lawfull for him to take another mans goods, or to haue right to that that is not hys by some iust title. I woulde wishe Cerberus and his fellowes therfore, to looigh this matter better befoze they triumph ouer vs in such sort as he doth in this his aunswere. And I woulde wishe him to consider well whether saint Austen in the Epistle where these Articles of Pelagius be written, do not write cleane contrary to this iudgement of his. For in the very place that he citeth to make for his purpose, S. Austen sayth thus. *Infantes nuper nati, non sunt in illo statu in quo Adam fuit ante prauaricationem, vt ad ipsos pertineat quod breuiter ait Apostolus. Per vnum hominem mors, & per vnum hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur: ita & in Christo omnes viuificabuntur. Vnde fit, quod Infantes nō baptizati, non solum regnum cōlorum, verum etiam vitam eternam habere non possint.* That is, Infantes that be lately bozne, are not in that state that Adam was befoze he sinned, that that thing which the Apostle doth

C. ij. in

1. Thes. 5.

1. Corin. 3.

1. Corin. 6.

1. Corin. 15.

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in fewe wordes affirme, might pertaine vnto them. By one man came death, and by one man came the resurrection of the deade. For euen as in Adam all dye: so in Christ shall all be made aljue. Wherby it commeth to passe that Infants which are not baptised, are not onely vnable to enioye the Kingdome of Heauen, but also lyfe euerlasting. These wordes me think, are very plaine against that which Cerberus would maintaine by Paule and Austen. For if Infants unbaptised can not haue the kingdome of God nor euerlasting lyfe: how doth this saying *In Christo omnes uiuificabuntur*: All shalbe quickned in Christ: pertaine to all the posteritie of Adam: but lesse he will say, that Infantes that dye before baptisme be not of Adams posteritie: Better matter can I not wilke for against Cerberus, than that which hangeth to the foundation that he himselfe buildeth vpon. It were for my purpose to aduance the auctoritie of this Epistle, bicause it helpeth me very much against this Hel Dogge Cerberus: but bicause I woulde not haue the Reader to conceyue such an opinion of S. Austen, as to thinke that he shoulde be of such minde as the Auctour of this Epistle doth shewe himselfe to be in certaine pointes: I will cite the iudgement of Erasmus concerning this Epistle & all other of this title. That is. *Ad Bonifacium. To Boniface. Speaking of y^e Booke of Epistles, where in this Epistle. 106. is written, he saith, Nonnulli simpliciter confecta, quod genus sunt illa Bonifacii ad Augustinum, Augustini ad Bonifacium.* Some of those Epistles (saith he) are altogether fayned. As are those of Bonifacius to Augustine, and of Austen to Boniface. Now iudge gentle Reader what this Cerberus meaneth, that leaning the god and sounde wordes of Austen, where he writeth very well of this matter: setteth his foundation vpon such rotten patches as some such as he is, haue put forth in

in Austens name. So maruell though Cerberus be ashamed to set his name to his booke. This might suffice for our defence against Cerberus his assaulte in this point. But I will adde one Scripture or two, and so the iudgement of some learned writers, that he take not occasion of a new calumniatio, because I promised more than I haue yet performed. Saint Paule writing to Timothy in his seconde Epistle and seconde chapter, sayth thus. *Sed firmum fundamentum Dei stat, habens signaculum hoc. Cognovit Dominus qui sunt sui.* The foundation of God, standeth firme and sure, having this sure seale. The Lord knoweth who be his. By which wordes it is manifest, that S. Paule understood not that all mankind were elected in Christ, and so redeemed by Christ: but a certaine number, which though they be unknowne unto men, yet doth the Lord (whose they be) knowe them well, and will not suffer them, no nor any of them, to perishe. Wherefore he exhorteth all such as call vpon the name of the Lord (that is all Christians) to depart from iniquitie. For in a great house (saith he) there be, not only vessels of Golde and Silver, but also of Timber and Earth: some to serue for honorable uses, and some for vile uses. I knowe how some doe wrest these latter wordes of S. Paule, to proue that it is in mans power to depart from iniquitie, because Saint Paule doth will Christians so to doe. And especially those wordes which follow, which are these. *Si quis ergo, emundauerit se ab istis, erit vas in honorem sanctificatum, et vile domino, ad omne opus bonum paratum.* If any man therefore, shall cleanse himselfe from these men: he shall be a vessel sanctified unto honour, and profitable for the Lord, being prepared and made ready for every good worke. These wordes do manifestly declare, say they, that it is in mannes power to cleanse himselfe, and to make himselfe a vessel meete for

C.iiij.

the

2. Tim. 2.

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the Lordes vse and seruice. These men will not vnderstande that commaundements, admonitions, exhortations, and councelles be to any purpose: except those to whome they be giuen, be able to do the things, that they be commaunded, admonished, exhorted, or councelled to doe. And so shall the commaundements of God be to no purpose. For who hath bene, is, or shall be able, to doe that God commaundeth, when he sayth. Thou shalt loue the Lorde thy God, with all thine heart, with all thy soule, and with all thy minde. And thy neighbour as thy selfe: Doth not S. Baule say that we are not able of our selues, so much as to think a good thought. And is not this according to y^e which Christ himselfe teacheth when he saith to his Disciples: without me ye can do nothing? But these men will not vnderstande that the vse of these things is, to cause the chosen childzen of God, to acknowledge their owne inhabilitie, and humblye to begge at Gods hande his helpe that therby they may doe y^e which is commaunded or taught: and that the reprobates may be without excuse, yea or pretence of excuse. Saint Austen, whome Cerberus woulde faine haue to take hys parte, doth vnderstande this place of Baule, cleane contrary to Cerberus his purpose: As appereth in moe places then one of his best writings. Namely in the vij. chapter of the .xx. booke *De Cinitate Dei*, that is of the Citie of God, (which is, the Church of Christ) where speaking of that Church called from among all the nations of the world: he saith thus. *Has enim elegit Deus ante mundi constitutionem exire de potestate tenebrarum, & transire in regnum filij claritatis sue, sicut Apostolus ait. Nam seducere illum gentes etiam nunc, & secum trahere in eternam poenam, sed non predestinatas in eternam vitam, quis fidelis ignorat? Nec moueat, quod saepe Diabolus seducit etiam illos, qui iam regenerati in Christo, vias ingrediuntur Dei. Nouit enim Dominus qui sunt eius, ex his*

2. Corin. 3.

Iohn. 15.

*De Cinitate
Dei. lib. 20.
Cap. 7.*

in eternam damnationem, neminem ille seducit. Sic enim nouit eos Dominus, ut Deus, quem nihil latet, etiam futurorum, non ut homo, qui hominem ad praesens videt, sic tamen videt, cuius cor non videt, qualis autem postea sit futurus, nec seipsum videt. Ad hoc ergo ligatus est Diabolus, & inclusus in abyſſo, ut iam non seducat gentes, ex quibus constat Ecclesia, quas antea seductas tenebat antequam esset Ecclesia. Nec enim dictum est, ut non seduceret aliquem: sed ut non seduceret, inquit, iam gentes, in quibus Ecclesiam proculdubio voluit intelligi. What is to say, God did before the beginning of the world, chose these nations, that he might deliuer them out of þe powver of darknesse, and translate them into the kingdome of the sonne of his owne brightnesse, as the Apostle sayth. For what sayth full man knoweth not, that the Deuill doth euen now, seduce nations, and draw them with himselfe into euerlasting paine: but not those nations which are predestinated into euerlasting lyfe: neither let it trouble any man, that the Deuill doth oftentimes seduce euen those, that being already regenerated in Christ, do walke in the wayes of God. For the Lorde knoweth who be hye: of them doth the Deuill seduce none, to euerlasting damnation. For the Lorde doth knowe them, as God knoweth, from whom nothing is hidde, no not of the things to come. Not as a man knoweth, who doth for the present time see a man, but yet so, as whose heart he seeth not, yea, he seeth not himselfe so, that he can tell what manner a man he himselfe shalbe hereafter. To this purpose therfore, is the Deuill bounde, and shut vp in darknesse: that he doe not now seduce the nations of whome the Church doth consist. Which nations he did before holde still in errour, before the Church was. For it is not sayde, that he shoulde not seduce any man: but that he shoulde not now seduce (sayth he) þe nations, in which nations, no doubt he woulde haue the Church to be bre-

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derstande.

This Booke was Austens owne without all doubt, and therefore, we maye be bolde to affirme that this is Austens minde, not only vpon this place of Scripture, but also vpon this matter, that is, that not all mankind, but a certaine chosen sort, are restozed againe by Christ. And that none of those that are so restozed, can perishe, although God doe sometime suffer them to fall.

*August.
li. 5. de bapt.
capit. 27.*

Againē, the same Austen witting against the Donatists, in his fifth booke *De Baptismo*, that is of Baptisme, saith thus, in the. xxiij. chapter of the same Booke. *Numerus ergo ille iustorum, qui secundum propositum vocati sunt, de quibus dictum est, Nouit dominus qui sunt eius: ipse est ortus conclusus, fons signatus, puteus aqua viua, paradysus cum fructu pomorum. Ex hoc numero, quidam spiritaliter viuunt, & super eminentem viam charitatis ingrediuntur. Et quum praecipuum hominem in aliquo delicto, instruant in spiritu lenitatis: intendunt ne & ipsi tententur. Et cum forte & ipsi praecipuantur reprimantur in eis aliquantulum, non autem exstinguitur charitatis affectus: rursusq; resurgens & rursus descens, priusmodi cursui resistuntur. Nouit enim dicere. Dormitauit anima mea praetadio, confirma me in verbis tuis.* That is. That number therefore, of the righteous, which are called according to Gods purpose, concerning which it is sayde, that the Lord knoweth who they be that be his: is the same that is the fenced garden, the sealed fountaine, the pye of springing water, and the paradise full of the fruite of Apples. Of this number there be some that lye spirituallly, & walke in the excellent waye of charitie. And when they doe in the spirit of lenitie, instruct a man that is overtaken wth any fault: they doe take god heede lest they themselues be tempted also. And when it happeneth & any of them be overtaken: the affection of loue is some thing repressed in them, but it is not bitterly quenched. And when

it riseth againe, and waereth feruent: it is restozed againe to his olde course oꝝ taste. Foꝝ these men can saie. My soule did slumber foꝝ very wearinesse, do thou make mee strong in thy wordes.

And againe in the same chapter, Saint Austen saith thus. *Sunt etiam quidam ex co numero, qui adhuc nequiter uiuant, aut etiam in heresibus, vel in gentiliū superstitionibus iaceant: & tamen etiam illic nouit dominus qui sunt eius.* Namq; in ille ineffabilis pꝛescientia Dei: multi qui foris videntur, intus sunt. & multi qui intus videntur, foris sunt. Ex illis ergo omnibus, qui, ut ita dicam, intrinsecus & in occulto intus sunt: constat ille horrus cœclusus, fons signatus, puteus aqua uina, paradysus eum fructu pomorum. What is. Where be also some of that number, which doe yet liue wickedly, either doe lye in Heresses oꝝ in h̄ superstitions of the Heathen: and yet the Lorde doth euen there knowe, who be his. Foꝝ in that vnspeakeable foꝝeknowledge of God: many that seeme to be without, are within, & many that seeme to be within, are without. What inclosed garden therefore, that sealed fountaine, that pyt of springing water, and that paradise of the fruite of Apples: doth consist of all those, that be inwardely & secretely within, if I may so speake.

And againe the same Austen saith in the .xlv. treatise vpon Iohn. *Es oues vocem eius audiunt, & proprias oues vocat nominatim. Habet enim nomina eorum scripta in libro vite. Proprias oues vocat nominatim: hinc dicit Apostolus. Nouit Dominus qui sunt eius.* What is. And his sheepe heare his voice, and he calleth his owne sheepe by name. Foꝝ he hath their names witten in the Booke of Lyfe. He calleth his owne sheepe by name. Hereof commeth it that the Apostle sayth. The Lorde knoweeth who they be that be hys.

What shoulde I cite any moe places of this Auctour foꝝ this purpose? If these will not satisfie Cerberus:

D.i.

let

August.
Tract. 45.
in Iohn.

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let him backe still till his throte be hoise. I knowe these may satisfie all that be not wilfully blinde. For in three generall places, S. Austen hath cited these wordes of S. Paule. (The Lorde knoweth who be his) euen in the same sence that I haue done.

One other Scripture I will cite also, which is written in the .xviij. of S. Johns Gospell. The wordes were spoken by our Saniour Christ himselfe, in that Prayer that he made to his Father the night befoze he suffered, and they are these *Non pro mundo rogo, sed pro his quos dedi mihi; qui a tui sunt.* I doe not praye for the worlde (sayth Christ) but for those that thou hast giuen vnto mee, because they be thine. And that Cerberus may know what is ment here by the worde Worlde: he shall see what S. Austen writeth in his. 107. treatise vpon John, concerning this text. *Mundum nunc modo intelligi qui viuunt secundum concupiscentiam mundi; et non sunt in ea sorte gratie, ut ab illo eligantur ex mundo: non utique pro mundo, sed pro his quos ei pater dedit, rogare se dicit. Per hoc enim quod eos illi pater iam dedit, factum est, ut non pertineant ad eum mundum, pro quo non orat. Deinde, subiungit: Qui a tui sunt.* That is. He would not haue vs vnderstande, that those men be the worlde which doe liue according to concupiscence or luste of the worlde, and are not in that state of grace that they might be by him chosen out of the worlde: He doth not therefore say that he doth pray for the worlde, but for them that his father gaue vnto him. For by that, that his father hath already giuen them vnto him, it cometh to passe, that they pertaine not vnto that worlde, that he prayeth not for. And after this he addeth. Because they be thine. If Cerberus were not to obstinately blinde, he coulde not but see and confesse, that S. Austen is full against him. For what other cause doth S. Austen alleadge, why those that Christ prayde for, were not of the worlde, but onely, that

August.
tractat. 107.
super Iob.

that the Father had giuen them vnto him: And what cause doth he alleadge why Christ might not chosse them out of the worlde that he prayed not for: but onely that they were not in that state of grace or mercye, that they might be chosen out of the worlde: And the text it selfe, might perswade any man but Cerberus and his felowes, that there is a number that be not restored by Christ. For woulde Christ denie to praye for any of them y are restored by him: I trowe not.

But to bring Cerberus from Hell gate, if it will be: I will cyte yet one place of S. Austen, wherem he speaketh as plainly as any man can deuise to speake, concerning this matter. In his first booke that he writeth of the deseruings, and forgiveness of sinnes, and of y baptisme of Infants, we reade thus in the. xv. chapter.

Ob hoc etiam dictum est, omnes, & omnes: n^oq, enim qui generantur per Adā, idem ipsi omnes, per Christū regenerantur. Sed hoc v. Et dictum est, quia sicut nullus carnalis generatio, nisi per Adam: sic spiritalis nullus, nisi per Christum. Nam si aliqui possent carne generari non per Adam, & aliqui regenerari spiritu, non per Christum: non liquide omnes, sine hic, sine ibi diceretur. Eosdem autem omnes, postea multis dicit. Possunt quippe in aliquare, omnes esse qui pauci sunt. Sed multos habet generatis carnalis, multos & spiritalis, quamuis nō tam multos hæc spiritalis, quam illi carnalis. Veruntamen, quem idemmodum illi omnes habet homines: sic ista omnes iustos homines. Qui sicut nemo præter illā homo, sic nemo præter istā iustus homo, & in vtrāq, multi.

After S. Austen had sayde, that it is not the only imitation of Christ, that can make a man righteous, but the free mercy which doth regenerate by the spirite, so is it not the imitation of Adam only that maketh vs sinners, but the punishment which engendreth by the sicke: he addeth the wordes about in Latine, which are in English thus. For this cause also, is it said, all, and all: for

W. g.

not

August, de
peccatorum
meritis &
remissione

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not the same all y^e are begotten by Adam, are by Christ regenerated. But this is well sayde, that euen as the carnall generation of no man, is otherwise than by Adā: so is the spirituall generation of no man otherwise than by Christ. For if there might be some men begotten in the fleshe, and not by Adam, and some men regenerated in the spirite, & not by Christ: we might not say plaine-ly all, either in the one place or in the other. And afterwarde, he doth saye, that the same all, are many: for in some certaine thing, those which are but felwe, may be all. But the carnall generation hath many, and the spirituall hath many also: although this spiritual haue not so many, as hath that carnall. But yet for all that, euen as that hath all men: so hath this all iuste men. For as without that, no man is a man: euen so without this no man is a iust man, and in eche of these are many.

Now let Cerberus and his fellows, bark at Austen. For he hath made the same interpretation of S. Pauls wordes, that I haue made before. Whereby it is manifest, that that Epistle that Cerberus buildeth vpon, is not Austens owne, but fained by some such as Cerberus is, and put forth in Austens name.

But bycause I promised before to proue mine affirmation as well by the iudgement of Auncient writers, as by Scripture: I will adde the iudgement of one or two moe, whose autoritie and antiquitie is not to be dispised. Of the which Ambrose shall be one. Writing vpon the Epistle to the Romans, he saith, *Sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem: sic & per unius iustitiam in omnes homines, in iustificationem vita. Hoc est, sicut per unius delictum, omnes condemnationem meruerunt, similiter peccantes: ita & in iustitia unius, omnes iustificabuntur credentes. Si qui autem condemnationem hanc, generalem esse putant: simili modo & iustificationem generalem accipiant. Sed non est verum*

Roma. 5.

verum, quia non omnes credunt. Sicut enim per inobedientiam
 unus hominis, peccatores constituti sunt plurimi: ita et per unius
 obedientiam iusti constituentur multi. Quos supra omnes dixi:
 hic plures & multos significat. Plures enim delictum Ade se-
 cuti sunt per uariandas, non omnes, & multi iusti constituentur,
 non omnes. Non ergo in eos regnauit mors, qui non peccauerunt in
 similitudine per uariationis Ade. That is to say. Euen as
 by one mans sinne, guiltinesse came vpon all men to con-
 demnation: so did iustification of lyfe come vpon all me
 through the righteousnesse of one man. That is, euen
 as by the sinne of one man, all men that doe sinne as he
 dyd, haue deserued condemnation: euen so all that do be-
 leue, shall be iustified in the righteousnesse of one man.
 And if any doe think that this condemnation is general:
 let them in lyke maner take the iustification to be gene-
 rall. But that is not true, bycause all men doe not be-
 leue. For euen as by the disobedience of one man, many
 were made sinners: so by the obedience of one man, ma-
 ny shall be made righteous. The Apostle doth here call
 those same, many, that he did before call, all. For many
 haue in sinning soloued the sinne of Adam, but not all:
 and many shall be made righteous, but not all. Death
 therefore hath not raigned ouer them, which haue not
 sinned in lyke sort as Adam did. These be the wordes of
 Ambrose. Which though at the first sight, they seeme to
 incline to the errour of Pelagius: yet when they be well
 weighed, they giue a good and sounde meaning. That is,
 that sinne neuer raigned in any of Gods elect. For al-
 though the elect of God, in as much as they be the childre
 of Adam, be partakers of Adams sinne, and in Adam
 condemned: yet are they by Christe deliuered from that
 condemnation, so that sinne hath in them no domination
 at all: Which thing appeareth in them by the faith in
 Christ, which when they come to knowledge, they doe
 both

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both by wordes and workes declare . That this is the meaning of Ambros, both very plainly appeare, by that he sayth, that all the beleuers shall be iustified. For what needeth iustification, where no condemnation was : Thus much I thought good to write concerning þe simple meaning, of this auncient Father, least any mā of simplicity mistaking his meaning, might think þe he should denie þe Elect to be conceived and borne in originall sinne, from which neuer any that was borne (Christ only excepted) coulde be free. But this is his meaning, that in the Elect and chosen Children of God, this sinne hath no dominion, as it doth appeare by their obedience that they shewe in beleuing the Gospell : but in the Reprobates, it beareth rule still : For Christ hath not killed it in them.

And to make an ende of this matter : Saint Paule sayth thus in his eyght chapter to the Romans . Who shall laye any thing to the charge of Gods Elect : It is God that doth iustifie, who is it that shall condemne : If all mankinde, then, be elected in Christ (as Cerberus sayth) toen shall no sinne be layde to any mans charge. For who dare accuse Gods chosen children : And so shall Cerberus doctrine be the destruction of all vertue, as he hath afore affirmed of the doctrine we teache of Predestination.

As for that which Cerberus citeth out of the seconde chapter of S. Johns first Epistle, & the other places that he sendeth the Reader unto : I doe notwe passe over, as sufficiently answered, by that I haue written concerning S. Paules meaning in the first to the Romans.

Cerberus.

The first of Pelagius errors was, that riche men being baptizd, except they did vterly renounce and forsake their riches, though they seeme to doe some good,

good, yet is it not accepted, neither can they haue the Kingdome of God. A filthy, and an abhominable error, directly repugnant, both to the state of the common wealth, and also to the worde of God, which sayth. Charge them that be riche in this world, that they be not exceeding wyse &c. And that they doe good and be riche in good workes. &c. *1. Timoth. 6.*

The sixt error is, that the grace of God and the helpe of God, is not giue to euery one of our works, but that it is in free choyse, in the lawe, and in doctrine. This error is exceeding wicked and execrable, that mā by the law, by doctrine, and by free choise, is able to doe any maner of good worke, whatsoeuer it be, without the grace and helpe of God. For as S. Paule sayeth, we are not sufficient of our selues, to think any thing, as of our selues: but our ablenesse cometh of God. And againe. It is God that worketh in vs, both the will and the dede, euen of good will. *2. Corinth. 3.* *Phillip. 2.*

The seuenth error is, that the grace of God is giuen according to our deseruing. Vile and abhominable is this error also, and contrary to the manifest minde and words of the Apostle, which sayth. If it be of workes, then is it no more grace, for then were deseruing, no more deseruing. *Roma. 11.*

The eyght error is, that none can be called the children of God, except they be all together made without sinne. This error is lyke wicked with the rest, directly repugnant to the open Scripture, where it is written. If we say we haue no sinne, we deceiue our selues, and the truth is not in vs. For as S. Iames saith of himselfe and of all other. In many things we sinne all. *1. Iohn. 1.* *Iacob. 3.*

Crowley.

In these foure errors, Cerberus can finde nothing to charge vs with all: and therfore he goeth about to get himselfe credite among the simple Christians, by calling these errors, filthy, and abhominable, exceeding wicked and execrable, vile and abhominable, and lyke wycked with the reste. But if a man might come to reason with Cerberus: I thinke it woulde fall out in the ende, that he is not so cleare of the first errour as he would seeme to be, when he calleth it exceeding wicked and execrable. For if he were asked: why feared he to translate Saint Pauls words, according to his meaning, when he saide to the Phillipians. *Deus est qui operatur in vobis & velle & perficere; pro bona voluntate.* What is. It is God, that worketh in you, both the will and the performance thereof, according to his gods will or pleasure. Cerberus can not alway with Gods god will. And therefore he translateth St. Pauls wordes, even of god will. He feareth, by like, that some man woulde conclude, y it is Gods god will, that by such malicious doings, as his is, in growing of his slanderous writings: some of them that be slandered thereby, shoulde take occasion to open hys subtiltie, both in the detestling of these errors, and also in the citing of Scriptures to the contrary of that which is affirmed in them. Which is nothing else, but to blinde the eyes of the simple. But such as haue had to doe with such as he is, do knowe, that as he saith here, that man is not sufficient of himselfe to thinke any thing, so he thinketh, and wyl say if he be bagged, that man hath power of himselfe to withstande the god motions of Gods holy spirit, so that God can not drawe such as he will, but only such as he findeth willing to be drawne. And to auoide the errour of giuing of grace according to merites or deserving, he sayth that it is giuen to all mankind indifferently. Let all men therefore, beware of his subtiltie: for

Phillip. 2.

Rom. 8.

Rom. 8.

Rom. 8.

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he mindeth to discretue.

Cerberus.

The ninth errour is, that there is no free choyse, if a man haue neede of Gods helpe, seing it is in a mans owne will to doe a thing, or not to doe it. This was also the wicked opinion of *Pelagius*: that if it be graunted, that a mā hath neede of Gods helpe: then muste it needes followe (saith *Pelagius*) that he hath no choise in doing of things, but whatsober a man doth, that must he nedes, and cannot choose but do. This is the Deuils only way, aboue all other to leade men to destruction, not to suffer them to walke in the playne path of the Lorde, but to turne them to some extremitie, either on the left hande, or else on the right, either into the blinde path of crooked superstition, or into the wyde way of leude libertie, either to seeke iustification by deseruing of workes, or by an only fayth, not mightie in loue by operation. Such lyke extremitie doth the Deuill vse in this point of Doctrine, either driuing men into the doubting dreames of destenie, or into the absolute freewill of Papistrrie. Either affirming all things so to be ordeyned of God, that whatsoeuer a mā doth, be it good or euill: he muste needes, and can not choose, but of meere necessitie, by the ordinaunce of God, commit the same. Or else affirming, that man by freewill, or naturall strength, can do the wil of God, and walke in his lawe without the continuall helpe and grace of God. Which two extremities, Austen doth very plainly condemne, in these words following.

Libertum sic consuetum arbitrium, ut dicamus nos semper Dei

E.i.

indigere

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indigere auxilio, & tam illos errare qui cum Manichæo dicunt hominem peccatum vitare non posse, quam illos qui cum Ioviniano asserunt, hominem non posse peccare. Augustinus de verbis Apostoli, sermone. 192.

We doe (sayth he) so confesse free choise, that we saye a man hath alwaye neede of the helpe of God. And that as well they erre, which saye with *Manichæus*, that a man can not eschewe sinne, as also they which saye with *Iovinian*, that a man can not commit sinne. Thus sayth *Augustine*.

To conclude therefore, this is numbred among the wicked errorrs of *Pelagius*, that if a man haue free choise, then hath he no neede of the grace or helpe of God, contrarye to the manifest and open Scripture, which sayth by the mouth of S. Paule. I can doe all things, through the helpe of Christ, which strengthneth mee. And *Esdras* saith. They that haue abhorred my lawe, whilst they had yet freedome and open roume of amendement, and conuersion, and vnderstoode not but dispised it: the same must knowe it after death, in paine.

And here, yet once againe, I desire thee to marke who they are, which with *Pelagius* fall into this extremitie to affirme, that if a man haue choise, then hath he no nede of Gods helpe: or if he haue nede of Gods helpe, then hath he no choise at all. And who they are, which on the other side, with *Austē* against *Pelagius*, do affirme and cōfesse: that man so hath freedom or choise, that neuerthelesse, he hath cōtinually, nede of the helpe & grace of God. Who they are, I say, which in this point also, ought worthily to be called *Pelagians*, let all men iudge. The case is so clere, that no lack of knowledge, but onely wilfull blinde-
ness,

*Phillip. 4.
4. Esdr. 9.*

wesse, may helpe to cloke the matter: I will therefore
 passe forward.

Crowley.

Sothe Cerberus thinketh he hath wonne the feld.
 This case is so plaine (sayth he) that no lacke of know-
 ledge may helpe to cloke it, but wilfull blindenesse. And
 what is the case? Sooth that he and his fellows be
 cleared of Pelagian heresie: and I and my fellows pro-
 ues to be of one minde with Pelagius, who sayde that if
 a man haue choise, he needeth not Gods helpe: or if he
 neede it, he hath no choise at all. And where hath Cer-
 berus founde that Pelagius sayde so? Not in the ninth
 Article, written in the 105. Epistle (for there he sayth but
 thus: If our will or choise, haue neede of the help of God
 it is not free: for by free choise, every man hath in his
 owne will, either to doo any thing, or to leaue it undone)
 but he findeth it in the 191. Sermon Descriptiue, that is, of
 the time, not as the wordes or opinion of Pelagius, but
 as the wordes of Manichæus: Here is piete packing.
 To make blinde men beleue, that there is no difference
 betwixte Pelagius opinion in his ninth Article, and he
 that now write and preache of the eternall predestinatio-
 of God: Cerberus bringeth out one of the opinions of
 Manichæus, and saith, that soasmuch as we agree with
 him in that point, and he and his fellows doe not, there-
 fore, we be Pelagians; and he and his company are eni-
 mies to Pelagius and so to. But as Cerberus hath re-
 quested his friends, whome he auertheth: even so must
 I desire thee (gentle Reader) yet once againe to marke
 how Cerberus handleth his matter; that he may seeme
 to purge himselfe with to charge me and others with Pe-
 lagian heresie.

I will not deale with Cerberus, as he hath done with Samuel: for if I would, I might say that he had shamefully helped S. Austen, when he citeth his wordes out of his. 192. Sermon *De verbis Apostoli*, & is, vpon the wordes of the Apostle, whereas saint Austen writeth but. 35. sermons of that title. Perther are the wordes that he citeth found in the. 152. sermon *De tempore*, that is, of the time: but in the. 91. But as I haue promysed before, I will ascribe all such things to the negligence of the printer, although ther be iust cause to ascribe this to Cerberus him selfe. For it appeareth by the copie that came to my handes, that he had read it ouer after it was imprinted, and before it was stricken in the shredes: for he hath mencioned some faultes with his pen; but thys fault certainly vntouched. Wherefore it seemeth that he toke it for no fault at all. And yet of I gather that he neuer read the place in S. Austen him selfe, but had it in some of the patrons of Pelagius error, and had no leysure to seeke it in S. Austens wordes, and therefore mistoke both the title and number. Which if Cerberus might fynde in me, should be a matter of some thing.

Well, to the purpose. Cerberus hath helped both Pelagius and he. For he saith that he affirme, that if man haue choyse, then hath he no neede of Gods helpe; or if he haue neede of Gods helpe, (then hath he no choyse at all. Let vs see the wordes that are written in the Epistle. 106. euon as saint Austen (if that Epistle be his) writeth them in Latyn. *Enon esse liberum arbitrium, si Dei indigemus: si non indigemus, in propria voluntate habeo unusquisque, facere aliquid vel non facere.* Nowe lett vs see howe Cerberus him selfe doth englishe this Latyn. The ninth error (sayth he) is, that there is no free choyse, if a man haue neede of Gods helpe. Being it is in a manys power to do a thing, or not to do it. Nowe how agreeth this with y^e which he chargeth

Pelagius

Pelagius wolthall : Hath Pelagius sayde that man hath
no choyse at all : My can man haue no choyse at all, but
lesse the same be free to do what it listeth : I thinke all
men do see that he chargeth Pelagius weth moze than e-
uer he spake or wrote in this poynt. And as touching the
former part of his Article, which being truly translated,
are thus much. And þe choyse is not free if it haue neede
of Gods helpe. And he is able to speake against this : Un-
derstanding *Libertatem*, or free, to signifie that which is not
vnder the power of any other. And I trowe saint Austen
will say nolesse in the 17. sermon that he wrote *De verbis
Apostoli*, of the wordes of the Apostle. Thus sayth saint
Austen. *Cum dica tibi, sine adiutorio Dei nihil agis, nihil boni
disco. Nam ad mala agendum, habes sine adiutorio Dei, libertatem
voluntatem, quoniam non est illa libertas, et quoniam in quo de-
mitur est, huius est seruus, additum est. Et ceteris qui facit peccata
suum, seruus est peccati. Et si vos filius liberaueritis a uic, veri liberi
eritis.* What is to say. Whether I say vnto thee, that thou
doest nothing without the help of God : I meane, no good
thing. For thou hast a free will to doe euill without the
helpe of God, although the same be not free. For loke of
whom a man is overcome, to þe same is he made a slaue,
and every one that doth commit sinne, is become the ser-
uant of sinne. And if the soune shall make you free, then
shall ye be free in deede.

Nowe if Cerberus wil conclude that Pelagius deni-
eth that man hath any choyse, because he sayth, it is not
free, if it haue neede of Gods helpe : then let him so con-
clude vpon saint Austens wordes in this place. For he
sayth that mans will is not free, no not in doing euill. For
it is subiect vnto sinne, and can not but obey that tyrant.
And shall we thinke then that saint Austen woulde saye
that it is free in doing good : I thinke not. For he hath
sayd that in that which is good, we can do nothing with-

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out Gods helpe.

But least Cerberus shoulde take a newe occasion to calūniate, because saint Austen doth often tymes graunt that he denieth not the freedome of mans will, and so set Austen agaynst Austen : I will in fewe wordes shewe howe both saint Austen and we, do vnderstande mans will, both to be free; and not free.

As mans will is not regenerated, so is it free from h spirit, and bounde to that corruption that entred into all mankinde by the synne of the first man, which corruption saint Paule calleth the lawe of the members, the wisdom of the flesh, the olde man and the flesh, so that it cannot once lift vp it selfe to any thing that is not agreeing to that corruption.

Contrariwise, man that is regenerate, so farre as he is regenerate, hath his will, freed, and set at libertie, fro that corruption, so that it cannot leade him further than the spirit of God will suffer him to goe; so; he is now freed from corruption or sinne, and made the bondman of af spirit, so that he hath now in that regenerated parte, no desire in anye other thing than the lawe of God. As he cannot have anye desire in sinne. But as sainte Paule sayth. As touching my inward man, I haue a desire in the lawe of God. And agayne. Such as are ledde by the spirit of God, are the children of God. They are therefore called spirituall, and newe creatures.

Agayne, as man is a reasonable creature, so is his will called *Arbitrium*, that is, Choyse, and because the same cannot be enforced by any humane or mans power, it is called *Librum*, that is, Free. And so is it *Librum Arbitrium*, Free Choyse. For though man haue power ouer mā to restrain h actions of his will, yet hath he not power to restrain the will it selfe. As for example; Simon, being imprisoned in Egypte, had a will to be with his Father

Rom. 7.

Rom. 8.

Genes. 42.

Father and brethren in the land of Canaan, not with-
 standing that his body was kept in prison and restrained
 of libertie to execute his will. For Joseph had no power
 vpon the wil to turne it, or reſtraine it. But Simeon had,
 yea, he coulde not but haue his will at libertie, notwith-
 ſtanding any thing that Joseph either dyd or coulde de-
 uiſe to doe. For to turne or ſtaye the will of man, is the
 worke of God only. And therefore S. Paule ſayth. I haue
 planted, & Apollo hath watred, but God gaue y increase. *1. Corinth. 3.*
 And S. Auſten ſayth. *Qui plantat, & qui rigat, ſorinſecus ope-*
ratu: qui vero dat incrementu, intrinſecus opitulatur. He that *De verbis*
 planteth, and he that watereth, do worke outwardly: but *Apoſt.*
 he that giueth increaſe, doth help or ſuccour withinſorth. *ſer. 4.*
 And this is not done by any bodily force, but by that in-
 ward drawing that Chriſt ſpeaketh of whẽ he ſayth. No
 man commeth vnto me, excepte my Father drawe him. *Iohn. 6.*
 This drawing is not a forcible drawing: but a wor-
 king of the power of God, whereby the will that ſtrone
 agaynſt, is made ready to follow the drawer. An exam-
 ple wherof we haue in Paule. Who willing to goe to *Act. 9.*
 Damasco to perſecute Chriſtians, is vpo a ſodaine made
 willing to preach Chriſt. This was not wrought by the
 ſtriking him downe to the grounde (ſo: then ſhoulde the
 lyke haue bene wrought in the Ietwes that came to take
 Chriſt, ſo: when he ſayde, I am, they al fel to the ground) *Iohn. 18.*
 but it was wrought within by the power of the ſpिरितe.
 Saint Auguſtine therefore, ſayth very well. *Qui ſecit te*
ſine te, non te iuſtificat ſine te: Ergo ſecit neſcientem, iuſtificat
volentem. He that made thee without thee, doth not iuſti-
 fie thee without thee, therefore he made thee, when thou
 kneweſt not: but he doth iuſtifie thee being willing.
 So this doe the wordes of Saint Paule agree when
 he ſayeth. *Deus eſt qui operatur in vobis & velle, & operari.* *Phil. 2.*
 It is God that worketh in you both the will and the
 worke

spoke that is according to the will. But first the will, for that before we follow the will, we are by the same will made willing to follow. Thus doth S. Austen, and so doe we (that Cerberus barketh so at) understand the will of man to be free.

De verbis

Apost.

Scy. II.

To conclude this matter and to see what mans free will is able to doe: see what S. Austen sayeth, *Creatus est primus homo in natura sine culpa, in natura sine vitio, creatus est rectus, et se fecit rectus. Quid se autem ipse fecerit, notum est. Cadens e manu Figuli, fractus est. Regbat enim eum ipse qui fecerat, voluit deserere a quo factus erat, permisit Deus tanquam dicens. Deseruit me, et inueniat se, et miseria sua probet, quia nihil potest sine me. Hoc modo ergo offidere voluit Deus homini, quid valeat liberum arbitrium sine Deo.* The first man was created in nature without blame, in nature without fault, he was created by right, he did not make himselfe byright. It is knowne what he made himselfe. Falling out of the hande of the Potter, he was broken. For he made him did governe him, but he was willing to forsake him that had made him. And God suffered him so to doe, as it were saying thus. Let him forsake me, that he maye finde himselfe, and that he maye by his miserie proue, that without me he can doe nothing. By this meane therfore would God shewe vnto man: what free will is able to doe without God. This maye suffice to as many as will be satisfied. But I feare me that Cerberus and his felowes are none of them.

By this it appeareth that we runne not into the extremities as Cerberus saith we doe. For we neither teache fatall destinie, nor popeshe will libertie, but we affirme that man hath a choyse, and that in some meaning the same is free, and yet not without standing, Gods so knowledge, predestination, and election, to be infallible. As shall more plainly appeare when I shall come to the place

place wherein I am by Cerberus charged with the setting forth of such a doctrine as is worthily misliked of many.

In the meane while I must say something of y^e where in I with others be charged and playnely affirmed to be Pelagiās. And that it may appeare whether we be so or no: it shall be needefull that we set downe the opinion of Pelagius, as we finde it written by S. Austen in a booke of more authozitie than is that Epistle that Cerberus buildeth vpon.

Saint Austen being requested by one named *Quodvult Deus*, to write a Cataloge of heresies: he satisfieth his request. And thus he writeth of Pelagius heresie. *Pelagianorum est heresis hoc tempore omnium recentissima, à Pelagio Monacho exorta. &c.* At this time (sayth he) there is the heresie of the Pelagians, which is the newest of all, and sprang out of one Pelagius, a Monk. Which maister one Celestius did in such sorte followe, that their followers are also called Celestines. These men are such enemies to the grace of God (whereby we are predestinated to be adopted or chosen to be his children through Iesus Christ, and whereby we are deliuered from the power of darkness, that we may beleue in him, and be translated into his kingdome, for which cause he sayd: No man cometh vnto me except it be giuen vnto him of my Father: and whereby, Charitie is poured out in our hearts, that sayth may worke by loue) that they beleue, that man is able without it, to do all the commaundements of God, where as if that were true, it might seeme that the Lord had in vaine sayde, *Sine me nihil potestis facere.* Without me, you can do nothing.

Whether we be of this mind with Pelagius or no: let all the world that seeth our writings or heareth our doctrine, iudge. Or whether Cerberus and his fellows be

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like to be of this minde, which finde fault with our doctrine, because we teach that there is an elected and chosen number to whome God hath giuen sayth, and hath poured out lone in their hearts, so that they maye come vnto Christ, and by their works of obedience to Gods will, shew forth the liuely sayth in Christ, that in their election they haue receiued freely at Gods hand.

Let all the worlde, I say, iudge betwixte vs. We say that there is a certayne chosen number, which in mercy are chosen to be the children of God, images of the sonne of God Iesus Christ, and inheritoures of his kingdome. And that none can be of this number, but those onely to whome it is giuen freely without any maner deservings, eyther past, present, or to come. And that they being thus chosen & predestinated, must alwayes acknowledge, that it is God that worketh in them, and that of them selues they are not able so much as to think a good thought. And yet assure them selues, that Hell gates can not preuaile agaynst them, that is, that the power of the Diuell shall not be able to hurte them. And that though they be still soze assaulted, and sometimes soze wounded: yet they shal neuer be overcome, but shal overcome in Christ, and triumph with him in immortalitie for ever.

But Cerberus and his company, say that al mankind is elected, and that there is no reprobation at all, and consequently, no election. For if there be none refused, then is there none election, but a generall acceptation. And this their election they say is so uncertayne, that no man can thereby be certaine of his saluation, but al men must still remayne in doubt of damnation by sinne, whereas S. Paule hath sayde, that there is no damnation to them that be grafted into Christ. And Christ himself saith, that it is not possible that the elected soze shoulde be seduced. They say also that the power of mans free will is to receiue

Rom. 8.

Math. 24.

ceine or refuse the grace of God which is indifferently offered vnto al. Which if it be true, then must he be able also of himselfe to do that God commaundeth, which is the playne error of Pelagius. Well, I leaue these two opinions to the iudgement of the reader, to consider which of them is most like to be that which Pelagius helde.

But to giue a little more light to the Reader, I will note one sentence more out of that that S. Austen writteth concerning the heresie of Pelagius. *Illam vero gratiam Dei, sine qua nihil boni possumus facere, non esse dicunt nisi in libero arbitrio, quod nullis suis precedentibus meritis, ab illo accipit nostra natura, ad hoc tantum ipso adiuuante per suam legem atq; doctrinam, ut discamus, quae facere, & quae sperare debemus. Nos autem ad hoc per donum spiritus sancti, ut quae didicerimus esse facienda faciamus.* What is. They say (sayth Austen) that the grace of God, without which we are able to do no good thing, is not otherwise than in Freewill, which our nature hath receiued of him, not by any desertings that was in the same before, he only helping vs herebto by his law and doctrine, that we may learne what we ought to do, and what to hope for. But we say to this, that through the gift of the holy Ghost, we may do those things that we haue learned to be meete to be done. Here it is playne, that Pelagius maketh the grace of God nothing else but an helpe to the Freewill of man. Whether Cerberus and his fellows do so too, or not, let the iudge that reade his wordes that are written in his aunswere to this letter, and do weygh them with indifferent mindes.

Now as touching that place that Cerberus citeth out of the sermon *De tempore*, that is of the time. 191. Although I knowe what Austen himselfe writteth of all his Epistles and his sermons, saying that he had not perused or retracted the when he set forth his two booke of Retractions, neither doeth it appeare in any of his writings,

*Retract. 2.
in fine.*

J. ij.

that

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Vide. Lib. 2.
De pecc. me-
ritis & re-
miss. Cap. 6. 7.

that euer he did retract them: Yet I will not relecte it as none of Austens wordes, for the doctrine is sound if it be rightly vnderstande. It is possible for man by the power of God to be preserved from Actuall sinne, although he can neuer be without the sinne of concupiscence so long as he liueth in mortall flesh. So is it possible also, yea it can not be chosen, but vnlesse God doe by his grace staye man, he shall commit Actuall sinne after his regeneration, and of him self man is not able to stay him self from it. But what make Austens wordes against vs? We confesse with Austen, that man hath alwayes neede of Gods helpe, and we say with the same Austen, that they do erre, which say that man can not auoyde sinne, but yet as I haue sayd before, being stayed by the power of God. For other wise these wordes of Austen should be contrary to his owne wordes in his 13. sermon *De verbis Apostoli*, Of the wordes of the Apostle. Where he sayeth thus. *In hoc agone cum confregistis, Deum habemus spectatorem, in hoc agone cum laboramus, Deum poscimus adiutorem. Si enim nos ipse non adiuuat, non dico vincere, sed nec pugnare poterimus.* What is. When we fight in this battayle, we haue God to be holde and loke vpon vs, when we are in daunger in this battayle, we do pray vnto God to helpe vs. But if he do not helpe vs, I say not that we shall not ouercome, but that we shall not be able so much as to fight.

We will not therefore set Austen against him self, but take that meaning of his wordes in one place, that may agree with his wordes in another place. And so are we with Austen, and not against him, as Cerberus layeth to our charge. Nayther do we holde with Pelagius in any vnt ruth, but if he do in any point confesse truth, then do we agree with him, although S. Austen shoulde say to the contrary. Aske better vpon your conclusion therefore (good master Cerberus) and learne to apply Scriptures

tures better than you haue applied the words of S. Paul to the Philippians, else men will say ye vnderstand not S. Paule, for S. Paule doth not there goe about to ascribe any thing to the power of his owne Freewill: but altogether to set forth the exceeding great mercy of God towards him who did stay him from falling both in aduersitie and in wealth. As it may well appeare to al that will with iudgement reade the place.

Phil. 4.

Your sentence also cyted out of Edozas: you shoulde knowe it not to be of such authoritie, that it might serue in the triall of such a cause as this is. But graunt it were of the greatest authoritie. What can it make against vs which deny not that man hath a choyse which in some sort is free (as I haue declared) but do cōfesse that man which despiseth the warnings and long sufferings of God in this life, shall after this life, in paynes learne to vnderstand what they did then. But proceeds as you saye you would.

4. Esdr. 4.

Cerberus.

There followeth the tenth, and the eleauenth errours, which are these: That our victorie cometh not of Gods helpe, but of free choyse, and that remission of sinnes is not giuen to the that repent, according to the grace and mercy of God, but according to the deseruing and labor of them, which by repentaunce are worthy of Gods mercy. O blasphemie intollerable, O filthy puddle, and sincke moste execrable: full of stinking errours, full of damnable presumption, like to the pride of Lucifer moste abominable: the detestable vilenesse whereof is such, that rather by exclamation, I haue thought it good to renouce it, than with Scripture of reason to confute it.

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fute it. All reason, and all Scripture, gyueth all glory vnto God. And this blasphemous error, taketh away all the glorye of al goodnesse, from the father of all mercy, and God of al consolation, and gyueth it vnto vile and wretched man, which hath of him selfe nothing that is good, but doeth altogether receiue it from the mercy and goodnesse of God. Here concludeth Austen wyth the errours of *Pelagius*, and sayth, that all these errours he reuoked, or renounced in the generall Counsell of Palestine.

Crowley.

I haue not swozne to finde faulte with all that Cerberus sayeth in this his aunswere, as it may seme that he hath, to reprove and depaue, all that I and other that haue, or do write or speake of Gods predestination, do or haue affirmed. I will therefore ioyne with Cerberus in this detesting and renouicing of these *Pelagian* errours, as one that doth abhorre them no lesse than he doth. And bicause man can see no further than these things that be outward: I do with all mine heart wish that he would make it knowen vnto men by such meanes as maye be most to his glorie: whether wee, or Cerberus and his followers do in y heart detest and abhorre these errors most. I will not enter into iudgement: but there is cause to suspect that Cerberus and his sorte be not so cleare, as by these wordes they would seme to be. But let God be Judge.

Cerberus.

Thus haue I set forth in Englyshe these errours of *Pelagius* together, that thou which art willing to knowe

knowe the truth, and vnderstande the matter euen as it is, mayest be able to iudge, who they are that holde of any of these errors, and not to credit the malice of certaine, whych to cloke their owne false opinions, accuse other to be Pelagians, who in dede, from their veric heart and soule, abhor all these wicked opinions, and haue bene manye yeares willing to bestow their lyues against all these abhominable errors.

Yet is there one thing whervnto *Pelagius* was compelled to subscribe, whiche I haue not rehearsed among the errors afore sayde, bicause the denial therof, is of all our Gospellers (as I suppose) receyued for no error. The Article is this. *Quod Infantes non baptizati, non solum regnum celorum, verum etiam vitam eternam habere non possint.* Herevnto did *Pelagius* subscribe. That infantes whiche are not baptised, can not haue the Kingdome of God nor eternall lyfe. Which cruel opinion, that all vn baptised children are damned, Austen in manye places of hys workes doth boldly and vehemently mayntayne. But *Caluin* sayth, *Explodendum esse illorum glossam palam est; qui oēs non baptizatos, eterne morti adiudicant.* It is cleare (sayth he) that theyr glose is worthy wyth hissing or clapping of handes, to be driuen out of the dores: which condemne vnto cuerlasting death, all those, whych are not baptised, & bicause *Caluin* is with so many of vs, whych are Gospellers, in auctoritie fully sufficient to encounter with Austen: I thynke it good (for shortnesse) in this article to say no further.

Crowley.

Cerberus, minding to enter into that which he promi-
sed

sed before (that is to shewe what part of our doctrine he misliketh) doeth conclude with his friende to whome he seemeth to write this aunswere : as though he being willing to knowe the truth, and vnderstande the matter, coulde no more giue credit to anye that writeth or speaketh contrary to that which he hath here written. Whose doyngs therein, it pleaseth him to terme malice, and the accusing of such as are of sound beliefe, that thereby they may cloke their owne false opinions.

But if it shall please that friend of his (if any such be) as Cerberus himselfe, to reade this my simple Apologie with indifferent mindes : it maye be that they will be of another minde then Cerberus both in thys aunswere shewe himselfe to be, vnderstanding that oure doyngs are neither malicious, nor yet the cloakings of anye false opinions; but the true trauaile of them that seke the glory of God, and the saluation of his people, by the setting forth of the truth of his eternall and euermlasting Benediction ! Let God giue the increase at hys good wyll and pleasure.

Yet one thing he woulde not seme to haue forgotten, but rather of purpose to haue deferred to thys place, that he might not seme to agree with Pelagius in any point that might seme to be erroneous. For he hath said before. Here concludeth Austen with the errours of Pelagius. Subtillge handled of Cerberus. For though he consent to that which Pelagius hath by his subscription confirmed : yet he agreeth not with Pelagius in his error, for he was enforced thus to subscribe, & did afterwarde returne to his olde errours againe, as Dr. Austen affirmeth in his Cataloge of heresies. And if he denye it, yet consenteth he not to Pelagius error : but to Iohn Calvin, and vs Gospellers, and to make vs beleue that he is one of vs in this point : he calleth that a cruel opinion that

that Pelagius was constrained to subscribe vnto, that is, that Infantes which are not baptised can not haue the kingdome of God, no; eternall lyfe. And to knyt vp the knot withall, he setteth Iohn Caluin against S. Austen, affirming, that for as muche as in the opinion of verie many of vs Gospellers (for now Cerberus is one of vs) Iohn Caluin is in authoritie fully able to encounter with S. Austen: he will for shortnesse sake, say no further of this article. I woulde I had none occasion here to thinke y Cerberus bleth a figure, which learned men cal *Ironia*. For what a frumpe is this: That Caluin is in authoritie fully sufficient, to encounter with Austen. Surely Cerberus may be a Gospeller, as he tearmeth him selfe: but no Papist could deuise to giue a more kindly mocke to Caluin & vs Gospellers, than this is. For who knoweth not, that the authoritie of wyrters, is iudged to stande chiefly in the auncientnesse of their wytings, and then there is no comparison to be made betwixt Caluin and S. Augustine, who liued .x. hundred yere & more before this day. And Caluins modestie was neuer so little, as to compare him selfe with Austen, but in all his wytings he doth reuerence the iudgement of that learned Father, and doeth alledge his authoritie in confirming of truthes, so far forth as the same doth not dissent from truth. And Austen neuer desired to haue hys iudgement in matters to be other wise receiued, than the same should be found to be sound, & according to the Scriptures. As appeareth in his .7. Epistle, and in the Proeme of his thirde booke *De Trinitate*. Of the Trinitie. Whose wordes concerning this matter, being many, it shall suffice to note this short sentence, *Noli meis litteris quasi Scripturis canonicis inservire, sed in illis, & quod non credebas eum inuenire, incunctanter crede: in istis autem, quod certum non habebas, nisi certum intellexeris, noli summiter retinere.* That is. Be not bounde vnto my
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writings, as vnto the Canonical Scriptures: but when thou shalt finde in the Scriptures that whiche thou didst not beleue, beleue it without any delay or doubting: but when thou findest that in my writings, which thou didst not know certainly before, except thou shalt certainly vnderstand it, do not stiffely affirme it.

I am sure that Iohn Calvin did alwayes obserue this rule in reading S. Austens workes. And if he were no we lining woulde giue Cerberus the hire of a mocking varasite, thus to set him against S. Austen. Yea, it might haue becormmed Cerberus very well, either to haue bene shorzer, and haue written no worde of this matter: or else to haue vttered his iudgement of this article, in suche sorte that the reader might haue vnderstand thereby the truth of the article, and holwe Calvin & we that be Gospellers do hold this article, not setting our selues against S. Austen, but for gods cause dissenting in Iudgement, both from Pelagius and Austen. And yet hauing a reuerend opinion of the one, do detest and abhorre the errour of the other.

Well, I maye not be so shorze in this matter as Cerberus is, but I thinke it my dutie, hauing this occasion, to do what shall lie in me, to let the reader vnderstande that S. Austen is not so much to be blamed for this cruell opinion, as Cerberus woulde haue men to thinke that Iohn Calvin doth reckon him to be. Neither doth I woorthe instrument of Gods mind to make the name of Austen odious to the Christian reader, as it seemeth that Cerberus would make the names of both those men of God.

Marke therefore, gentle reader, what might cause Austen some thing to swarue from the truth in thys article. He had to do with suche a one as denied Infantes to be spotted with Adams sinne, and that therefore they needed no regeneration, and so consequently no sacrament of re-
genera:

generation. The abomination of this error caused Austen to lye so far on the other side, that he had not such a consideration of the promise of God, as he shoulde haue had. And so affirmed more than once, that al that dye without baptisme must nedes be damned. Let vs be contented that God hath by this error shewed Saint Austen to bee a man. And let vs giue him thanks for the abundance of god doctrine that this man hath leste in writing, not doubting, but that that mercifull Lorde whom he serued, woulde not suffer him to ende his life in that error (no more than he dyd in the Manicheis heresie, which he did sometime stoutly defende) althoughe it haue not pleased him to suffer it to appeare in writing, that euer he did acknowledge it to be an error.

As touching the opinion, that Calvin and we Gospellers do holde concerning Infantes that die without baptisme: it differeth something from Austen, but more from Pelagius. Iea, we doe as muche abhorre the error of Pelagius, as Austen did. For we affirme, and are able by the Scriptures to proue, that al Adams natural childzen are deade throughe Adams sinne, and that none of them can be quickened and reuiued againe, other wise than by Christ. And that so many as are not giuen vnto Christ, do stil remain in that sinne, and cannot be saued. So far off are we from this Pelagian heresie.

So we that it maye appeare howe we differ from St. Austen: I will cite some matter out of the workes of maister Iohn Calvin. Not as Cerberus doth, to set him directly against Austen, but to shewe how God hath revealed vnto hys seruant Iohn Calvin, that secret that he had not reuealed vnto his seruant Austen so fully: so far forth as we can finde written in his booke. First, we reade in the booke of maister Iohn Caluins Institutions in the title of Pedobaptisme or baptising of Chyl dren,

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these wordes folowing. Sed omisso canilio, tenenda simplex est interpretatio quam attuli: neminem, donec renouatus fuerit aqua viva, hoc est spiritus, posse ingredi in Regnum Dei. Iam est ex eo, explodendum: esse eorum commentum palam est: qui omnes non baptizatos, eterna morti adiudicant. That is. But, all subtilties set a side, the simple interpretation that I haue made, must be holden, that is: that none can enter into the kingdom of God, til he be renewed by liuely water, that is, the holy ghost. Now therfore, euen hercof it is manifest, that the false opinion o: fantasie of them that condemne to eternall death, all that be not baptised, is to be bypnen out with hissing and clapping of handes.

Againe, the same Caluin sayth in his Comment bp: on the fift Chapter to the Romanes. *Ut misera peccato hereditate potiaris, satis est esse hominem, residet enim in carne & sanguine. Ut Christi iustitia fruaris, fidelem esse necessarium est, quia fide acquiritur eius consortium. Infantibus peculiari ratione communicatur. Habent enim in fidei adoptionis, quo in Christi communionem cooptantur. De piorum liberis loquor, ad quos promissa gratia dirigitur. Nam alij a communi sorte nequaquam eximuntur.* That is. To enioy the miserable inheritaunce of Sinne: it is enough to be a man: for it dwilleth in flesh and blood. But to enioy the righteousnesse of Christ, it is required of necessity, that a man be faithfull. For the company o: felowship of Christ is obtained by faith. As Infants, it is after a certaine peculiar manner communicated. For they haue in the covenant, the right of adoption, wherby they are adopted into the communion of Christ. I speake of the chyldren of the goble, vnto whom the promise of mercie is directed. For others are not deliuered from that lot, that is common to all men.

By these wordes of Caluin, it appeareth how we differ from Augustine, for we are of one minde with Caluin, who denieth not, that the chyldren of the vnfaythfull that

that dye without baptisme, do remaine in the same state
 that the sinne of the firste man brought all mankind
 into. We differ therfore, only in that we affirme that the
 children of the godlye doe appertaine. to the covenant of
 God, and therefore do not perishe though they be preuen-
 ted by death. Will better Auster continued to the ende in
 that minde. that he sheweth him selfe in certaine of his
 writings concerning this matter: it is vncertaine, for in
 his Retractions there is no mention thereof. But if he
 did, this onely is the difference betwixt him & vs, that we
 ascribe that to the couenāt, promise, and election of God,
 that he ascribeth to þ sacraments. And as it appeareth in
 his 3. booke of questions vpon the olde Testament, he him
 selfe teacheth the same doctrine that we doe. His wordes
 be these, in the 34. Question. *Primum colligitur, inuisibilem
 sanctificationem quibusdam adfuisse, et profuisse, sine visibili-
 bus sacramentis, quae propter inuicem sitae non esse sumi, et al-
 lia tunc fuerint, et alia modo sint: V. visibilem vero sanctificationem,
 quae fit per visibilia sacramenta, sine illa inuisibili posse
 adfuisse, non posse proficere. Nec tamen ideo sacramentum contemnen-
 dum est: nam contemporaneo, inuisibiliter, sanctificari nulla
 modo potest. Hinc est quod Cornelius etc.* What is to say. We
 do therfore gather, that certaine men haue had the inuisi-
 ble sanctification, and haue bene benefited thereby, with-
 out the visible sacramentes; which are according to the
 diuersitie of the time chaunged, so that then they were of
 one sort and now of another: And that the visible sanc-
 tification, which should be wrought by the visible sacra-
 mentes, maye be present without this that is inuisible,
 but can not be profitable without it. And yet in that the
 sacrament therfore to be contemned: for he that contem-
 neth it, can by no meanes be made holy inuisibly. Whereof
 it came, that Cornelius and those that were with him,
 when they were perceyued, to be inuisibly sanctified by

August. lib. 3
 Quest. rec.
 test. Quest. 84

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the holpe Ghost that was poured into them, were not
withstanding baptised. &c.

*Retraſat.
lib. 2. cap. 55.*

Theſe words of D. Auſten, do plainly declare of what
minde he was when he wrote theſe queſtions. And theſe
booke of queſtions, with the reſt, he hath retracted and
peruſed againe, allowing this ſentence of his therein as it
appeareth in the 55. chapter of his ſecond booke of Retra-
tations. Cerberus hath no cauſe therefore, to ſet Iohn Cal-
uin againſt Auſten, for we take that to be vndoubtedly
the doctrine of Auſten, which we finde in his Retra-
tations, and not renoked.

But Cerberus purpoſe was, craftily to cauſe all that
would hearken vnto him, to eſteeme both Caluin & vs, as
moſt arrogant hereticks, that wyl not ſticke to compare
one of our time with that auncient Father, and to accept
his iudgement, without either reaſon or learning, direct-
ly againſt the iudgement of him, whom al the Church of
Chriſt hath theſe many hundred yeres, with thyſe reueren-
ces: For who ſeeth not, that Cerberus can not be one of
theſe Goſpellers that do account Caluin to be fully ſuffi-
cient in authoritie to encounter with Auſten: ſith he writ-
teth ſo bitterly againſt all the that either write or preach
that, that Caluin hath in writing moſt evidently proued
and defended. And he ſhall ſaith Auſten againſt Caluins
doctrine, and woulde ſeeme thereby, to triumphe over him
and all that be of his minde.

As for the place that he getteth out of Caluin, I leaue
for Cerberus to ſeke out at his leſſure, and when he hath
founde it, to note wherein it may be founde. But I beleue
it will be hard for him to find in Caluines workes, that
ſentence in thoſe wordes.

Cerberus.

There

There remaineth then, as before I promised, briefly to note those thyngs, which I thinke worthy to be reprov'd, about the doctrine of Predestination, as it is now a dayes taught of many. Wherin least I should seme to speake without assured ground, and because wordes in preaching, in talke, or disputation (whereof I haue heard great abundance in thys matter) may rashly passe with small aduisement, and eyther easely be denied or soone forgotten: I am determined to touch nothyng but their very wordes, whych are set forth in Print. And because the taking and aunsweryng of their whole bookes were a matter long and tedious, being commonlye stuffed on the one side, wyth an heape of opprobrious and outragious wordes against such priuate persons as they take in hand to write agaynst: and on the other side filled, rather wyth obscure subtelties, than wyth plaine affirmatiōs, I haue thought it best therefore, to take certayne sentences whych contayne manifest affirmatiōs, out of diuers late printed Englyshe bookes, wherein the summe and effect of this doctrine (which manye doe for iust cause mislike, is fully, plainely, and simplye declared.

Crowley.

Polve Cerberus beginneth to growe to the performance of his promise, in noting those things in the doctrine of predestinatiō now preached, as seme to him mete to be reprov'd. And by the way, he will not taunt vs, but thus he sayth, that in preaching, talking, and reasoning, wordes may passe vs rashly and with small aduisement, and be either easely denied, or soone forgotten: Therefore he will touche nothyng but that which we haue written
and

and set forth in print. Well, contented, but yet I would Cerberus should knowe that we neither preache, talke, nor dispute with such rashnesse or small aduisement, but that we are able; and witt, by Gods helpe, stande to all that we haue spoken therein, and he is able to charge vs withall. As for the outragious wordes that we vse towards them that we write against, shalbe found modest enough, when they shalbe compared with the wordes that in this bps answer he bleth towards vs. Let him therefore procede in noting those things that he misliketh.

Cerberus.

I reade in an Englyshe booke set forth by Robert Crowley, and entituled, the confutation of. xiii. Articles. &c. these wordes. Adam therefore, beyng so perfect a creature, that there was in him no lust to sinne, and yet so weake, that of himselfe he was not able to withstand the assault of the subtile serpent: no remedye, the onely cause of his fall, must nedes be the predestination of God.

Thou seest, dearly beloved, in the conclusion of this sentence one point declared, wherein the controuersie doth consist. For where he plainely affirmeth, that Gods predestination is the onely cause of Adams fall, which is the fountayne of all sinne: other hauing a much more reuerend opinion of God and of hys holyc predestination, do set their fore, or rather their heart and soule, agaynst their sayd conclusion. Esteemyng it far better to be torne in manye thousande piieces, than to thynke or say, that Gods fore-ordinance or predestination, is the cause of any fiare or euil. I beseech thee, let not thine eies be blinded, or thy minde muffled wyth malice, cyther agaynst the
one

one partie or the other, but in the ballace of vpright iudgement, waye the difference. The one sayth (as in this conclusion manifestlye appeareth, and as afterwarde, yet more plainly he affirmeth) that the predestination of God, is the onely cause of Adams sinne, and so consequently of all euill. The other affirmeth directly contrary. That God or his predestination, is the cause of no sinne or euill, but the only cause of all goodnesse and vertue. And herewyth agreeth the holyc and diuine Apostle Saint Iohn in hys Epistle saying. All that is in the worlde, as the concupiscence of the fleshe, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father. Al good things that are in the worlde, are no doubt of God our heauenly Father: but whatsoeuer in the worlde, is concupiscence, lust, sinne, euill or wickednesse, the same is not of God our heauenlye Father: S. Iohn doeth plainly and precisely affirme. The lyke playnenesse vseth also the holyc man Iesus the sonne of Sirach, in these wordes. Say not thou it is the Lordes fault, that I am gone by, for thou shalt not doe the thing that God hateth; saye not thou, he hath caused me to go wrong, for he hath no neede of the vngodlye. The verye same thing is plainly declared, in these Scriptures folowyng, and in other places almost innumerable. Psal. 5. Pro. 19. Ieremie. 7. & 19. Osee. 13. Iob. 34. & 35. Rom. 7. 1. Corin. 14. Iacob. 1. Exod. 34. Deut. 5. 2. Reg. 14. Psal. 81. & 144. Prou. 1. Sap. 1. & 2. 11. 12. 15. Ecclel. 2. & 18. Esay. 7. & 30. 55. & 65. Lament Iere. 3. Ezech. 18. 24. & 33. Ioel. 2. 4. Eldr. 1. 2. 7. & 8. Math. 23. Act. 17. 1. Timoth. 2. & 4. 2. Pet. 3. The same sayth Austen also plainly in these wordes. *Non ergo casus ruentium, nec malignitas iniquorum, nec cupiditates peccantium, predestinatio Dei, aut exitus aut suasis, aut impulsus:*

H.i.

sed

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sed plane predestinavit iudicium suum, quo unicuique retributurum est pro ut gessit siue bonum, siue malum, quod iudicium futurum non esset: si homines Dei voluntate peccarent. Neither the fall of them that fall, nor the wickednesse of them that be wicked, nor the luste of them that offende, hath the predestination of God, eyther prouoked, moued or compelled, but without doubt he hath foreordained his iudgement, wherby he will recompence euerye man, according as he hath done, whether it be good or euill, the whiche shoulde be no iudgement, if men did sinne by the will of God.

Crowley.

I do acknowledge that this English booke, that Cerberus saith he hath read, was of my writing. I acknowledge also, that Cerberus hath cited the wordes truely, euen as I wrote them. But that I ment by them as Cerberus doth conclude vpon them: I utterly deny. For he concludeth that I haue affirmed, that Gods predestination is the onely cause of all euill. Whiche I neuer ment to teache, neither do my wordes, duely considered, giue any occasion of such conclusion.

I graunt, my wordes might haue bene more explained, and my meaning set forth more at large, and all occasions of such calumniation cut off, if I had sene that before I wrote that booke, whiche I thanke my Lord God, I haue sene since. Wherfore I minde by the help of God to do that now, if I was not so well able to do then, that the Reader may perceiue, that I haue with Austen profited in writing. My wordes that Cerberus citeth, are these. Adam therefore, being so perfect a creature, that there was in him no lust to sinne, and yet so weak, that of him selfe he was not able to withstande the assault of the subtile

*August. prol.
lib. Retract.*

tile serpent : no remedie, the only cause of his fall, must nedes be the predestination of God. Cerberus findeth no fault with any of these wordes, till he cometh to no remedie. And then no remedie, I must be condemned as one that affirmeth Gods Predestination to be the onely cause of Adams sinne, and so consequentye of all sinne. But I haue not saide that Gods predestination was the onely cause, or anye cause of Adams sinne. By wordes be that Gods Predestination is the onely cause of Adams fall. Holwe Cerberus can not see holwe Adams fall may be god, and therefore he sayeth that it is the fountaine of all sinne, and that to be the cause of that fall, is to be the cause of all sinne. But suche as haue eyes to see, do see, that as Gods predestination is the cause of Adams fall : so Adams fall is god. For it is the meane whereby God hath shut vp all vnder unbeliefe, that he might haue mercede on all. And the meane whereby the Scripture shutteth vp all vnder sinne, that the promise which is of the faith of Iesus Christ, might be giuen to the faithfull.

Rom. xi.

Galath. 3.

I write therefore now, as I wrote before in my Confutation of Shaxtons Articles : that for asmuch as there was in Adam nothing to moue him to sinne (for lust to do contrarie to Gods will, was not yet entred into him) & Satan the enemy had no power then, neither hath anye power yet, ouer anye creature of God, further than God doth limit and appoint him : it must nedes followe, that the only cause that Adam was assaulted & ouerthowen by Satan, was the predestination of God, which is ouer all one with his vnsearchable will & counsell. The fall of Adam thus considered, neyther is, nor can be counted sinne : for it is the performance of Gods purpose, which is euer god, although vnsearchable by mans feble vnderstanding. And yet I do not denie Adams fall to be sinne

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in Adam himself: for it was *Factum contra mandatum Dei*. And
 dede done contrary to the commaundement of God. And so
 it had a cause in Adam himselfe, which was the power of
 his will, whereby he consented to the enticement of Satan,
 who used the woman as his instrument therein. Of this
 will and the power thereof, Saint Austen writeth thus:
De libero arbitrio, lib. 3. Cap. 18. Cum autem de libera voluntate
recte facienda loquimur: de illa scilicet in qua homo factus est, lo-
quimur. When we speak of the will that is free to do well,
 we speak of that will wherein man was made. And a-
 gaine in his booke *De natura & gratia, Capite. 43.* speaking of
 man, he saith. *Quis enim eum nescit, sanum & inculpabilem*
factum, & libero arbitrio, atq; ad iuste viuendum libera potestate
constitutum? Who knoweth not that man was made
 sound & blameable, and that he was ordeined with free
 shoyse, and free power or libertie to liue righteously: And
 againe in his booke *De Correctione & gratia, Cap. 11.* *Istam gra-*
tiam non habuit homo primus, quia nunquam vellet esse malus: sed
sanus habuit in qua si permanere vellet, nunquam malus esset, &
sine qua etiam cum libero arbitrio, bonus esse non posset, sed cum
tamen per liberum arbitrium deserere posset. Nec ipsum ergo Deus
esse voluit sine sua gratia, quæ reliquit in suo libero arbitrio: quo-
niam liberum arbitrium ad malum sufficit, ad bonum autem ni-
hil est, nisi adiungetur ab omnipotenti homo: quod adiutorium si
homo ille per liberum non deseruisset arbitrium, semper esset bo-
nus: sed deseruit & desertus est. Tale quippe erat adiutorium quod
desereret cum vellet, & in quo permaneret si vellet, non quo fieret et
vellet. The firste man had not this grace, whereby he
 shoulde neuer be willing to be euill: but yet he had that
 grace, whereby he might haue bene alwayes preserved
 from euill, if he would haue continued therein, and withy-
 out which also he could not by free will, be good, but yet
 he was able by free will to forsake it. God therefore would
 not haue him to be without his grace, wh^{ch} he had left in
 his

his owne free will. For free will is able enough to do euill, but to do good it hath no power at al, except it be holpe by the almightie goodnesse: which helpe, if that man had not by free will forsaken, he shoulde haue bene good for ever, but he did forsake, and was forsaken. For the helpe was such, that he might forsake it when he woulde, and suche wher in he might remaine if he woulde, not such whereby it might come to passe that he should be willing.

By these places of S. Austen, we maye see of what minde he was concerning the free will of man before his fall. It was suche that he mighte consent to what he woulde. But the grace to be willing to consent to nothing but that which was good, was not giuen vnto man, that man might haue experience of the power of his owne will, and so for ever after ascribe al the glorie to him that worketh all in all.

The cause of Adams fall therfore, euen by the iudgement of S. Austen (of whome Cerberus maketh suche boast) was not in himself: For God had fore appoynted, that by that meanes man should haue experience of hymselfe, and so learne to trust in one stronger than hymselfe. But the cause that made his fall sinne, was in himselfe. For he did willingly consent to the perswasion of his wife, who also had in like maner consented to the perswasion of the Serpent.

If Cerberus could consider the fall of the first man after this sort: he would neuer conclude, that teaching that the Predestination of God was the onely cause of mans fall, shoulde withall conclude, that it is the onely cause of all sinne and euill. For I do not teache that it is the cause of any euill or sinne at all.

In vaine therfore, doeth Cerberus make his Antithesis, or comparison of contraries, when he sayth. The one affirmeth that the Predestination of God is the onely cause

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cause of Adams sinne, and so consequentl^ye of all euill: And the other affirmeth directly contrary, that God o^r his Predestination is the cause of no sinne o^r euil. And much moze baine is it, that he citeth so man^ye testimonies of Scripture to that purpose. Fo^r I affirme that which he would make men beleue I denye, and denye that which he would haue men to thinke I do affirme.

But one thing I woulde gladly learne of Cerberus. That is, where he findeth, eyther in Scripture, o^r in auncient w^{ri}ter, that Adams fall is the fountayne of all euill. We may manifestly p^{ro}ue by Scripture, that sinne was befoze Adam fell, otherwⁱse there coulde haue bene no tempter to entice him to sinne. Fo^r God tempteth no man to euill. And man had in himselfe no concupiscence o^r lust to sinne: therfoze euill was befoze Adam fell. And consequently, Adams fall was not the fountain of al euil.

Jacob. 1.
Saint Austen in the. ii. Chapter of his firste booke of Retractions sayth, that when he with others had diligently searched from whence euill might spring: it was agreed vpon amongst them, that it had none other fountaine than the fr^{ee} choise of the will. Mans fall can not then be the fountaine of all euill: fo^r there was euill in Angels befoze man was made, and that sprang out of the fr^{ee} choise of the will that was in the Angelles.

But graunt, that the fall of man had bene the fountayne of all euill: might not Gods predestination be the cause of mans fall, but it must straight wa^ye follow consequentl^ye that the same is the cause of all the euill that springeth therof: Then tell me (maister Cerberus) how it may be, that Gods predestination is not the cause of all the euill that springeth of the fr^{ee} choise of will. Fo^r this ye wil not deny, I am sure, that God hath predestinated, both men and Angels to haue the fr^{ee} choise of wil. And his will alone, accordⁱng to which he hath predestinated all

all things, is the cause why men and Angels haue the free choyse of wil. Shal we say therfore, that consequently it is the cause of all euill : bicause it is the cause of that wherout all euilles do spring : So thou hell bound, not so. God is altogether good, and the fountaine of all goodnesse, and from him can spring nothing that is not good. All those things therfore that spring out of the free choise of the will, are exceeding good, as God, or his predestination is the cause of them, and the euill that is in them, commeth of the instrument whereby God doth worke those things. I pray you therfore, loke better vpon your consequently. &c.

As for the sentence that Cerberus citeth oute of S. Austen : *Non ergo casus ruentium. &c.* I thinke if a man should vpon a sudden warning, require to see the place where S. Austen writeth those wordes : it would be hard for Cerberus to shewe it him. And therfore I blame him not, though he haue not quoted the place. But to do him a pleasure, I haue sought it in S. Austens workes and founde it *In decimo articulo falso Augustino imposito.* In the x. of those articles that were falsly ascribed to S. Austen. Of what autoritie that booke of S. Austen is, may easely appeare to them that will reade his Retractions : for it is not mentioned among the booke that he retracte, and reformed in suche pointes as he himselfe misliked. But lest maister Cerberus should saye (as the Papistes be to say of the Protestantes, and as some free wil men haue said of vs that teache the doctrine of predestination) that this is the common shift of all heretikes and obstinate defenders of vntruthes, to diminish the autoritie of Scriptures and sayings of Doctours that are alleaged against them, by saying that the same are not autentike, or that they maye be suspected not to be the writings of them in whose name they be set abrode : I will admit
this

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this saying of S. Austen as his owne, and that therein he meant as he wrote, and that his meaning is true. Let vs weigh the wordes of S. Austen therfore, and see how his meaning may be true, & yet agree wth the doctrine that we teach. The predestination of God (sayth he) hath neither stirred vp, counselled, nor enforced, the fall of the that do rush downe headlong, nor the malignitie of them that be wicked, nor the desires of them that do sinne: but doubtlesse he hath predestinated his iudgement, whereby he will rewarde euerye man according to his doings, whether the same be good or euill. Whiche iudgement should not be, if it were the will of God that men shoulde sinne. I haue translated these wordes somewhat otherwise than Cerberus doth. But whether of vs doth better expresse the meaning of S. Austen, let the learned iudge. And whether I haue not translated theym so that they may serue better for Cerberus purpose, than as they are translated by himselfe. Let vs therefore looke to the meaning, and howe they make wth vs or against vs.

Saint Austen teacheth that Gods predestination, doth not stir vp, entice or enforce any man to fall, to be wicked, or to haue a desire to sinne. And which of vs doth teach the contrary? Euen you sir (saith Cerberus) when ye say that the predestination of God, must needs be the only cause of Adams fall. To this I haue sufficiently answered before, if any answere will satisfie Cerberus. But yet for further answere I saie now, that I haue not at anye time saide or written, that Gods predestination did stirre vp, entice or drive Adams to fall. Wherfore I haue not taught contrary to S. Austen in this point. But Cerberus will saye that our meaning is not all one wth S. Austens. Let vs therefore examine S. Austens meaning. I vnderstand his meaning to be, that when man doeth fall, is wicked, or desireth to sinne: his will is not by
Gods

Gods Predestination stirred vp, enticed or compelled therevnto, but doth freely consent therevnto being stirred vp, prouoked and dyuinen forwarde by the tempter, and by none other meane, if we speake of the first man, for in him was not, before his fall, that concupiscence that is nowe in vs, & was in him after his fall. Whether thys be þ true meaning of S. Austen or no, let the learned iudge. And why may not the same meaning be gathered of my wordes, when I saye, that Adam being so perfect a creature, that there was in him no lust to sinne, and yet so weake, that of himselfe he was not able to withstand the assault of the subtiler serpent: no remedie, the onely cause of his fall must nedes be the Predestination of God. I say not, that Gods Predestination did stir, prouoke, or dyuine him forward to fall: And why maye I not meane as S. Austen doth in the eleauenth chapter of his booke, *De corruptione & gratia*, where he sayeth (as I haue cited before) *Nec ipsum ergo Deus esse voluit sine sua gratia, quem reliquit in suo libero arbitrio: quoniam liberum arbitrium ad malum sufficit, ad bonum autem nihil est, nisi adiunctur ab omnipotenti bono: quod adiutorium, si homo ille, per liberum non deseruisset arbitrium, semper esset bonus, sed deseruit, & desertus est. Tale quippe erat adiutorium quod desereret cum vellet, & in quo permaneret si vellet, non quo fieret ut vellet.*

God therfore (sayth Austen) would not suffer him to be without his grace, whom he had left in hys owne free choise: for free will is able inough to do euill, but to do good it hath no power at all, except it be holpen of the almighty goodnesse: which help, if that man had not by his free will forsaken, he should haue bene good for ever, but he did forsake & was forsaken. For the help was such that he might forsake it when he would, and such wherein he might remaine if he would, not such whereby it might come to passe that he should be willing.

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Doth not S. Austen affirme here, that the help of God which Adam had, was not suche, that by it he might be willing neuer to forsake it : And what other cause of this can you find : thā the Predestination of God, which is according to his everlasting will, vnto the whiche all things are and must be subiect.

Rom. ii. If Cerberus will not be satisfiſſed with thys : let him remember the saying of S. Paule, which S. Austen doth so often vse, to stop the mouthes of the vnaunſwerable enemies of Gods free grace and predestination. *O altitudo diſſatiarum ſapientie & ſcientie Dei. Quam incomprehenſibilia ſunt iudicia eius, & inueſtigabiles vie eius ?* And the depeneſſe of the richesse of the wiſedome and knowledge of God. *Howe incomprehenſible are hys iudgements, and hys wayes paſt finding out :* Stay here, maſſter Cerberus, go no further I charge you, leſt ye be thruſt headlong in to hell for your proude preſumption.

Cerberus.

And alchough there be ſome places of Scripture, wherupon they would ground this opiniō, that men ſhould ſinne by the wyll of God, or that God ſhould predeſtinate or ordeyne men to ſinne, as where it is ſayde, that God hardened the heart of Pharao, and ſuch like : yet partayneth it nothing to that purpoſe, if it be wayed with the reſt of the Scriptures. For as Austen ſaith. *Ipe quaſi eos indurat, quia in ſto iudicio indurari ſinit. Lib. de eſſentia Diuinitatis.* He doth (ſaith Austen) as it were harden them, becauſe, that with his iuſt iudgemēt, he ſuffreth them to be hardened. And in his booke, *De libero arbitrio & gratia. Cap. ii.* he ſayeth : Where at any time we reade in the ſcripture, that mē be ſeduced, or their hearts hardened of God : there
may

may we not doubt, but that their wicked desertings went before, lest yerunne (sayth he) into the saying of Salomon. *Inspicientia viri violat vias eius. Deum autem causatur in corde suo.* The foolishnesse of a man defileth his wayes, but he sayeth in his heart, God is the cause of this hardening of heart.

Melancthon, in his common places, speaketh verily plainly, saying: *Nec figura ille verborum offendunt. &c.* Neither, sayth he, do these figuratiue speeches offend. As I wil harden the heart of Pharao & such like. For it is certaine, that in the Hebrew phrase, they signify a permission or suffering, and not an effectuall wyl of God, as, Lead vs not into temptation, that is to say, Suffer vs not to be led into temptation. These are Melancthons woordes. And marke what he sayth of the Hebrew phrase, for al men know him to be a man learned. But to be short, it is surely to be maruelled at, that although they do thus accuse Gods Predestination, to be the only cause of Adams fal (which is in dede, not onely sinne, but also the very wellspring of al wickednesse, and the filthy fountaine of all our vncleannesse) yet they dare affirme themselves to be the only friendes and louers of Gods Predestination, & al others to be the enemies of Gods holy Predestination, which doe not subscribe to this their fantastical imagination. Moreouer, if it should be said, that they make God the Autor of sinne, they would crie naye, and saye they were slandered. But, whether God be not the autor of that, whereof he is the onely cause: let the vncorrupted heart iudge. Also to saye the truth, when they see their time and place, they are bolde inoughe, yea, euen to vse the terme Autor, in that same manifest sense, as in a booke set forth by *Iohn Knox*, against an aduersarie of Gods Pre-

destination (as he calleth hym) where, in the. 178. page he sayth thus.

Therefore, whatsoeuer the Ethnickes and ignorant did attribute vnto Fortune, wee assigne to the prouidence of God. And straight way he sayth. We shall iudge nothing to come of fortune, but that all cometh by the determination of hys counsell. And furder, it displeaseth him when we esteeme any thing to procede from any other, so that we do not behold hym and know him, not only the principall cause of all things: but also the auctour, appointing al things, to the one part or to the other by his counsell.

Marke well his wordes, and the very sense therof. All cometh of God, sayth he, God is the principal cause, and God is the auctour of it whatsoeuer it be. God appointeth al things, both to the one part and to the other, both to the wicked and to the godly all things, nothing is excepted, as well damnation as saluation, as well sinne as vertue, as well wickednesse as holynesse, yea, if it happen to be murder it selfe, for that a little before he rehearseth. Whatsoeuer it be, it procedeth from none other (saith he) but frō God, God so hath appointed it. God is the principal cause of it. Yea, and not onely the principall cause: but also the auctour of it. Here seest thou those playn termes, which sometime for a little nice lisyng, they can not, or will not speake, that God is the auctour of all murder and mischief. As for fortune, I knowe it to be an Heathenish fable, but where he saith, that God is not onelye the principall cause, but also the auctour of all things, without any exception: and that whatsoeuer the Ethnickes attributed vnto fortune, that same we ought to ascribe to the prouidence of God: it is suche a wide wandring and large blasphemy

phemye, as hath not bene lightlie heard. For who knoweth not, that vnto fortune the Ethnickes ascribed treason, and craftie conspiracie. As where they call her *Iusidiosa*, *Perfida* & *Malefida*. Vnto fortune they ascribe cruell murder, and tyrannicall mischiefe. As when they call her *Aspera*, *Dura*, *Sana*, *Truculenta*. Vnto fortune they ascribed filthy lust and impudent bawdrye: as when they call her *Lenocinans*, *Bruta* and *Impudens*. Vnto fortune they ascribed, scornefull pride, and vaine glory, calling her, *Imperiosa*, *Procerax* and *Superba*. Vnto fortune they ascribed, beastly blindnesse, & rude ignoraunce, calling her *Ceca*, and *Exoculata*. To conclude, vnto fortune, the Ethnickes ascribed all peruerse and pestilent wickednesse, and all abomination detestable, calling her *Nefaria*, *Abominanda* & *Improbata*. Yet saye these professors of destiny: whatsoeuer the Ethnickes ascribed vnto fortune, that same ought we to attribute to the prouidence of God: yea and God is the very auctor, the principal cause, and the only cause therof.

Crowley.

Cerberus supposeth no we, that he hath pulled from vs þe solidation of our faith. For he saith, that those scriptures that we would ground our opinion vpon, appertaine nothing to that purpose, when they be weighed with the rest of the scriptures. For the triall of this matter it shalbe mete for me at this time, plainly to set down in writing, what the opinion is, that I and other of my minde in this matter of Predestination, doe holde. And then, what those Scriptures be that Cerberus meaneth of, conferring the same with as manye other places of scripture, as haue any thewe of a contrarie meaning: so shal

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Shall it appeare what Cerberus hath worne by that he
citeth out of Aulken and Melanthon. First, we hold that
what soever hath bene from the beginning, is now, or
shal be to the ende and for ever: was in Gods purpose
without beginning, and predestinated or foreappointed
to be in the time and order that it hath ben, is, or shal be:
so that nothing hath, doth or shal come to passe other wise
than he hath withoute beginning purposed and foreap-
pointed the same. The reasons that we stay vpon, are
these. Gods power is absolute, so that what he will do, he
is able to do, and what he will haue done, can not be let-
ted by any contrary power, & what he will not haue done,
can not by any power be done. But his power coulde
not be absolute. ec. if ought might be done other wise thā
he hath purposed & appointed. Therefore, all things come
to passe, euen as he hath without beginning purposed &
appointed the same. Another reason is thus. Gods wis-
dome is most perfect, so that whatsoeuer he doeth, is so
done, that the doing thereof cannot be repented: But if
ought that he doth, might fall out other wise thā he ment
it should, whē he did it, it should follow that his wisdom
were not most perfect, so; it is not point of a wise man
to saye, I thought not that it would haue so happened.
Therefore nothing hath, doth, or shal happen other wise
than he ment it should, when he did first ordeine it. The
third reason is, that his foreknowledge can not be decei-
ued, but euen as he did foresee, and know before hande,
that things should come to passe, so they haue, be, and
shal be brought to passe. But this coulde not be, if things
should be done, other wise thā by his appointmēt. Ther-
fore al things haue, are and shal be done by his appoint-
ment. These be the chief reasons that we stay vpon. The
scriptures that we do most stay vpon, are these. *Conuenerunt*
enim in ciuitate ista, aduersus sanctum filium tuū Iesum quem
excisti,

vnixisti, Herodes & Pontius Pilatus, cū gentibus & populis Israel: ad faciendum quęcunq; manus tua & consiliū tuum prius des creuerunt fieri. *Act. 4.* Where gathered together euen in this Citie, against thy holy childe Iesus, whome thou haste appointed, both Herode and Pontius Pilate, with þe Gentiles and peoples of Israel: to doe whatsoeuer thyngs thy power and counsel had befoze decreed to be done. Actes the iij. Chapter.

Againe in the.vij.of Exod. it is thus wozitten. Dixitq; *Exod. 7.* Dominus ad Moysen. Ecce constitui te Deum Pharaonis, & Aaron frater tuus erit Prophetā tuus. Tu loqueris ei omnia quę mando tibi, & ille loquetur ad Pharaonē, ut dimittat filios Israel de terra sua. Sed ego indurabo cor eius, et multiplicabo signa & ostenta mea in terra Egypti, & non audiet vos. And þe Lord said vnto Moses. Behold I haue appointed thee to be Pharaos God, & Aaron thy brother shalbe thy Prophet. Thou shalt speak vnto him all those thyngs that I shall commaunde thee, and he shall speake vnto Pharaos, that he let the chyldren of Israel depart out of his land. But I will harden his heart, and will multiply my wonders and signes in the land of Egypt, and he shall not hearken vnto you.

Moreover, in the.xix. Chapter of the.iiij. booke of the Kings, we reade thus. Venerunt ergo serui Regis Ezechie ad Isaam. Dixitq; eis Isaas. Hęc dicetis domino vestro. Hęc dicit Dominus. Noli timere à facie sermonū quos audiſtis, quibus blasphemauerunt pueri Regis Assyriorum me. Ecce ego immittam ei spiritum, & audiet nuntium, & reuertetur in terram suam, et deiciam eum gladio in terra sua. And in the ende of the same Chapter it is wozitten thus. Cumq; adoraret in templo Nesroch Deum suum: Adramelech, & Sarsar filij eius, percusserunt eum gladio. &c. The seruantes of King Ezechia came vnto Elay. And Elay said vnto them. Thus shal ye say vnto your Lord. Thus sayth the Lorde. Be not thou afraide of the woordes that ye haue hearde, wherewith the seruants

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nauntes of the King of the Afficians haue blasphemed me. Behold I wil put a spirit into him, and he shal heare a tidings, and he shal returne into his owne countrie, and in his owne countrie will I ouerthrowe him with the swoorde. And in the end of the same Chapter it is wozitten thus. And when he was in the Temple worshipping Pelroch his owne God: Adamelech and Saraser hys owne sonnes slewe him with the swoorde. &c.

Genes. 45.

Furthermoze, in the xlv. of Genesis, we reade thus. *Premisitq; me Deus, et seruumini super terram, et escas ad viuentium habere possitis. Non vestro consilio, sed Dei voluntate missus sum: qui fecit me quasi patrem Pharaonis, et Dominum vniuersae domus eius. &c.* God sent me before, that you might be rescued vpon the earth, and haue stode to lyue by. It was not by your abuse or counsel, that I was sent hither, but by the will of God, who hath made me to be as a Father vnto Pharaos, and Lorde of all his house. &c.

To conclude, in the last chapter of the same booke, we reade the matter repeated after this sort. *Nolite timere, num Dei possumus resistere voluntati? Vos cogitastis de me malum: sed Deus vertit illud in bonum. &c.* Feare not, are we able to resist Gods will? you did deuise euill for me: but God did turne it to good.

By these Scriptures it appeareth plainely, that all those thinges that Herode, Pilate, and the Iewes did to Christ: that Pharaos did in the hardnesse of his heart: that the sonnes of Sinacharib did to their Father: and that Iosephes brethren did vnto him: were all done by the determinate purpose and Predestination of God. Wher vpon, it seemeth to me, that we may conclude that all other actions are done according to the same purpose and predestination. Other wise, we must needs confesse, that God is either disapointed of his purpose oftentimes, or else that he createth many thinges, not knowing be-
fore

foze what shall become of them. Which absurdities may in no case be graunted.

Now what those Scriptures be, wherewith Cerberus would haue these and such like scriptures to be weyghed, we must gesse: for Cerberus citeth not so muche as one, I will therefore gesse as nere as I can, what scriptures those be that he meaneth of. One as I suppose, is written by Saint Paule to Timothee. The wordes are these. *Deus vult omnes homines saluos fieri, & ad agnitionem veritatis venire.* God would haue all men saued & come to the acknowledging of the truth. Let vs first weigh this place with the other aforesaid, and see how this maye make the other to seue nothing to þ purpose that we allage them for. God would haue all men saued, and to come to the acknowledging of the truth: But if he did soe ap-
 poynt Herode, Pilate, and the Jewes, to accuse and con-
 demne his sonne Christ, and his harden Pharisees heart, kill Simeon with the sword of his sonnes, and sende Joseph into Egypt by the trecherie of his brethren: he would not haue all men saued: for the rewarde of these woordes is damnation: therefore God neuer appointed a waye of these things to be done. I am sure Cerberus can not applye this place better to his purpose, than it is in this argument applied. Now let vs see what maye be said to the contrarye, without eyther denyng or wresting of Saint Pauls wordes. First, Saint Austen doth interprete these wordes of Saint Paule after this sort. *Libro de voluntate Dei, Cap. 2. Occurrit enim, cur pereant ex his aliqui, quum omnipotens Deus, omnes homines saluos fieri velit, & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Deinde, cur rursus induret alios, miserius aliorum, aut quomodo omnes saluos fieri velit homines, quum ipse nonnullos non saluentur induret? Hoc quantum ad humanam iustitiam videtur iniustum: sed quis ita desipiat, vel potius quis ita blasphemet, ut dicat de iustitia Dei, lege humana iustitia di spiciendum? Quæ*
 K.i. profecto

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profectus, si iustitiae Dei aduersatur, iniusta est. Ab illo enim qui summi iustus est, omne quod qualitercumq; iustum est, manare manifestum est. Quis ergo ait, qui incommutabiliter manentem, et omnia quae sunt condentem, regentem, et seruientem Dei sapientiam, genus humane sapientia arbitrio? De qua idem Apostolus docet, Quis sapientia carnis, inimica est Deo. Et alibi. Sapientia huius mundi, stultitia est apud Deum. Non est ergo de illa maiestate diuina sapientia, humane ratiouis arbitrio disputandum. What is to say. For this is objected. Why should any of these perswade, seeing that God that is almightie, is willing that all men should be saved, & come to the acknowledging of the truth? Whereunto, why doth he on the contrary part, harden some, taking mercy on other some: or howe is he willing that all men should be saved, when he himselfe doth harden some, least they should be saved? As touching humane iustice, this thing seemeth vnjust. But who would he so stultie, or rather who would be so blaspheem: as to say, that we should reason of the iustice of God, by the order of the iustice of man: which no doubt, if it be against the iustice of God, it is vnjust. For it is manifest, that whatsoeuer hath in it anye iustice at all, doeth spring from him that is iust in the highest degree. And so shall it be therefore, that will weigh by the arbitrement of mans wisdom, the wisdom of God, which remaineth immutable, and hath made, doth gouerne and prouide al things that be: Of which wisdom, the same Apostle saith. What the wisdom of the flesh, is enemie vnto God. And in another place. The wisdom of the world is foolishnesse with God. We maye not therefore, by the arbitrement of mans wantie, dispute of that matter of the wisdom of God.

Againe, in his booke De spiritu & littera, Capite. 32. the same Author saith. Si credemus, et impetremus hanc gratiam, et ratiōe credimus, De hac quaeritur, unde sciamus.

Si natura, quare non omnibus: cum sit idem Deus omnium creator? Si dono Dei, etiam hoc, quare non omnibus, cum omnes homines vellet saluos fieri, & ad agnitionem veritatis venire? Prius igitur illud dicamus & videamus, vtrum huic satis faciat questio, quod liberum arbitrium naturaliter attributum a creatore anime rationalis: illa media vis est, qua vel imendi ad fidem, vel inclinandi ad infidelitatem potest. Et ideo, nec istam voluntatem, qua credit Deo, dici potest homo habere, quam non acceperit. Quandoquidem vocante Deo, surgit de libero arbitrio, quod naturaliter cum crearetur, accepit. Vult enim Deus omnes homines saluos fieri, & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Non sic tamen, ut eis achmum liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel male viuentes, iustissime inducentur. Quod cum sit, infideles quidem contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, cum eius Euangelio non credunt: nec ideo tamen cum vincunt, verum scipsos fraudant magno & summo bono, malisq; penali bus implicant, experturi in supplicijs potestatem eius, cuius in donis misericordiam contempserunt. Ita voluntas Dei semper inuicta est. Vinceretur autem, si non innemiret, quod de contemptoribus faceret: aut vilo modo possent euadere, quod de talibus ille constituit.

That is. If we do beleue, to the end that we may obtaine this grace, and do also by the consent of our will, beleue: hereof a question is moued, whence we haue this will. If it be of nature, why is it not in al men: seing one God is the creatoꝝ of all men? If we haue it by the gift of God, why is it not giuen to all men: seing he is willing that all men should be saued, and come to the acknowledging of the truth: Let vs therfoꝝ affirme the first, and see whether it may satisfie this question, because free will, whiche the Creafoꝝ hath naturallly giue to the reasonable soule: is that indifferent power, whiche may eether be bowed to faith, or inclined to infidelitie. And therfoꝝ, it can not be said, that man hath not receiued this will, whereby he beleueth in God, because, whẽ God calleth, it riseth of free will, whiche he receiued when he was naturallly created.

B.g.

Fo:

For God is willing that all men shoulde be saued, and come to the knowledge of the truth: and yet not so, that he would take from them free will, whereby they may be iustly iudged, whē they vse it wel, or otherwise. In which doing, the Infidels do worke contrary to Gods will, because they beleue not his Gospell. And yet doe they not therfore ouercome it, but they do defraude them selues of the great and most excellent godnesse, and do entangle them selues with cullies, wherewith they are punished, and shal in the punishments haue experie of his power, whose mercede they did in his giftes contemne. So is the will of God alwayes vnconquered. But if he coulde not finde howe to vse these despisers, or if they could by anye meanes escape that which he hath appointed to become of such: then should his will be ouercome in dede.

Againe, in his booke entituled *Enchiridion ad Laurentiu*. Capite. 103. he sayeth thus. *Ac per hoc, cum audimus, Et in sacris litteris legimus, quod velit omnes homines saluos fieri: quama-ius certum sit nobis, non omnes homines saluos fieri, non tamen idē debemus omnipotentissima Dei voluntati aliquid derogare, sed itā intellegere quod scriptum est: qui vult omnes homines saluos fieri: tanquam diceretur, nullum hominem fieri saluum, nisi quem saluum fieri ipse voluerit: non quod nullus sit hominum, nisi quem saluum fieri velit, sed quod nullus fiat, nisi quem velit, Et ideo sit rogatus ut velit, quia necesse est fieri si voluerit. De orando quippe Deo agebat Apostolus ut hoc diceret. Sic enim intelligimus id quod in Euangelio scriptum est: Qui illuminat omnem hominem et non quia nullus est hominum qui non illuminetur, sed quia nisi ab ipso nullus illuminatur. Aut certe sic dictum est. Qui omnes homines vult saluos fieri, non quod nullus hominum esset, quem saluum fieri noller, qui virtutes miraculorum sacre noluit apud eos, quos dicit aduersariis fuisse penitentiā, si ficiſset: sed ut omnes homines omne genus hominum intelligamus per quascūq; differentias distributum, Reges, priuatos, nobiles, ignobiles, &c.*

That

That is to say. And hereby when we heare and reade in the holy scriptures, that he is willing y all men should be saued, although we knowe assuredly that all men are not saued : yet may we not therefore derogate any thing from the almighty will of God, but vnderstande that which is wrytten, on this sort. Not that there is no man, but that he woulde the same shoulde be saued : but that none ca be saued, but such as he will haue saued. And that therfore he ought to be prayed vnto, that he woulde be willing, because it must nedes be, if he be willing that it shoulde be. For when the Apostle spake these wordes, he was in hande with the prayers that are to be made vnto God. And after the same maner we vnderstand that which is wrytten in the Gospell. Whiche lightneth euerye man. Not that there is no man that is not illumined, or lightened : but for that there is none illumined, other wise than of him. Or els vndoubtedly the wordes haue thys meaning. Which is willing that all me should be saued, not that there shoulde be no man tohome he would not haue saued, which would not worke his miracles among them that he saith would haue repeted, if he had done so : but that we should vnderstand by all men, all sortes of men, by what differences so euer the same be seuered, kings, priuate persons, noble persons, and ignoble. &c.

And againe in his booke. De correptione & gratia. Cap. 14.
S. Austen sayeth thus. Cum autem homines per correptionem in diuinam iustitiam seu veniunt, seu reuertuntur, quis operatur in cordibus eorum saluare, nisi ille, qui quolibet plantante atq; rigante, & quolibet in agris atq; arbutibus operante, dat incrementum Deus, cui volenti saluum facere, nullum hominum resistit arbitrium? Sic enim, velle vel nolle, in volentis aut nolentis est potestate, vt diuinam voluntatem non impedit, nec superet potestatem. De his enim qui faciunt que non vult, facit ipse que vult. Et quod scriptum est, quod vult omnes homines saluos fieri, nec tamen omnes salui

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salui sunt: multis quidem modis intelligi potest, ex quibus in alijs opusculis nostris, aliquos commemorauimus, sed hic vnum dicam, ita dictum est. Omnes homines vult saluos fieri, vt intelligantur omnes predestinati, qui a omne genus hominum in eis est, sicut dictum est Pharisais. Decimatis omne olus, vbi non est intelligendum, nisi omne quod habebant. Neq; enim omne olus quod erat in toto terrarum orbe decimabant.

That is to say. When men doe by chastisement, either come or returne into the way of righteousness, who is it that worketh health in their hearts, but he who giueth the increase, who any man planteth or watreth, and when any man worketh in the fieldes or orchards, who it is God, against whom, being willing to saue, no mans freewill doth make resistance. For to be willing or unwilling, is after such sort in the power of him that is willing or unwilling, that it be not a let to the will of God, nor do ouercome his power. For of them that do those things that he willet not, doth he make those things that he is willing to make. And where as it is written: that he is willing that all men should be saued; and yet all be not saued: it may be vnderstanded many wayes, whereof we haue in our other little workes made mention of some, but I will now speake of one more. This is the saying, he is willing that all men should be saued; that thereby, all that be predestinated might be vnderstande, so that among them are men of all sortes. As it was sayd to the Phariseis, ye doe pay the tenth of euery garden hearbe. Where we may not vnderstande, more than all that they had. For they did not giue the tenth of al the hearbes that be in the whole circle of the earth.

By these places of scripture. Asken may Cerberus sit, hold in this place of scripture (God is willing that al men should be saued, &c.) being waied with the places that we builde vpon, doth make that they serue nothing to our purpose.

¶ In expounding of these wordes of S. Paule, God is willing that al men should be saued & come to the knowledge of the truth : S. Austen doth affirme as much as he do, as may wel appeare to as many as will way these places of his, with indifferent iudgement.

One other place for this purpose, is witten in the 33. Chapter of Ezechiel. The wordes are these. *Viv ego dicit Dominus. Nolo mortem impij, sed ut convertatur impius à via sua, & vivat. Convertimini, convertimini, à vijs vestris pessimis, & quasi è moriemini domus Israel?* What is to say. As truly as I live, saith the Lord, I desire not the death of the ungodly, but that the ungodly be converted frõ hys olone way and live. Be converted, be converted frõ your most wicked wayes, why will ye die, O you house of Israel :

Saint Hierome expounding this place, beginneth at these wordes in the same Chapter. *Tu ergo fili hominis, dic ad domum Israel : sic locuti estis dicentes. Iniquitates nostræ & peccata nostræ super nos. &c.* Wherefore thou sonne of man, speake thou to the house of Israel and say : thus haue ye spoken, saying : Our iniquities & sinnes are vpon vs. &c. By occasion of which wordes, S. Hierome sayeth thus. *Si negligenter legamus, videtur nobis eadem prophetia esse quæ supra, in qua dicitur. Nunquid volens cupio mortem iniqui dicit dominus : nisi converti cum à via sua mala & vivere? Et in fine eiusdem prophetiæ. Convertimini & redite ab vniuersis impietatibus vestris, & non erunt vobis in tormentum iniquitates. Ibi enim ad eos sermo fit qui volunt agere penitentiam, & iustitia peccata delere, ut cum fiducia convertantur, & pleno animo agant penitentiam. Hic autem ad eos loquitur, qui magnitudine peccatorum, imò impietatum suarum desperant salutem & dicunt : Iniquitates nostræ & peccata nostræ super nos sunt, & in ipsis tabescimus, quomodo ergo vivere poterimus? Et est sensus. Cum semel nobis mors proposita sit : & vulneribus nostris nulla medicina possit restituere sanitatem : quid necesse est laborare & frustra consumi.*

Super. Ezech.
Cap. 33.

presen-

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presentem vitam non cum desperatione transigere, ut saltem hanc fruamur: qui a futuram perdidimus? Quibus respondet Deus, non velle se mortem impij, sed ut reuerteretur & viuat. Et Apostropham facit ad impios desperantes: cōuertimini à vris vestris pessimis. Atq; ut sciatis, qui sint impij ad quos loquitur, sequens sermo demonstrat. Quare moriemini domus Israel? Vis autem & mors in hoc loco non hec significatur, qua omnes communi cum bestijs, lege naturæ, vel vinimus, vel morte dissoluimur: sed illa de qua scriptum est. Placebo Domino in regione viuentium.

What is to saye. If we reade this negligently, it seemeth to be the same prophetic, that is before, wherein it is said, do I willingly desire the death of the vngodly, sayth the Lord: or, but that he be conuerted from his owne euill waye and line: And in the ende of the same Prophecie: Be ye conuerted and come backe againe from all your vngodlineses, and your iniquities shall not turne you to tormentes. For in that place he speaketh vnto those which are willing to repent, and by righteous life, to blot out their sinnes, that they might with sure confidence returne vnto God, and with full mindes repent. But in this place he speaketh vnto the, that throughe the greatnesse of their owne sinnes (yea their owne impieties) do dispaye of saluatiō, and say. Our iniquities and our sinnes are vppon vs, and in them doe we consume away: how can we therefore line? And this is their meaning. Seeing that death is once set before vs, and no medicine is able to heale our wounds: what nede we labour, and be consumed, and not passe ouer thys life with desperation: so, that at the least way we may enioy this life: For the life to come we haue already lost. Vnto whome God maketh aunswere, that he willet not the death of the vngodly: but that he be conuerted & line. And he turneth his speech to the desperate vngodlye ones: saying, turne you from your owne wayes, which are most wycked.

ked. And that we might knowe who those wicked ones were to whome he spake, the wordes that followe do declare. O ye house of Israel, why will ye dye: And that life and that death, wherby we do by the order of nature, with the brute beastes eyther live or die, is not in this place signified: but that life wherof it is written. I will please the Lord in the land of the living.

By these wordes of S. Hierome: it appeareth, that he understood not the wordes of Ezechiel, in such sorte as Cerberus would haue vs to understande them, that is, that by them is taught a doctrine contrarie to that which we teache, and so consequently, the places that we builde vpon, proued to make nothing for our purpose. For Hierome saith; that in the. cxiij. Chapter of his Prophecie, Ezechiel speaketh to them that be penitent, and woulde by righteous life blot out their sinnes past. These doth he there encourage, with bolde courage and assured hope of forgiveness at Gods hand, to go forward with their repentance begon, saying: Be ye conuerted, and returne againe from all your vngodlinesse, and your iniquities shall not turne you to torment. But in this place, in the. 33. of his Prophecie (sayth S. Hierom) the Propheete speaketh to the desperate people of I Ierusalem, which said: Our iniquities and sinnes are vpon vs. &c. Giuing them selues to continue in wickednesse, as those that dispayred of forgiveness of that which was past, although they should do thenceforth endeavour amendment. To these (sayth the Propheete) speaketh God, saying: Turne from your olde moste wicked wayes. Why will ye die, O ye house of Israel: The greatnesse of our sinnes can be no cause why we should dispaire of Gods mercy. Wherefore we teache with Ezechiel, Ieremie, Esaie, and the rest of the holie Propheetes, that God is ready to receiue to mercy as many as by repentance and amendment of life turne to him,

L. f.

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beleuing the promise that he hath made in the death and bloodshedding of his only sonne Iesus Christ. I conclude therefore that this place maketh so; our purpose, and not against vs. And least I shoulde trouble the Reader ouer much, with such places as this: I do referre all such places to the aunswere I haue here made, not doubting but the diligent Reader, who sekerh nothing but the simple trueth, shalbe therewithall satisfied.

Nowe, as touching the places of S. Austen, whyche Cerberus citeth out of his booke: *De essetia Diuinitatis: And De libero arbitrio & gentia*: I will first rehearse all the wordes that S. Austen wyrteth in those places, concerning this matter, and then weigh them, that we may see how they may serue so; Cerberus purpose. The wordes are these, *Indurare dicitur Deus quorundam malorum corda, sicut de Pharaone Rege Egypti scriptum est: non quod omnipotens Deus, potentia sua corda eorum indueret, quod est impium illud credere: sed ex egetibus eorum culpis, quam duritia cordis, quam ipsi sibi mala perpetrando nutriunt, non aufert: quasi ipse eos indueret, quid iusto iudicio indurari sinis.* What is to say: It is said that God doth harden the heartes of certaine euill men, as it is written of Pharao King of Egypt: not that the Almightye God doeth by his almightie power harden their hearts, which thing to beleue, is an vngodly thing: but when they faultes requiring the same, doeth not take from them that hardness, which in committing euilles, they themselues doe nourishe to themselves: he doth as it were himselfe harden them, because he doth, by his iust iudgement, suffer the to be hardened.

If Cerberus woulde haue weighed these wordes wel: he woulde neuer haue applyed them against vs. For we teach not, that the almighty God, doth by his almightie power harden mens hearts, so; we know that it were an vngodly thing so to teach or beleue: but we teache as S. Austen

*Augusti. De
essetia Diuini-
tatis.*

Austen doth, that they; times requiring the same, he lea-
ueth them in the hardnesse of their hearts, which by com-
mitting of euilles, they do nourish vnto themselves. For
by the sinne of the first man al mens hearts are hardened,
and of them selues they can do nought else but nourishe
that hardnesse, and Gods hardning of their hearts, is no-
thing else but the withholding of the deaue of his grace
from them, without which they can not be softened. And
this he doth in iust iudgement, for the sinne of ours first
Father hath deserued no lesse in vs all. But here I must
let the Reader vnderstande, what places Cerberus ppe-
heth so; his purpose. Erasmus supposeth, that rather Hu-
go Victorinus than S. Austen should be the Author of this
booke. Well, I will not strue wpyth him for the matter.
But let him consider it better befoze he applie it against
vs againe.

The wordes of the other place that Cerberus citeth
out of the xxi. chapter of S. Austens booke. *De gratia & li-
bro arbitrio*: are as faithfully handled as the other. Cerberus
feared to set downe to many of Austens wordes, least the
Reader shoulde see that they make with vs against Cer-
berus and his fellows. I will therfoze set downe so ma-
ny of hys wordes as may make his meaning knowne to
the diligent Reader. Firste, in the beginning of the same
Chapter, he sayth thus. *Quis non ista iudicia diuina contem-
niscat, quibus agit Deus in cordibus etiam malorum hominum
quicquid vult, reddens eis tamen secundum merita eorum?* Robo-
am filius Salomonis respuit consiliū salubre Seniorum quod ei de-
derunt. &c. Who would not (saith Austen) tremble at these
iudgements of God, wherby he doth in the heartes euen
of wicked men, worke what he listeth, and yet rendring
vnto them according to their deseruings. Roboam, the
sonne of Salomon, refused the holefome counsell of the
Elders which they gaue him, which was that he should

L. ij.

not

*August. De
gratia & li-
bro arbitrio.
Cap. 21.*

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not deale roughly with the people, and he bearkened rather to the wordes of them that were of his owne age, giuing a rough aunswere to them, whom he should haue answered gentlie. And so forth, citing many examples out of the Scriptures, to proue, that God is he, that worketh in the hearts of euill men, those things wherby his purpose is performed in punishing of sinne.

And towards the end of the Chapter, he saith: *Hij & talibus testimonijs diuinorum eloquiorum, quæ omnia commemorare nimis longum est, satis, quantum existimo, manifestatur, operari Deum in cordibus hominum, ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocumq; voluerit, siue ad bona, pro sua misericordia, siue ad mala, pro meritis eorum, iudicio rectè, suo, aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, semper autem iusto. Fixum enim debet esse & immobile in corde vestro, quia nō est iniquitas apud Deum. Ac per hoc, quādo legitis in litteris veritatis à Deo seduci homines, aut obtūdi vel obdunari corda eorum, nolite dubitare præcessisse mala merita eorum, & iuste ista paterentur: ne incuratis in illud Proverbum Salomonis. Insipientia viri, violat vias eius: Deum autem causatur in corde suo. That is to say, By these and such like testimonies of holy Scriptures, wherof it were too long to make a whole recitall, it is, as I suppose, sufficientlie shewed, that God doeth worke in the heartes of men, to encline their willes whither it pleaseth him, whether it be to good things, according to his merite, eyther to euill things, according to their merites, and according to his owne iudgement, which is sometime open, and sometime secrete, but alwayes iuste. For this perswasion ought to be fixed and vnmoueable in your hearts: that there is none iniquitie with God. And hereby, when ye reade in the writings of the truth, that God doth leade me out of the way, or that he doth dull or harden their heartes: do ye not doubt, but that their euill deseruing went before, that they might iustly suffer these things, leass ye should runne into that*

Iouerbe

Proverbe of Salomon, which sayth . The foolishnesse of a man doth defile his wayes : but in his heart he layeth the blame in God.

If Cerberus would haue set downe all these wordes of S. Austen : I shoulde not haue needed to write any answer to that whiche he did set downe . For S. Austens wordes are sufficient for answer , when he sayth that God worketh in the hearts of me to encline their willes, whether it be to good things, according to his mercy, or to euill things, according to their deservings, & that which way he him self is willing to encline them. Now let Cerberus finde contradiction in S. Austens wordes, if he can. As for me , I can see none . But if Cerberus can finde none , then hath he applied S. Austens wordes against vs, contrary to S. Austens meaning.

Nowe let vs see what Cerberus hath founde in Melanctons common places . Melancton speaketh verie plainly (saith Cerberus) and sayth, *Nec signa ille verborum offendunt. &c.* Neither saith he , doe these figurative speeches offend. As I wil harden the heart of Pharaao, and such like : for it is certain, that in the Hebrew phrase, they signifie a permission or suffering, & not an effectuall will of God. As leade vs not into temptation, & is to saye, suffer vs not to be lead into temptatio. These are Melanctons wordes, sayth Cerberus : and marke (sayth he) what he sayeth of the Hebrew phrase, for all men know him to be a man learned . Here Cerberus beginneth to triumphe, and semeth to himselfe to haue wonne the fild. Melancton hath said it, therfore it must nedes be so. I reuerence Melancton, and do acknowledge that he was learned : but let vs see whether, in this point, Melancton haue not shewed him selfe so loth to offende such as Cerberus is, and therfore seemed to haue giuen them baite against himselfe. In the same booke of common places, in the first

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title, which is *De Deo*: he describeth God after this sorte:
Deus est essentia spiritalis, intelligens, eterna, verax, bona, pura,
iusta, misericors, liberrima, immensa potentie & sapientie. &c.
 That is to saye: God is a spirituall essence, vnderstan-
 ding, euerlasting, true, good, pure, iuste, mercifull, moste
 free, & of vnmeasurable power and wisdom. &c. Power, if
 God do permit any thing to be done which he is not wil-
 ling should be done, how is he almighty? Other there-
 fore, as learned as Melancthon, haue sayd, & in my iudge-
 ment, truly: that to permit and to will is al one, in him
 that can not be enforced to permit or suffer that which he
 is not willing should be. But as I haue declared before,
 we affirme not, that the actions, wordes, and thoughtes
 of man, as they are willed or permitted by God, are or
 can be sinne. For he being altogether good, and nothing
 else but godnesse, can not will or permit anye thing that
 is euill. The euill therefore that is in mens thoughtes,
 wordes or actions, commeth of the Deuil and mens owne
 willes: which God doth will or permit, as a meane, ey-
 ther to set forth his mercie in forgiving, or his iustice in
 punishing, whiche in that respect can not be other than
 good. What Cerberus hath wonne by citing these words
 of Melancthon: let y^e learned that haue read other mens
 writings vpon this matter, iudge. I haue sayde that I
 thinke to be true.

But now Cerberus thinketh to paye vs home. Lo he
 shoute, sayeth he, it is sure to be maruelled at, that al-
 though they doe thus accuse Gods Predestination to be
 the onely cause of Adams fall (which is in dede not onely
 sinne, but also the very wellspring of all wickednesse, and
 the filthy fountaine of all our vncleannesse) that yet they
 dare affirme themselves to be the onely friends and lo-
 uers of Gods Predestination. &c. Cerberus will be shorte
 now. Well let him be answered as shortly. He hath all
 this

this while laboured to proue that was neuer denied, that is, that the sinne of Adam in his first fall, is the cause of al the sinne that hath bene, is, oꝛ shalbe committed by his posterity. For we hold, that after Adam had once sinned, neyther he noꝛ anye of hys posteritie, being naturallye brought forth in this worlde, could of them selues do any other thing than sinne. The cause wherof we say, is that concupiscence and lust to do euil, which entred into him, & from him is descended into his posteritie. But what is this to the cause of Adams fall. Whys concupiscence was not in Adam before his fall. It could not therefore be the cause therof. And as I haue declared before: Adams fall coulde not be the cause of all sinne: foꝛ sinne was before Adam fell. We knowe that sinne is not a creature: but it is a falling away of the creature from that order that the Creator did commaunde the creature to continue in. But this was in þe Angels, Ergo before the fall of mā. By þe fall of man therfore was declared what mans freewill was able to do. It was able to admit sinne, and so by freewill sinne entred into man, and by man into the worlde, that is into all naturall men. And yet we say not, that either mans freewill oꝛ man himselfe is euill, as he is Gods creature, and freewill Gods gifte. I conclude therfore, that as the fall of Adam was the performance of Gods purpose, so was it no sinne, but exceeding good, as euery performance of Gods purposes muste needes be. And so the Predestination of God being the cause therof, is no cause of sinne. Let Cerberus maruel as much as he will, how we can graunt God to be the cause and not the Autour of sinne. For we do not say that Gods Predestination is the cause of sinne. Much lesse doe we say that he is the Autour, as Cerberus doth charge vs by occasiō of certayne wordes written by Iohn Knoxe against an aduersarie of Gods Predestination.

Although

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Although Iohn Knoxe being yet liuing, & able to defend his owne writings, I might refer Cerberus to his answer: yet I wil not sticke to write a few lines in the defence of his doctrine in this point. Cerberus seemeth to mislike with Knoxe for two things: one is, for that he saith that we assigne to the prouidence of God, all things that the Ethnicks and Ignorant attributed vnto fortune. And the other is, for that he saith that we know and beholde God to be, not onely the principall cause, but also the authour of all things, appointing them to the one parte or to the other by hys counsell. This is (sayth Cerberus) suche a word wandring blasphemie, as hath not lightly bene hearde of. And although Cerberus would haue vs marke the wordes, & the very sense of the, as though he would set forth the same so plainly, that all men might easely perceiue the meaning of the: yet with his leaue, he sheweth that he himselfe did not see that he would haue other to marke. For what mad man would write wordes in such meaning, as Cerberus would haue vs thinke that Iohn Knoxe wrote his: That is, to call God deceptfull, vnfaithfull, and vntruely: Rough, hard, fierce and cruel: Baldy, beastly, and shamelesse: Impetuous, malapert, and proude: Blinde, and without eyes: Wicked, to be abhorred, and altogether naught: Was there euer man so farre beside himself, as to write of God in this meaning? I durst appeale to Cerberus himselfe (though he be the dogge of Hell) whither in conscience he doe thinke that it were possible that any reasonable man may so far forget him selfe, as to write wordes in any such meaning. Let Cerberus therfore, loke better vpon Iohn Knoxe wordes, and seke a better sense in them than this. If he wil do so, he shall finde that Iohn Knoxe meaning is, that where as the Ethnicks and Ignorant attributed vnto fortune, a power to giue or take away,

to

to preserve or destroy, to helpe or to hinder. The which knowe y^e there is no such power in any other thā in God, do assigne all these things to his providence: knowing y^e nothing cometh to passe by Fortune or chance, but that God by his providence doth governe and rule all things, appoynting them to the one parte, or the other, by his counsell. And when he appointeth anye to that thing which in them is sinne (as was the murder of Sînacharib in his owne sonnes) yet in Gods purpose it is good, for it is the execution of his iust iudgement, or the meane wherby his glorie shal be the more aduanced in shewing mercie. If Cerberus be not certified with this answer, let him seke for further answers at the hands of him whose workings he hath so maliciously perverted.

Cerberus.

But now to returne againe to *Crowley*. After that he hath written, that Gods predestination is the onlie cause of Adams fall, then goeth he forth in the same booke, and the same Article, vnto the next execrable wickednesse, committed in the world, saying: Now, what say we to Cain: was he not predestinated to slea his brother? No, saye the freewill men. Here thou seest dearly beloued, who they are that so odiouslie are noted with the name of freewyll men. Not only the Papistes, against whom he pretendeth there to wryte: but namely all those that saye, God hath not predestinate any man to commit murder, or such like wycked abomination. These call they freewill men, these cal they Pelagians. In dede such as so maintayn freewill, that a mā by freewill wythout the grace and helpe of God, may abstayne from euill, or do good, as the blinde Papistes doe, and as before it

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is proued, that *Pelagius* did holde, or as before is rehearsed, that *William Samuell* sayth: that man maye deserue God: those I saye, might worthily be called Pelagians, bicause they hold, eyther al, or some part of hys errors. But those which teach, that all murder and mischiefe spryngeth out of Gods predestination, or that any mansleaver is predestinate of God to kyll hys neighbour, or any adulterer to lye with his neyghbours wyfe, or any traytour predestinate of God, to conspire against hys Prince, or any rebell to ryse against his Soueraigne, as these men most plainly affirme: they holde in thys poynt the error of the Manicheans, whych was as ye hearde before, by the wordes of Austen. *Homines peccatum vitare non possunt*. That a man can not eschewe euill, or can not choose but commit sinne. These men, I say, whych affirme that Caine was predestinate to murder hys innocent brother Abell. And as in the same booke and the same Article also, he sayth, that the most wicked persons that haue bene, were of God appointed to bee wicked euen as they were. They hold the error both of the Stoikes, and also of the Manicheans. That is to say, as Austen declareth in the ninth & xvi. chapter of the first booke of his *Retractions*: that euil hath his original of Gods ordinance, & not of mans free-wil. For if murderers, theues, adulterers, traitours, & Rebelles be of God predestinated and appoynted to be wicked eue as they are, and can not choose but of mere necessitie by the ordinance of God commit, all such wickednesse, euen as they do: then what is our lyfe but a mere destinie, all our doyngs Gods ordinaunces, and all oure imaginations, braunches of Gods predestinatiō? And I doubt not, but the Stoikes and Manicheans, would also temper the matter wyth

wyth a great discretiō of wordes, as these men wyll saye, that we must speake more reuerentlie of the matter. But seyng they plainely holde these principles, and when they see theyr tyme, speake plainely thereof them selues, as you maye well perceyue by that whych hath alredy, and shal yet be more largely rehearsed: I see no cause why it should not of al mē be plainly declared. Agayne, if it be a trueth, why should it not be plainly spoken, if it be a truth, that traitours be predestinate of God to conspire the destruction of their Princes, and Rebels predestinate of God to make insurrection against their soueraines: If (I say) it be a trueth, that God hath so predestinated the, & that they must of necessity, & can not choose but commit such wyckednesse: why shoulde it not be plainly spoken? except a man should be ashamed to speake the trueth. But in what Scripture is that written? Or is it not rather written. For thy lyfe, shame not to say the trueth. And surely to say as it is: I see not well howe any man can speake more plainely in thys matter than they them selues doe. For what can more plainly be spokē: thā that Gods predestination is the cause of Adams fall? And that Caine was predestinate to slea his brother? And that God is both the principal cause, and also the author of all thyngs, both on the one side and on the other, appoynting al things to al men. And whatsoeuer the Ethnickes ascribed vnto fortune: that same we ought to attribute vnto the prouidence of God. And that the most wycked persons that haue bene: were of God appointed to be wicked euen as they were.

Ecclef. 4.

Crowley.

pp. 4.

Here

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Here it appeareth, that the chiefe quarrell that Cerberus had, when he wrote this aunswere to his friends letter, was against Crowley. If the spirit of loue had led him, he might haue had conference wth Crowley (for belike he knoweth him well ynough) & not thus maliciously by setting out his answere in print, haue gone about asmuch as lieth in him, not only to discredit the doctrine y^e Crowley preacheth: but also to bring him in displeasure with his Prince, as one y^e teacheth theues, murderers, traitors & rebels, & al other naughty persons to defend their wickednesse by Gods predestination & ordinance. But Crowley shal by Gods helpe, be able to cleare him selfe of all this, & to make the malice of Cerberus so knowne to al men, that he shal from henceforth haue little credit among such as doe not fauour the error of our new Pelagians.

For answere to al y^e Cerberus hath in this his returne to Crowley, written, I might referre the Reader to that whiche I haue already written. But least Cerberus should thinke that that were but a shift, I will aunswere to his Tautologic, or repetition of the same wordes and matter that is before written and answered, and chiefly because he doth here inferre more playnely that which before he meaneth to conclude.

I haue saide, that Gods predestination was the onely cause of Adams fall, that Caine was predestinate to slea his brother Abell, and that the most wicked persons that haue bene, were of God appointed to be wicked, eue as they were. For the first, I referre the Reader to that whiche I haue already written thereof. For the seconde, I say: that as God predestinated Abell to be a figure of Christ and his Church in suffering, so he predestinated Caine to be a figure of the cruell persecuting Jewes & other, that haue, do, & shall persecute Christ & his Church. And as Caine in sleaing his brother Abell was a figure

of

of the cruell persecutours, so was not the murder euill : but as it was the execution of Caines wicked will, it was abhominable sinne, and deserved no lesse punishment at Gods hand, than it had in deepe. And as concerning the power of Caines will, whereby he consented to do this deepe: it was altogether bound to the will of Satan, by the sinne that his Father Adam had first committed, & was not deliuered from that bondage, because he was none of them whome Iesus Christ, the sonne of God had deliuered and made free: as doeth well appeare by that he sayeth: My sinne is greater than that it can be forgiven. He had not receyued the spirite of Adoption, whereby he might cry Abba, Father. Wherefore, it is manifest, that whatsoeuer he did, was abhominable in Gods sight, for he lacked sayth whereby mennes workes are made acceptable before God. For without it, it is impossible to please God. As it is written. *Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo.* Without sayth, it is not possible to please God. And hereof it came, that is written *Ad Cain enim & munera eius Deus non respexit.* God had no regarde to Caine and his oblations. For euen his beste oblations which he offered, were sinne in the sight of God, according to the wordes of Saint Paule. *Quicquid ex fide non est, peccatum est.* Whatsoeuer is not of faith, the same is sinne. How can it be then, but that the murder of his brother must be sinne, as it was the execution of his malicious purpose: but as it is the performance of Gods purpose, it can not be but good. The lyke is to be saide of the murder of the sonnes of Sinacharib committed vpon their own father, and the rebellion of Absolom, the whooredome of the same, the thefte of the Sabines, and whatsoeuer wickednesse we reade of. For God had sayde before, that he woulde slea Sinacharib with the sword, and that the sword should not depart from Dauid.

Hebr. 11.

Genes. 4.

Rom. 14.

4. Reg. 19.

2. Reg. 16.

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2. Reg. 2.
Job. 1.

uols house. And Job sayde : The Lorde hath taken a-
way. In that Cerberus therefore, hath taken vpon him
to write thus maliciouslye againste me and others that
teach the true doctrine of Gods euerslasting predestinati-
on : he is not by our doctrine iustified from sinne therein,
althoughe in the purpose of God the same be god (so; it
is the stirring vp of me and others, to loke more diligent-
ly to the teaching of that doctrine, in such sorte that the
weake Christians be not offended, neyther the enemies
occasioned to blaspheme) but when Cerberus and we
shall stand before the iudgement seat of Christ together :
then shall it appeare with what mynde wee haue both
written. For his malice towards Crowley can not then
be couered.

And where as Cerberus woulde know, where it is
written that all truth should not be playnely spoken : let
him aske Saint Paule why he would first feede his hear-
ers with mylke, and afterwarde with stronger meate.
And let him aske our Saviour Christ, why he sayd that
olde bottles could not holde new wyne, and that ther-
fore men vse to put newe wyne into new vessels that
both maye be preserved together. And as for hys place
that he citeth out of Sirache, (For the lyfe shame not to
say the truth) I refer to the Reader to consider and weigh
by the circumstance of the place. Wherby it shal appeare
how well it maketh for hys purpose. Sirach sayth : For
the lyfe shame not to saye the trueth, for there is a shame
that bringeth sinne, & there is a sinne that bringeth glo-
ry & fauour. Now, how can Cerberus proue by this place
that a preacher must without discretion vtter all truth at
all times & in al places : It is manifest that Sirach mea-
neth to instruct all men, that shame should not kape vs
from confessing the trueth of our owne euill, when we
are depyended therein : for that shame bringeth sinne.

(What

Ecclef. 4.

(What is, causeth vs to lie in hyding our owne faultes be-
foze committed) but the other shame, that is, to doe that
which is not honest, bringeth glorie and fauour. Shame
therefoze sayth Sirach, to do euill : but fo: thy life, shame
not to confesse the euill that thou hast once done, and art
taken wth that, or vehemently suspected therof. But (sayth
Cerberus) how can any man speake moze plainly of this
matter, than they theselues doe : fo: what can be moze
plainely spoken : than that Gods p:destination is the
cause of Adams fall : And that Caine was predestinated
to slea his brother : And that God is both the principall
cause & also the Autho: of al things, both on the one syde
and on the other. &c. Al this is sufficiently answered al-
ready. But y^e cause, why in our writings we vse so plaine
wordes in this matter : is, fo: that we haue not to doe
wth babes that neede milke, but wth open enemies, that
vnder colour to cleare God of iniquitie, go about to take
from him the glorie of his almighty power, and libertie,
to do what he will do wth his owne creatures, without
checke or controlement : And to ascribe to the power of
their owne free will, that gloze that the free mercy of God
deserueth. We doe not this therefore in our common or-
der of teaching, but being enforced by the malice of such
as Cerberus is.

Cerberus.

And further, in the same booke and the same Article.
Yea, I am sure (sayth he) that you will graunt, that if
God doe predestinate a man to do things rashly and
without any deliberation : he shall not deliberate at
all, but runne headlong vpon it, be it good or euill
that he doth. He maketh also an argument after this
sort, saying : Whatsoeuer God foreseeth and prede-
stina-

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destinateth : must necessarily come to passe (for his
prescience and predestination are infallible) but he
foreseeth and predestinateth al things : *Ergo* al things
must come to passe of necessitie. The *minor* of which
Argument is apparantly false. For though God doe
foresee all things : yet doeth he not predestinate
all things. For his foresight doeth extende both to
good and euill : but his predestination is onelye of
things that be good. As the Scriptures and all aun-
cient writers proue. And here againe it is to be no-
ted also : how plainly they make God the Authour
of sinne. For if this *maior* be true, that God doth not
onely foresee, but also predestinate all things : Yea,
euē sinne and euill, as the fall of Adam, and the
murder of Caine, and the wickednesse of all them
that haue bene most wycked : then may this *minor* be
truely annexed : That God is the Authour of al that
he predestinateth. And so must this conclusion nee-
des follow : that God is the Authour of all sinne and
euill. The first parte, that God predestinateth all
things; or all that he foreseeeth : is a proposition of
their own assertiō, without any ambiguitie or doubt-
full meaning. The seconde part, that God is the Au-
thour of al that he predestinateth, is mine assertion.
Which is so manifest and true, that they haue scarce
any maner of colour to deny it. For what is it to pre-
destinate any thing? but first to purpose, decree, and
appoint, and ordeine it to be done? Now, he which
first purposeth, decreeth, appointeth, ordeineth, or
inuēteth a thing to be done: is not he the Author of
the same? Or is not he rightly to be called *Causa, Ori-*
go, Fons, Radix, Principium, Autor? The Cause, Orig-
inall, Fountaine, Roote, Beginning or Authour of
the same? He which first purposeth, decreeth, apoin-
teth,

teth, and ordeineth an Insurrection or Rebellion to
 be made against his Prince: is not he to be apprehē-
 ded as the very Authour of al the sedition, and wor-
 thily and rightly to be iudged and called? What mā
 can be so ignorant: as not to perceiue it? For all the
 worlde knoweth, that for none other cause, one is
 sayde to be the Authour of any thing, but onely, for
 that he is eyther the first inuētor, or else the first pur-
 poser, appointer, & ordeiner of the same. And also,
 whosoever is the first inuentor, or else the first orde-
 ner of any thing: most properly he is sayd to be the
 Authour of the same. Nowe, marke againe the Ar-
 gument, and see how the conclusion followeth. God
 predestinateth all things, yea, euē sinne and euill:
 And God is the Author of all that he predestinateth,
 as hath bene plainly proued: *Ergo*, he is the Authour
 of sinne. This must needes follow, if the first propo-
 sition be graunted. That God predestinateth or or-
 deineth al things, or al that he foreseeeth. Wherefore,
 the olde writers, in confutation of the Manicheans,
 laboured in nothing so much, as to proue, that al-
 though God did foresee all things, both good and e-
 uill: yet dyd he onely foresee, and not predestinate
 those things which are euill. As by an infinite num-
 ber of places, out of the auncient writers, if shorte-
 nesse woulde suffer, I coulde easely proue. But one
 place of Austen, I wil rehearse, which doth not on-
 ly resolue clearly this matter betwene foresight and
 foreordinaunce: or betwene the prescience and pre-
 destination: but also most plainly teacheth, al that
 is to be sayde of predestination: *Propter Ad obiectio.*
Vince. Rehearsing the words, and defending the opi-
 nion of Austen, where he proueth that the Diuell
 can scarcely be called the Authour of sinne, bycause
 N.j. it

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it came of mans owne will, and asketh by what man-
nesse and frenesse men doe attribute that vnto God,
which can not be altogether ascribed vnto the De-
uill. And at the last he concludeth with these words
of Austen.

*Nihil ergo talium negotiorum Deus predestinavit ut fieret:
nec illam animā nequiter et impie, victum, ad hoc ut taliter vi-
ueret preparavit: sed salutem suam non ignoravit. Et de tali iustē
se iudicaturum esse praesciuit: atq; ita ad predestinationem eius
nihil aliud referri potest, nisi quod aut ad debitam iustitiae retri-
butionem, aut ad indebitam pertinet gratiae largitatem.*

Therefore (sayth he) God hath predestinated no
part of any such doings; neither the soule, which af-
terwarde liued wickedly and filthily, hath he prepa-
red to that ende that it should so liue: but he was not
ignorant that such a one it would be. And so no-
thing may be referred to the predestination of God:
but onely that which pertayneth vnto the due re-
compence of his righteoulnesse, or to the vnderferued
gift of his grace. These are the wordes of Austen
which surely are marvellous full of pith, conteyning
the whole summe of that which may be sayde in this
matter of Gods predestinatiō, and are therefore most
worthie to be noted, yea, and to be committed to
heart, or kept in perpetual memorie. For being tho-
rowely weyghed, they do plainly set forth, the full
resolution of all this question.

Crowley.

Cerberus is so maliciously bent agaynst Crowley,
that he can kepe no order in charging him with that that
he hath written agaynst Shaxton. For this (yea, I am
sure) wherewith he chargeth me here, standeth in my booke
more

more than eghte whole leaues after the Argument that he findeth such fault with. Yea, it is parte of that which I doe inferre vpon the confession of Shaxton himselfe, in his Article that I confute, after I had by many Scriptures proued the *minor* proposition of that Argument. But who can hope that Cerberus can with his three mouthes keepe order in his barking? Let me (if I can) aunswere him in order, vnto that wherewith he doth so vnoorderly charge me.

First he saith, that I say that I am sure that Shaxton will graunt, that if God doe predestinate a man to doe things rashly and without any deliberation, he shall not deliberate at al, but runne headlong vpon it, be it good or euill that he doth. Nowe let vs see what Cerberus hath sayde to this. He seemeth to make a great matter of it: For he beginneth thus: And surder. As though y^e wherewith he will now charge Crowley, is more to be detested than the rest that is already spoken of. And yet when he hath made rehearfall of the wordes: he seemeth by silence to allowe them. Wherefore, I will be bolde to say to Cerberus, as I dyd to Shaxton. I am sure that you will graunt, &c.

But as one that brauisedly had gone about to finde fault with wordes that he was not able iustly to disproue: Cerberus leaueth these wordes, and returneth to an Argument that I wrote well most nyne leaues before, and saith. He maketh also an Argument after this sort, saying: Whatsoeuer God foreseeth and predestineth, must necessarily come to passe (for his prescience and predestination are infallible) but he foreseeth & predestineth al things. Ergo, all thinges muste come to passe of necessitie. Here Cerberus hath found matter to babble about. The *minor* proposition of this Argument he findeth no fault withal. Wherefore I will suppose that he thinketh it to be true, that

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that whatsoever God foreseeth and predestineth, must necessarily come to passe. But by Cerberus owne confession, God foreseeth & predestineth all good things. Ergo, all good things come to passe of necessitie. Thus much haue we gotten of Cerberus. So that if it be a Stoicall opinion, to say that all things come to passe of necessitie: yet Cerberus shall not be so cleare from it as he would seeme to be.

But my *minor* proposition must be apparantly false. For though God do foresee all things, yet doth he predestinate only those things which are good, as the scriptures & auncient writers doe proue. So that now there remaineth no more to be proued by me, but that God predestineth those things that be euill. Which thing if I can proue: Cerberus and I are agreed.

Well, If Cerberus would be entreated to belene all that I haue written in the former part of this Apologie: then should the controuersie betwixt vs, sone be ended. For I haue sayde, that euen those things, that are worst in mans doings, are good in Gods purpose. As the consenting to the persuation of the Serpent in the first man: the murder of Abel in Caine, & those wickednesses that others haue wrought: were in Gods purpose good, although in those that did those things, they were exceeding euill. For then hath Cerberus graunted, that God doth predestinate them, and so consequently he hath graunted that they come to passe of necessitie, as those things that God predestineth must needs doe. But whether Cerberus will belene that which I haue written or no: I will by Gods help proue that those actions which in man are most wicked, were predestinated by God to be done: And then I troue mine Argument shal conclude aright, notwithstanding ought that Cerberus shalbe able to say to the contrarie.

And

And leaſt we ſhoulde varie aboute predeſtination, as not agreeing vpon the definition what it is : I am contented to take that deſcription which Cerberus hym ſelfe hath made of it. He ſayth, that to predeſtinate any thing, is firſt to purpoſe, decre, apoynt, or ordeyne it to be done. But God hath firſt decreed to be done all the euil things as euer were done by men : *Ergo*, he hath predeſtinated euils. The *minor* in this argument is proued by that that is wrotten in the fourth Chapter of the Actes of the Apoſtles. *Conueniunt enim in Cinitate iſta, aduerſus filium tuum Ieſum, quem vniſſi, Herodes & Pontius Pilatus, cum gentibus & populis Iſrael: ad faciendum quacumque manus tua & conſiliū tuum decernerunt fieri.* That is to ſay. In this ſame Citie (meaning Ieruſalem) Herode and Pontius Pilate, with the Heathen and the people of Iſraell, gathered themſelues together, agaynſt the childe Ieſus whome thou haſt annoynted: to doe vnto him whatſoeuer things thy hand and counſell haue firſt decreed to be done. What thoſe things were, it is manifeſt in the hystorie of the Goſpels. They called him a Samaritane, they ſayd he had a diuel, they ſought to take him in his anſweres, they went about to ſtone him to death, they accuſed him, they condemned him, and faſtened him to a Crolle, & then rayled vpon him. What could men do worſe than to uſe themſelues ſo towardeſ the ſonne of God : But S. Peter ſayth, that all theſe things were done according as the hand & counſel of God had firſt decreed to be done : Wherefoze I think my *minor* in my firſt Argument that Cerberus ſinderth ſuch fault withall, to be ſufficiently proued.

But now we Cerberus hath made of my *minor*, a *maior*, and framed an Argument for his purpoſe, which I muſt ſay ſome thing to, otherwiſe wpll Cerberus glozie in his Arte.

God doth not onely foreſee, but alſo predeſtinate all things,
p. lii.

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things, yea, euen sinne and euill. &c. But he is Authour of all that he predestineth : *Ergo*, he is the Authour of sinne. The first part (saith Cerberus) is their olone assertion. And for my part, I acknowledge it so to be. But not in that meaning that Cerberus sayth it. For it is not our bare assertion without prouise, but we are able by playne Scriptures and reasons, to proue that God doth both foresee and predestinate all things, as I haue before proued in the confirming of this same proposition, being the *minor* in mine Argument. But for more ample prouise : the Reader may consider that which is written in the Psalm 138. where Dauid the Prophet sayth thus. Lord, thou hast proued me, and hast knowe me. Thou hast knowen my downesitting and my hyrpling. Thou vnderstandest my thoughts long since. Thou hast searched my path, and my couch rounde about, and hast foreseene all my wayes. For loe, there is not a worde in my mouth: Beholde, thou Lord knowest all things. This is sufficient for the prouise of the first parte of this proposition. Which is, that God foreseeth all things. For the prouise of the second part, which is, that God predestineth all things: I haue cited the words of Peter in the fourth of the Acts: wherein is affirmed, & the power & counsel of God did first appoint those things to be done, which were done to Christ by Herod, Pilate, the Gentiles, & by people of the Jewes.

Reasons also we haue to proue the same, which are these. If God should not foresee all things, he could not be prouident in all things : but it must needs be graunted that he is prouident in all things : *Ergo*, he doth foresee all things. If God did not predestinate all things, then might his prouidence be deceyued: but his prouidence can not be deceyued : *Ergo*, he doth predestinate all things. This may suffice for the prouise of our assertion. Now let vs see, howe Cerberus annexeth his *minor* to this *maior*, which

which is this. But God is the Author of all those things that he predestineth. And to proue this doth Cerberus make much a doe, yea and much more than needeth. For we will not sticke to graunt him that God is the Author of all that he predestineth. Well sayth Cerberus, then I conclude, that God is the Author of all sinne & euill. I denie that Argument.

It were but follie to reason much with this bawling Curre, about the rules of Logicke: For it seemeth by his conclusion that he knoweth no Logicke at all. For if he did, he would not so shamelesly inferre a necessarie conclusion vpon the graunting of pure particulars. For it is a generall rule among Logicians, that *A pars particularibus non necesse est sequi veram conclusionem.* It is not a thing of necessitie, that a true conclusion shoulde followe vpon those propositions that be pure particulars. As in this Argument that Cerberus hath made, the maior and minor are. Agayne, he concludeth more than is graunted in the Antecedēt (which is also contrary to the rules of Logick) For though it be graunted, that God is the Author of all that he predestineth: yet is he not the Author, as Cerberus doth conclude that he is: What is to say, the cause, the spring, the fountaine, the roote, the beginning and Author of any thing that is not good. For none euil thing can spring of him that is altogether good & nothing but goodnesse it selfe. As I haue sayd already therefore: so I say agayne. God is the cause, spring, fountaine, roote, beginning and Author of al things that haue any being. For he only hath his being of himself: & all other things haue their being of him. And he alone is the worker of al actions: Nam in eo vivimus, mouemur & sumus. In hym we lyue, move, & haue our being. And as these things spring of God the fountaine of goodnesse, so are they al exceeding good. And as the actions are wrought by him so are they exceeding

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ceeding good also: although in themselves they be exceeding euill, as is the Diuell and al his Angels and members, and all those works that are wrought contrary to the commaundment of God. And the wordes and thoughts that are of the same kinde. As I haue sufficiently proued before, by examples taken out of the holy histories.

Let Cerberus therefore looke vpon his Logick againe, and learne to frame a Syllogismus better. Veraduerture being in his mad mode when he wrote this answer to his friends letter: he had quite forgotten the fourtene modes of the three figures, wherein the Logicians do vse to forme their Syllogismusses. To giue him occasion therefore, to call himselfe to remembrance: I will set downe those short memoriall verses which the teachers of Arte vse to print in the minds of their scholars, to the end that they should not in disputations be abused by such as Cerberus is, which vse to frame Arguments, without either figure or mode. The verses are these.

*Barbara, Celarent, Prima, Darii, Ferioq;
Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, secunde.
Tertia grande sonans, recit at Darnpi Felapton
Adiungens Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferisim.*

Now, if Cerberus be acquainted with these verses: Let him shewe in which of these figures and modes his Syllogismus is formed. And if he find it in none of the: then let him desire some more skillfull than himselfe, to take this matter in hande. For his Arte will not serue him to goe thorow withall, so long as he medleth with them that knowe what Arte is.

I know that the matter contained in Cerberus Syllogisme, may be brought into the forme of a Syllogisme in the first figure, and the thirde mode called *Darii*. After

ter this matter. Whosoever doth predestinate any thing, is the Author thereof. But God doth predestinate sinne. Ergo, he is the Author thereof. Thus farre I haue holpen Cerberus to frame his Argument. But least Cerberus should thinke that I haue framed against my selfe such an Argument as I am not able to salute: I wyll shewe the fallace of it. First in the *maior*, the word Author is doubtfull. For it may be vnderstanded eýther of him that predestinath or foreappointeth a thing to be done, or of him that is the doer of the same thing. And therefore in reasoning it must be explained and made voide of all amphibologie and doubt. For this is a rule in Logicke, that the termes which are vsed in reasoning, must be plaine and void of all doubtfulnesse. If we will therefore make a god *maior* in this Argument, we must say, that whosoever doth predestinate or foreappoint a thing to be done, is so the Author of it, that the acte or deede done, must be ascribed to him, in as much as it is a deede or an acte done. And then may we adde this *minor*, but God hath predestinated and foreappointed the acte or deede that is done by the sinner: Ergo, so farre forth as it is an acte or a deede, God is the Author of it. Here is not God charged with the sinne that man committeth, for that springeth of mans choyse, which being corrupted and made bonde to sinne by the sinne that the first man first committed, can not of it selfe choyse to do any thing in such sort, that the same shall not be sinne. For mans wilddome and choyse, which St. Paule calleth the wilddome of the flesh, neýther is, nor can be subiect to the lawe of God. And so all that man thinketh, speaketh or doth in his owne wilddome & choyse, is against the law & commaundement of God, & so sinne by the cõmon definition of sinne, as is mentioned before.

And to make this matter moze plaine, let vs take one example or tivo, whereof in the holie Hystories & bookes

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4. Reg. 19.

of the Prophets, we haue many, and let vs see how God is the Authoꝝ of the acte oꝝ deede, and not of the sinne that is in the acte. First in the .xix. Chapter of the fourth booke of 2 Kings, we read, that when Sinarib had blasphemed God, and Ezechias the King had made his complaint and prayers to God: the Prophet Esay was commanded to say thus vnto the King. Be not afraid of the wordes wherewith ye haue heard the King of the Assyrians seruants blaspheming me. Beholde, I will chaunge his minde, and he shall heare a tidings, and shall returne into his owne country, & I will querthow him with the sword in his owne land. And in the end of 2 same Chapter, the Historie sayth thus. And when he was worshipping in the Temple of Belsch his God: Adramelech & Sarsar his owne sonnes, slew him with the sword. Here it is manifest, that God according to his promise made to Ezechias, hath killed Sinarib: but yet by 2 sword of his owne sonnes. The acte in this murder is Gods, and so it is exceeding good, so; it is the performance of Gods promise, and the execution of iust iudgement vpon the wicked blasphemer. But the sinne of the acte, was theirs whose handes were instruments to murder their father. For they minded nothing lesse than to fulfill Gods promise, oꝝ to execute his iudgement vpon the blasphemer.

Esa. 10.

The same example we read in the .x. chapter of Esay the Prophet, set forth yet more plainly after this sort. Come Assur, thou rodde of my furie, and the staffe of my wrath, amongst these men. &c. A little after. But he will not think so, and his heart will not be so perswaded: but his purpose will be to destroy, and to bring many Nations to naught. &c. Here we see, how God bled Sinarib as his rod in chastising the Nations: and yet do he sinne in those actions that God wrought by him. And we see also how God bled his sonnes, in destroying him,

him, and yet they sinned in murdering their Father. So is God the Author of the age, which was good in him, and they Authors of the sinne of the age, which was euill in them.

Another example we haue written in the .xiiij. chapter of the second booke of the Kings, where the Prophet Isthah sayth thus to King Dauid. Thus sayth the Lord. Beholde, I will stirre by euill against thee in thine own house, and I will take from thee thy wiues, euen before thy face, and will giue them to thy neighbour, & he shall lie with them in the open sunnelight. Thou haste done this deede in secrete: but I will doe this that I haue spoken of, euen in the sight of all Israell, and in the open sunnelight. The fulfilling of this is written in the .xviij. Chapter of the same booke. The acte whereof wrought by Absolome, was in God, who vsed Absolome as his instrument, the iust punishment that Dauids sinne, in abusing Urias wiffe, had deserved. But the same in Absolome, was abhominable and incestuous. whoredome, whereby Absolome minded to make all Israell thynke, that he abhorred his father, and that he would utterly rote him out.

Let this suffice for the making plaine of that whych I haue said, concerning that which I haue said, touching the acte in God, and sinne of the wicked acte in man.

Thus much for the matter of Cerberus Argument reduced into forme.

Nowe let vs see what may be sayd to that one place, that in steede of so many, Cerberus citeth out of S. Austen. Which doth not onely resolue clearely this matter betweene foresight and p̄destination, but also moste plainely teach all that is to be said of p̄destination.

And first, let vs set downe al the wordes of S. Austen, euen as they stande in the place whereout Prosper doth

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Articulo.ii.
fals. Aug. imp

the them. They are writtē in the elementy of those Articles, which are falsly imposed vpon S. Austen. The wordes of the Article are these. *Quod quando patres incestant filias, & mares filij, vel quando serui Dominos occidunt, sided fiat quia Deus predestinavit, ut ita fieret.* That when the fathers do abuse theyr olone daughters, and sommes theyr olone mothers, and seruantes murder theyr olone masters, the same is done, bicaule God hath predestinated that it should be so done. To this Article doth S. Austen aunswere thus. *Si Diabolo obijceretur, quod talium facinorum ipse Autor, ipse esset inuentor: puto quod aliqua ratione hac se posset exonerare inuidia, & talium scelorum patratorem, de ipsorum voluntate vinceret: quia, celsi delectatur sit furor peccantis, non probaretur tamen se non intulisse vim criminum.* Quas ergo insipientia, quauē demencia desinitur ad Dei referendum esse consilium, quod nec Diabolo in toto ascribi potest: qui in peccantium flagitijs, illecebrarum aduicator, non voluntatum credendus est esse generator? Nihil ergo talium negotiarum, Deus predestinavit ut fieret, nec illam animam, cui patet nequiterq; nihil unum ad hoc ut taliter vinceret preparauit, sed talem suam ipsam non ignorauit. Et de tali se iuste iudicatum esse presciuit. *Atq; ita ad predestinationem eius nihil amplius referri potest, nisi quod ad debitam iustitie retributionem, aut ad indebitam pertinet gratia largiat.* That is to say. If it should be layd to the Diuels charge, that he were the Authour or inuentor of such wicked dooers: I suppose he might by some reason vnburden himselfe of this enuie, and to proue that the committer of such wickednesses, commeth of the will of those men that charge him withall. For although he be delited with the outrage of them that sinne: yet might he proue that he had not enticed them to commit the faultes. By what folly, or what madnesse therefore, is it agreed, that that thing should be referred to the decree of God, which may not be altogether ascribed to the Diuell, which may be thought

thought to be an helper forwarde of the promotions, in the wicked actes of them that Sinne, but not the begetter of their willes. God therefore hath not predestinated any such things to be done, neyther hath he prepared that soule to liue filthily and wickedly, of purpose that it should so liue: but he was not ignorant that it would proue such a one, and he knewe before hand, that he him selfe should execute iust iudgement vpon such a one. And so, nothing may be referred to the predestination of God, more than that, which appertaineth to the due reward of iustice, or to the undeserued gift of grace or mercie.

These wordes (sayth Cerberus) being thorowly weyghed: do plainly set forth, the full resolution of this question. It is very true, they do so. And therefore, I beseech thee good Reader, weigh them well, that thou mayst by them be resolued in this matter of Gods predestination. And that thou mayst so be, thou needest no more but to weigh the wordes of Austens conclusion, wherein he sayth, that there can no more be referred to Gods predestination, but that only which both appertaine eyther to the due reward of iustice, or els to the undeserued gift of mercie.

When Sinacharibs sonnes slew their owne father: was not the acte in this murder & due reward of iustice, for that he had blasphemed God: And had not God sayd before, that he would slea him with the sword for that blasphemie: Why may we not then by S. Austens wordes, referre this dede to Gods predestination: Why Absolom abused his fathers wyues, was not the acte of that incestuous whoredome, the due reward of iustice, for that Dauid had abused the wife of his seruant Urias: And had not God sayd before, that he would punish it so: Why should not the acte therefore, in that incest, be referred to Gods predestination, even by these wordes

that

D. 11.

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that Cerberus doeth for his purpose. In this manner may we say of all other actions, which in the men that do the are wicked; although we know not what sinnes God doth punish by them, whereby the same does in him are exceeding good and iust.

If Cerberus would, he might haue seene some other places of S. Austen, wherein this matter is made moze plaine, than the bare wordes seeme to make it here. First in his xviij. booke, *De Ciuitate Dei*. He sayth thus, *Elegit discipulos quos & Apostolos nominauit, humiliter natos, imbonitos, illiteratos: ut quicquid magnum essent & facerent, ipse in eis esset & faceret. Habuit inter eos unum, quo malo utens bene, & sua passionis dispositum impleret, & Ecclesia sua tollerandorum malorum praeberet exemplum.* What is to say. He (that is to say Christ) did chuse Disciples, whom he called also Apostles, men borne of poore parentes, not called to honour, vniuerse: that he might be and do in them, what so euer they should be, or do. Among these he had one that was naught, that by doing well that euill and naughtie one, he might both fulfill the order of his owne passion, and also giue vnto his Church, an example how to beare and suffer those that be wicked.

Againe, in his first Sermon vpon the first part of the 34. Psalm: S. Austen sayth thus: *Ille videbat traditorem suum, & elegit illum magis ad opus necessarium, illius malo magni bonum operatus est. Et tamen inter duodecim electus est, ne ipse duodecarius tã exiguus numerus esset sine malo: hoc ad exemplum nostrae patientiae, quoniam necesse erat ut inter malos viveremus.* What is to say: He (that is Christ) did see and know him that should betraye him, and he did the rather chuse him as one necessarie for that businesse, and by the euill of that traitour he did worke a great good worke. And yet was the traitour chosen among the twelue, lest that little number of. xij. should be without a naughtie one:

*August. de
Ciuit. Dei. 18.
Cap. 49.*

*August. in
Psalm. 34.*

one : this was done for an example of our patience, because of necessity we must lyue among such as be enill.

Againe in the.59.tract.vpon John he saith. *Quod ergo dico, August. in lohn.tract.59.*

inquit, beati eritis, si feceritis ea, non de omnibus vobis dico. Est inter vos qui non eris beatus, neq. faciet ea, & ego scio quos elegerim : quos ? nisi eos qui beati erunt faciendo que preceperit, ac faciendi monstrauit, qui efficere beatos potest ? Non est igitur traditor Iudas electus ? Quid est ergo quod alio loco dicit ? Nonne ego vos duodecem elegi, & unus ex vobis Diabolus est ? An & ipse ad aliquid electus est, ad quod nūq. erat necessarius ? Non autem ad beatitudinem, de qua modo ait, Beati eritis si feceritis ea. Hoc non de omnibus dicit, scit enim quos ad societatem beatitudinis huius elegerit. Non est ex eis iste, qui panem illius sic cedebat, ut super eū leuaret calcancum. &c.

What is to say: *¶* here as I say therfore (saith Christ) ye shalbe happie, if ye shal do those things: I do not speak those wordes of you al. *¶* here is one amongst you y^e shall not be happie, neyther shall he do those things. And I do know to whō I haue chosen. *¶* whō hath he chosen : none but those, that shalbe blessed in doing those things, that he whiche is able to make them blessed hath commaunded & shewed y^e they ought to be done. Is not y^e traitor Iudas elected then : *¶* what meaneth that then, that Christ saith in another place : Haue not I chosen you. *¶* and one of you is a Diuell : *¶* as he also elected to some thing, whereunto euen he was necessarie : *¶* Trulie, he was not elected to the blessednesse, whereof Christ spake before, when he sayd : ye shall be happie if ye doe those things. He speaketh not this of all : for he knoweth whome he hath chosen to the fellowship of this blessednesse. *¶* This fellow, which did so eate Christs bread, that he did lyft vp his heele against him, is none of that fellowship. &c.

Againe, the same Sainct Austen in the.62. treatise *August. in lohn.tract.62.*
vpon John sayth thus. *Nisi ergo se traderet Christus, nemo tras-*
de-

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deret. Christum. Quid habet Iudas nisi: peccatum. Cogit enim in tradendo Christo salutem nostram cogitauit: propter quam traditus est Christus: sed cogitauit pecunia lucrum. Et inuenit animae detrimentum. Accepit mercedem quam voluit: sed nolenti est data quam noluit. Tradidit Iudas Christum: tradidit Christus seipsum. Ille agebat negotium suae venditionis: iste nostrae redemptionis. Quod facis facito citius, non quia tu potes, sed quia hoc vult qui omnia potest. What is say. Except therefore Christ would deliuer by himselfe: no man could be betraie him. What was there in Iudas more than sinne: For in betraying Christ he minded not to work our saluation, for which Christ was betrayed: but his minde was vpon the gaine of monie, and he founde the losse of his owne soule. He receyued the reward that he desired: but that reward which he was not willing to haue, was giuen vnto him being vnwilling to haue it. Iudas did betraie Christ: and Christ did deliuer by himselfe. The one applied his marchandise, the other, our redemption. What thou doest, doe quickly (sayd Christ) not bicause thou art able to do it: but bicause he that is able to do all things, is willing it should be so.

August. in
Iohn. tract. 107

Againe, in the hundredeth and. viij. treatise vpon Iohn, he sayth thus: Quos dedisti mihi custodiri, & nemo ex his perijt, nisi filius perditionis, vt Scriptura impleatur. Filius perditionis dictus est proditor Christi, perditioni praedestinatus, secundum Scripturam, quae de illo in Psalmo Centesimo octauo maxime prophetatur. What is to say: I haue kept those that thou hast giuen vnto me, and none of them is perished, save only the childe of perdition, that the Scripture might be fulfilled: He that betrayed Christ is called the childe of perdition, bicause he was predestinated to destruction, according to the Scripture, which in the Psalme. 108. chiefe is prophetic of him.

Againe in his questions vpon Exodus, and the. 18. question

question. *S. Austen* sayth thus. *Asiduo Deus dicit, Indu-
vibo cor Pharaonis: & velut causam insert, cur hoc faciat, & im-
plebo signa mea & portenta mea in Aegypto: anquam necessaria
fuerit obduratio Pharaonis, ut signa Dei multiplicarentur vel im-
pleretur in Aegypto. Visitur ergo Deus bene cordibus malis, ad id
quod vult ostendere bonis, vel quod facturis est bonis. What is
to say: God doth oftentimes say, I will harden Pharaos
heart: and he doth as it were bying in a cause why he
would doe it, saying: And I will fulfill my signes and
wonders in Egypt: as though the hardening of Phara-
os should be necessarie to the multiplying and fulfilling
of Gods wonders in Egypt. God therefore, doth use well
those hearts that be euill, for the fulfilling of that thing
that he is willing to shewe to them that are god, or of
that which he mindeth to do for them.*

*August. lib. 2.
Quest. sup. Ex.
Questione. 18.*

If Cerberus had had eyes to see: he might as well
have seen these places of *Austen*, as that one place which
he thinketh is sufficient for the declaration of the whole
matter. And there is not one of these places, that is not of
equall authoritie with that one place of his *Iaca*, and the
first of these places is of greater authoritie, as may ap-
peare to them that will reade the bookes of *S. Austens*
Retractions.

In these places *S. Austen* saith, that *Christ* chose to be
his disciples, such men as were borne of poore parentage,
not called to honour, and vnlearned: that he might be
and do in them, whatsoeuer they should be, or do. The
actions therefore, that were done by them, were his acti-
ons, and were in him exceeding good, although the same
were in some of the exceeding euill. This thing is made
more plaine in the other places cited oute of *S. Austen*.
First he sayth: *Christ* knew him that should betraye
him, and he chose him so much the rather, as one neces-
sary for his businesse. And againe he sayth, speaking of

I. J.

Judas,

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Judas, was not he also elected to some thing whereunto he was necessarie : And againe. Except Christ would haue deliuered vp himselfe : no man could haue betrayed him. What was there in Judas but sinne : As who should say, the acte was Christes, but the sinne in the acte was Judasses. Yea, he saith furder: That which thou doest, do quickly. Not bicause thou art able to do it: but bicause he that is able to do all things will haue it so done. And last of all he sayth of Judas, that he was called the child of perdition, bicause he was predestinated to destruction.

I suppose if Cerberus had scene and well weyghed these places of Austen: he would not haue triumphed so greatly in that one place of his. Neyther would he haue derided the iudgement of those that ascribing the acte vnto God, do iustly ascribe the sinne of the same acte vnto sinfull man, from whose free choyse consenting vnto euill; the sinne of the acte doth spring; and not from God from whom nothing can come that is not exceeding good (as it cometh from him.) But let vs now see how this hell hound playeth with his owne taile.

Cerberus.

But to returne againe vnto those, that contrarie to the Scripture, and all auncient writers: doe teach, that God doeth not onely foresee, but also predestinate both good and euill, as well the murder of Caine, as the holinesse of Abell: and thereby make God plainly the Authour of sinne. Whē they perceyue the outrageous blasphemie, to be ouermuch apparant and manifest: then doe they sometimes closely rolle it vp in a riddle agayne. Which yet for the darke speech thereof, may serue at the least,

least, to blind the eyes of some. As where (among many other wayes) they plainly make God the Author of sinne is, saying that God is not only the principall cause, but also the Authour of all things without exception, both on the one side and on the other. If they be then vrged with the consequence, that God is the Authour of sinne: they will aunswere, that in all & homination, God is the Authour of the fact, but not of the crime, as of the fact, deede or worke of adulterie, Sodometrie, murder and Idolatrie, God is the Author say they, but not of the fault or crime. This *Enigma* haue I heard some men vse, and it is also written in a booke, entituled, a brieffe treatise of election and reprobation, lately set forth and printed in the English tong, where he saith thus. Though we be compelled to say, that God is the Authour of the fact: yet we must answere, but not of the crime.

Areade, areade, what is that? God is the Author of the very fact & deede of adulterie, theft, murder, and treason: and yet he is not the Authour of sinne. And why? The subtiltie of the Riddle is this. That sinne is nothing. The theefe is not hanged for the deede that he hath committed (for God is the Author thereof) but he is hanged for the sinne, and that is for nothing. For whē they say, God is the Author of all things, then nothing is excepted. But sin is nothing, & therefore he is not the Author of sinne. The theefe is hanged for nothing. The murderer is put to death for nothing. The traitor loseth his head for nothing. The wicked are punished in euermore fire for nothing. A marvellous sophistification. A straunge Paradox, & cautelous riddle. But to be short, though many ways, this subtiltie might be answered: I will take onely the definition of sinne, as I finde it written in

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the same booke, where he sayth verie truly.

The nature of sinne, is defined by the authoritie of Scripture, to be a thought, word or deede, contrary to the wyll of God.

Now, bicause they say, that God is the Author of all euil deedes, though not of the crimes: let vs passe ouer the euill thought, and euill words, and speake onely of the deede it selfe, whych he hymselfe Ieshueth to be sinne, and contrary to Gods wyll. If God then be Authour of the fact or deede, which deede is sinne, and cōtrarie to Gods wyll: how can he then say, that God is the Authour of the fact, but not of the fault, seying he hymselfe setteth forth, not only a thought or a word, but also a deede to be sinne? And if God be the Authour of that same deede, whych deede is sinne: is it not a thing most plain, that God is the Authour of sinne?

Crowley.

Marke gentle Reader, I pray thee, how this Poppie playeth with his olone taylor. He imagineth that all, eue as many as do hold, that God doth not only create, but also predestinate al things both good and euill: do therin holde that God is the Authour of all sinne and abominable wickednesse. The contrarie whereof is in the former part of this Apologie, sufficiently proued. But he hath heard, he sayth, yea and seene in an English booke, an *Enigma*, a maruellous sophistication, a straunge Paradox, and a cautelous Riddle, which is this. Though we be compelled to saye, that God is the Authour of the fact: yet we must aunswere, but not of the crime.

Arade, argade, what is that: sayth Cerberus. The Curre can not smell how the ake may be Gods, and the sinne

sinne that is in the acte: his that is the instrument in the working of the acte.

But the subtiltie of this Kiddle, saith he, is this. That sinne is nothing. And then the theefe is hanged for nothing, the murderer is put to death for nothing, the traytour loseth his head for nothing, and the wicked are punished in everlasting fire for nothing. But this is some thing. That Cerberus saith that there is some thing wherof God is not the Authour. And so it followeth upon his wordes, that either there is another being besides God, wherof those things that God is not the Authour of, haue their being: or else that those things haue their being of themselves, and are therein equall with God, whose greatest honour is, in that he is and hath his being of himselfe. But Cerberus must be borne withall, whatsoeuer he saith. For if he be contraried: all hell shall ring of his bawling. We may not conclude by his wordes as he dooth upon ours. But for this once I will be bolde to say, that if God be not the principall cause and Authour of all things without exception: then there be some things, wherof God is not the principall cause and Authour. And so must it needes follow, whether Cerberus will or no, that the wordes in the beginning of St. Johns Gospell are not true. *Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, & sine ipso factu est nihil quod factum est.* By him were all things made, and nothing that was made, was made without him. But we knowe this saying to be true. Wherefore we are bolde to conclude, contrarie to the iudgement of Cerberus: that God is not onely the principall cause, but also the Authour and author of all things. And bicause Cerberus saith that we holde a paradox contrarie to all the aunient writers: let him read that which St. Austen writeth in the. 26. Chapter of his first booke of Retractions. His wordes be these.

Id. 117.

Dm

Iohannis.

August. lib.
Retra. cap. 26

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Deus autem mali auctor non est: ubi videndum est, ut malum intelligatur quod dixi. Mali Auctor non est, quia omnia quae sunt, a deo sunt: quia in quantum sunt, sunt a deo: ubi videtur. Et hoc ut patetur, non ab illo esse pernam malorum, quia ubi malum est, non qui puniuntur. Sed hoc ita dixi, quemadmodum dictum est. Deus mortem non fecit. Cum alibi scriptum sit. Mortis & vitae a Domino, Deus est. Malorum ergo poena, quae a Deo est, mala est quidem malis, sed in bonis Dei operibus est, quoniam iustum est ut mali puniantur, & ubi bonum est, omne quod iustum est. What is to say:

Sapient. i.
Eccles. ii.

Whether God be not the Author of the thing that is evil & where men must take heed, that they do not mischieve that which I have said, that is: That God is not the Author of that which is evil; for he is Author of all those things that bring any being, for in as much as they be, they be good. Also men must take heed, that hereby they take not occasion to think, that the punishment of the wicked cometh not of God: which punishment, is also evil unto them that be punished. But I spake this, when as it is said, that God made not death. Whereas in another place it is written, Death and life are of the Lord God: The punishment therefore of the wicked, which cometh of God, is evil unto them that be evil. But yet it is among the good works of God. For it is right that the wicked be punished, and every thing that is right, is good.

I suppose that when Cerberus hath read and well weighed these wordes of St. Austen: he will not say that we hold a Paradox, unless he minde to match St. Austen with us. Which if he shall do, he shall shake his stone bissing verie sore. For it standeth well, most altogether upon St. Austen's ground, although without Saint Austen's consent.

But Cerberus will loke, that some thing should be said to the answer that he maketh to our subtile sophistication

Alcatia. For he seemeth to himselfe to haue sayd so much that will we will we, it must be confessed that God being the Authour of the thing that is euill, he is also the Authour of the euill and sinne that is in the thing.

Cerberus saw many wayes, whereby the subtiltie of our Riddle myght be answered: but he would vse onely the definition of sinne, whiche he found written in the same English booke that our *Enigma* is written in. Oh what a valiant champion is this, he will vse none of his owne weapons: he wil be able to wound vs, yea utterly to beate vs downe and conquer vs with our owne weapons. Herie trulie hath that English writer sayd (sayth Cerberus) that the nature of sinne, is defined by 3 authoritie of Scripture, to be a thought, word or deede contrarie to the will of God. And bicause he will not seeme to take too much bauntage: he passeth ouer the thoughts & words, and taketh only the deedes done against the will of God. And with them he wil beate vs down flat to the ground.

The reason that he useth, is this. If God be the Authour of that deede that is sinne and contrarie to the will of God, how can he say that God is the Authour of the fact and not of the fault: Here is a substantiall answer. Bicause Cerberus can not tel how it should be so: therefore it is not so, neyther may any man say it is so. And yet I haue proued it to be so, both by the example of Sathanas death and other. As Cerberus may see, if he will, in the former part of this Apologie.

Cerberus.

And all thys their trauell is so proue, that the ordinance and predestination of God, doth so carrie men euen headlong, vnto all actions, though they be

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be neuer to misse his end: that of necessity they must
 needs and can not chioose but commit the same. Al-
 though Gods predestination were like a tempest of
 winde, so blowing in the sayles of a mans heart, that
 by it he is caried headlong to all things, whatsoeuer
 he doth, according to the saying of the Poet, *Lumina-
 ris atq; magis, p'cepit agere omnia Fatum*. Nowe, more and
 more destinie hurleth al things headlong. But sure-
 ly, this Stoicall necessitie, maketh such a confusion
 of all things: that let them colour vp the matter
 with as much cunning as they can, and qualifie it
 with as fayre wordes as may be: yet shall there neuer
 the state of a common wealth in England stand, if
 thys perswasion may once take roote amog the peo-
 ple, beside that it is vtterly repugnant to the holie
 Scriptur, and against all the auncient wryters, as
 shalbe hereafter briefly proued.

Crowley.

As for Cerberus is bolde to affirme, that all that
 we do, is nothing else but to proue, that Gods ordina-
 nce and predestination both carrie headlong all men into all
 actions, be they neuer so mischieuous, as a tempest carri-
 eth all afoye &c. &c. Surely Cerberus is too bolde heretofore:
 and doeth much mistake the purpose of our traualle. If
 he would, he might see (except he smoke of Hell haue mar-
 red his sight) that our purpose is, to proue that God in
 wisdome doth knowe, foresee and order all things. And
 that nothing can be done by any creature other wise than
 as by his instruments, which he doeth vse in wisdome,
 mercie, and iustice, and that so all actions are his, as the
 chiefe worker in all things. And that the same actions,
 as they are wrought by him, are exceeding good: although

In the creatures that God bleth for his instruments, some of them be exceeding euill. But Cerberus sayth, we doe maintaine Stoicall *Fatum* or destinie. And that if thys perswasion may once take place in the people: there shall neuer state of a Common welth stand in England. Besides that, it is contrarie to the holie Scripture, and against all the auncient writers, as he will byelisy proue. Well good Reader. Marke I praye thee, how Cerberus shall proue that he promisseth to proue: and how he shall be answered againe. And then doubt not but thou shalt see how well that blind Curre standeth in his owne coneypte, and thinketh himselfe to haue a cleare sight.

Cerberus.

And where they denie this doctrine of theirs to be the Stoicall opiniō, bicause the Stoikes (say they) fayned, that nature, wyth such order of cause as she hath tyed together, doth bring all things to passe by necessitie. But they affirme, that God by his eternall predestination, foreordinance, and providence, bringeth all things to passe by like necessitie. Thus doe the best learned of them make the difference. But a playne dilusion it is, to blinde the eyes of men withall. For (as *Priscianus* sayth) *Fatum* (which we call destinie) is deriued of the particple *Fatus*, whych is as much to say, as spoken. Bicause it is nothing else (saith he) but that which is spokē or appointed of God. As if a mā should say, it must nedes be so, for God hath spoken the worde. *Ensebius* also citing the definitiō of *Chrysippus*, sayth, that *Fatum* is nothing else but a certain decree, ordinace or determination of God. Which thyng (to make no more rehearfall of many mens sayings) Augustine plainly
 Q. I. decla-

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declared in his booke, *De Civitate Dei. Lib. 5. Cap. 1.* Thus sayth he is it proued, that they dyd call the will of the high God, *Fatum*. Gods wyll sayeth Austen; they called *Fatum*, or destinie. It is manifest therefore that the Stoikes did not imagine, that nature by an order of causes brought all things to passe by necessitie. But rather that God, foreordaining and appointing in order all causes in nature or otherwyle: brought all thyngs to passe by necessitie. Whych thyng together wyth the order of causes, *Tullie* speaketh of plainly, saying: *Fati necessitas. &c.* The necessitie of destinie (sayth *Tullie*) is that, which of God is ordeyned and appointed that it come to passe by an everlasting order of causes.

Crowley.

The Stoikes & we (as Cerberus sayth) do differ only in this. That they affirme al things to come to passe by necessity of destinie: & we, by necessity of Gods eternal predestination, foreordinance, & providence. And this is the difference that the best learned amongst vs do make. Who these best learned be, Cerberus doeth not tell vs. But this I am sure, that none amongst vs that is learned, wyll say that there is none other difference betwene the Stoicall opinion and ours, than that which Cerberus hath set downe. For the Stoikes helde, that the willes of men are not vnder the necessitie of their *Fatum* or destinie, because they could not see how it should so be, and yet be free also, as it may well appeare by that that *Seneca* writeth in the .x. Chapter of his fift booke. *De Civitate Dei*, where his words are these. *Vnde, nec illa necessitas formidanda est, quam formidando Stoici laborauerunt: causas rerum ita distinguere, ut quasdam subtraherent necessitati quasdam subderent:*

*August. De
Ciuir. Dei. lib.
9. Cap. 10.*

rent: atq; in his quas esse sub necessitate noluerunt, posuerunt etiam nostras voluntates, ne videlicet non essent liberae, si subderentur necessitati. &c. What is to say. Wherefore, that necessitie is not to be feared, the feare wherof caused the Stoikes so to deuide the causes of things, that they pulled alway some things from necessitie, and thrust some things vnder it: and amongst those things that they would not suffer to be vnder necessitie, they haue placed our willes, lest they should not be free, if they should be subiect to necessity. &c. But we hold, that all things, our willes & altogether, are subiect to Gods prouidence: Ergo, there is more difference betweene the Stoikes and vs, than Cerberus sayth that there is. And it is no dilution at all that we vse in y^e we refuse to cal it *Fatum* or destinie: although we know that Priscian^s & Tullie, Eusebius, Chrysippus & other, do in their sort, speake of *Fatum*, after such sort, that to the negligent Reader there may seeme smal difference betweene them and vs, in the matter of Gods eternal and euermlasting prouidence and predestination. For we follow herein S. Austen, whose sentence Cerberus would faine frame against vs. But I pray the gentle Reader, marke well the wordes of S. Austen, euen in the same booke, out of which Cerberus citeth matter against vs. As hea and in the selfe same Chapter, which is the first of the first booke: where the wordes that he sathereth vpon S. Austen, are not found. But these wordes are found there. *Proxius diuina prouidentia, regna constituntur humana. Quae si propterea quisquam fato tribuit, quia ipsam Dei voluntatem vel potestatem fato nomine appellat, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat. Cur enim non hoc primum dicat, quod postea didimus esse, cum ab illo quisquam quaesierit, quid dixerit Fatum? Nam id homines quando audiunt, usitata loquendi consuetudine, non intelligunt nisi vim positionis solum, qualem est quando quis nascitur, siue concipitur: quod aliqui alienant a Dei voluntate, ali-*

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qui ex illa etiam hoc pendere confirmant. That is to saye. The Kingdomes of this worlde, are altogether ordeyned by the prouidence of God. Which if any man haue giuen vnto destinie, bicause he doeth call the will or power of God it selfe, by the name of destinie: let the same continue in his opinion, but let him reforme his tong. For why doth he not at the first say that, which afterward he will say, when any man shal aske him what he doth call destinie? For when men do heare that thing: they do not by the common maner of speech vnderstande any other thing, than the force of the position of the starres, as the same is when any is borne or conueyed: which some men do seporate from the will of God, and some do proue that the one doth hang vpon the other.

In these wordes S. Austen doth plainly affirme, that euen Kingdomes of this world are appointed by Gods prouidence: and yet he denieth that the same should be said to be appointed by destinie. Wherefore in affirming the one, and denying the other, we doe but as S. Austen doeth.

How aptly Tullie is cited for the purpose of Cerberus: shal plainly appeare in mine answer to that which here followeth.

Cerberus.

The same order of causes also, is not forgotten of our mē, that in al points their doctrine might agree wyth the Stoicall doctrine. As in an English booke, translated out of French, lately set forth in print, & entituled, a briefe declaration of the table of predestination, where he sayth. Seyng God hath appointed the end: it is necessarie also, that he should appoint the causes which leade vnto the same ende. As if

if he should saye. Like as God hath appointed some man to be hanged: so hath he appointed him also to steale, as a cause leading vnto the same end whervnto he hath appointed him. Or else, it was his destinie to be hanged: *Ergo*, it was his destinie to steale. Or thus (which is all one) he was appointed by Gods predestination to be hanged: *Ergo*, he was appointed by Gods predestinatiō to steale. For seying God hath appoynted the ende (sayth he) it is necessarie also, that he should appoint the causes that leade vnto the same ende. As for ensāple. If thys be true, which they say, that God doth predestinate all things, or that God doth both appoint the end of all things, and also the causes which leade vnto the same end: then doth it follow & may truly be sayd, that Marten Swarth wyth hys men, was appointed and predestinate of God to be slaine at the battel of Stoke. And further, it foloweth, as God appoynted Martē & his fellowes to this end: so was sir Richard Symō the Priest, appointed & predestinate of God, to poure in the pestilent poyson of priuie conspiracie, & traiterous mischief of vayne glorie into the heart of Lambert his scholer, as a cause leading to the same ende. Item that the sayd Lambert, was appointed & predestinate of God, to consent and agree vnto the pestiferous perswasion of his master Sir Richard, in the pride of Lucifer, to aspire vnto the high type of honor, in deposing (if it possible were) the ryght and most noble heire of England, and eleuating hymself lyke a trayterous villaine, into the royall throne of the same, and that thus he was appointed of God to doe, as another cause leading vnto the same ende which God ordeyned. Item, that the Irysh men were appointed of God to be Rebellious traytours

Q. iij.

against

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against their Soueraigne Lord the King of England, and to maintayne the false and filthy quarrell of the said Lambert; as another cause leading to the same end. Item that the Ladie Margret sister vnto King Edward the fourth, was appoynted and predestinated of God, to be a traytouse to Englande, and to employ all hir wyt, force and power, to the vtter destruction of his naturall cōuerie, as another cause leading vnto the same end. Item that the sayd Ladie Margret was appoynted of God to conduct and hire Marten Swarth and hys men, to inuade the Realme of England, as another cause leading to the same end. Item that the sayd Marten Swarth, the Earle of Lincolne, the Lord Louell, the Lorde Gerarde, and diuers other Captaines of the Rebels, were appointed or predestinated of God, to be of such valiant courage, in maintayning the false quarrell of traitorous Lambert, that they were slaine: on the other side, many a true English mans blood; at the battell of Stokes, which was the ende of this wofull Tragedie, and by this, theyr manifest forme of doctrine, was altogether and euery part, appointed and ordeined of God, both the end and also the causes aboue rehearsed; and other innumerable, whych did leade vnto the same ende.

Crowley.

Here are many words and little matter. Great Items and small summes. A great deale of descant and no good plaine song. Being God hath predestinated the ende: it is necessarie also that he should appoint the causes which leade vnto the same end, sayth an English booke entitled a declaration of the table of Predestination. And what hath

hath Cerberus said here, to disprove this consequence :
 So far as I am able to iudge : we may graunt him all
 that he hath said : and yet affirme still, that if God haue
 appointed the ende : he hath also appointed the causes
 that leade to the same end. But I will understand Cer-
 berus, as I suppose he meaneth : that is, that God doth
 neither appoint the end, nor causes that leade therunto.
 If this be not his meaning : then hath he ment nothing,
 but to make simple men suppose that he is able to saye
 much. And see, gentle Reader, how well he agreeth with
 Dr. Aulsen, whose authoritie he woulde faine vse, both in
 steade of a sword and buckler. In the xxxvi chapter of his
 first booke, *De Civitate Dei*. Dr. Aulsen sayth thus. *Qui vero*
non affirmat constitutionem, sicut effectum quidam conspiciunt, vel
nascentur, vel inchoant, sed omnium connexionem, scilicet causam,
quae sit, omne quod sit, Fati nomine appellant : non multum sum-
ma de verbi controversia labandam atq. errandum est : quan-
doquidem ipsum causarum ordinem, et quandam connexionem
Dei summi tribuunt voluntati et potestati. Qui optimi et ver-
acissime credunt, et curata scire antequam fiant, et nihil inordi-
natum relinque : a quo sunt omnes potestates, quoniam ab illa
non sunt omnium voluntates. That is to say, As for those men,
 which do call by the name of destinie, not the constituti-
 on, or order of the celestiall signes, as y^e same is at the concep-
 tion, birth, or beginning of any thing, but the knitting
 together & order of all causes, whereby euery thing that
 is done, is brought to passe: we neede not much to labour
 and contende with them about the controuersie of that
 word: because they do attribute to y^e wil & power of God,
 that order and certain knitting together of causes, which
 is verie well and truly thought to knowe all things be-
 fore they come to passe, and to leaue nothing unordered:
 of whom al powers haue their being, although all mens
 willes doe not spring of him.

Here

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Here mayst thou gentle Reader, holde Cerberus fast, out with him, whose authoritie he woulde seeme chiefly to leane to. Austen sayth, that whatsoeuer is done cometh to passe by that knitting together and continuall order of causes which the Stoikes call destinie. But Cerberus will haue al set at six and seauen, and that nothing should come to passe by any such order. Austen sayth that it is verie well and truely thought, that God doeth knowe all things befoze they come to passe, and that he doth leaue nothing vnoyered. But Cerberus will none of that. For then must Marten Swarth & his men, Sir Richard Simon Briest, and his scholler Lambert, the Irish men, Lady Margret, the Earle of Lincolne, the Lorde Lowell, with the rest that rebelled in King Edwards the fourthes time, be appoynted and ordeyned of God to doe as they did. But rather than it should be so, Cerberus will say with Corra, that there is no God at all. For so doth S. Austen conclude by Ciceroes disputation that he hath agaynst the Stoikes. His wordes be these. *Quomodo igitur ordo causarum, qui praescienti certus est Deo, id efficiat, ut nihil sit in nostra voluntate, cum in ipso causarum ordine, magnum habeant locum nostra voluntates? Contendit ergo Cicero cum eis qui huc causarum ordinem dicunt esse fatalem, vel potius ipsam fati nomine appellant, quod nos abhorremus: precipue propter vocabulum, quod non in re vera consuevit intelligi. Quod vero negat ut ordinem omnium causarum esse certissimum, & Dei praescientia notissimum: plus eum quam Stoici detestatur. Aut enim deum esse negat, quod quidem inducta alterius personae in libris de Deorum natura, facere molitus est: Aut si esse confitetur Deum, quae negat praescium futurorum, etiam sic dicit nihil aliud, quam quod ille dicit insipiens in cordo suo, non est Deus. Qui enim non est praescius omnium futurorum: non est utique Deus. What is to say. How doth the order of causes then, which is certayne to God that knoweth them befoze, bying to passe, that*

*August. lib. 5
De Ciui. dei. 9*

that there should be nothing in our will: seeing our wills
to beare a great sway euen in the order of causes it selfe:
Let Cicero therefore strine with them that say that this
order of causes is fatall, or rather that do giue it þ name
of destinie, which thing we do abhorre: chiefly for the
name, which is not accustomed to be vnderstanded in
the thing it selfe. But where as he doth denie that the or-
der of all causes is most certaine and knowen to the pre-
science of God: we do detest him more than the Stoikes
did. For either he doth denie that there is a God, which
thing in his booke concerning the nature of the Gods,
he doth vnder an other mans person endeuour to do: or
else, if he do confesse that there is a God, whom he deni-
eth to know of things before they come to passe: euen so
saying, he doth none other thing than did that foolish mā
which said in his heart, there is no God. For he that doth
not knowe afoze hand all things that are to come, doubt-
lesse the same is not God. If Cerberus had had so much
leisure as to read ouer this ninth Chapter of S. Austens
fift booke, out of the which he would faine finde matter
against vs: no doubt he would not haue bragged so
much of S. Austens authoritie. But by like he trusted
some other mens notes gathered out of S. Austen, and
neuer saw the booke of S. Austen himselfe. I speake this
in his fauor. But see gentle Reader, how well Cicero
serueth for the purpose that Cerberus doth alleage him
for. And as thou findest him in this point, so trust him in
the rest. Cicero doth not only reason against them that
say there is a destinie called in Latine *Fatum*: but also a-
gainst all that say there is a God that hath knowledge of
things to come. And so consequently he affirmeth that
there is no God at all. Spoyleing God of his foreknow-
ledge (as S. Austen sayth) rather than he would suffer
man to be spoiled of his free will. But þ religious minde

*August. lib. 5
De Cinit. 9.*

R. 1.

(sayeth)

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(sayeth so, Austen) doeth chose both, doeth confesse both, and with the faith of goodlinesse doth cōfirme both. What is to say, the foreknowledge of God, and the libertie of mans will. So that whatsoeuer man doth, we say and beleue, that he doth it with the content of his will.

Cerberus.

Alas who seeth not the destruction of England to follow this doctrine? who seeth not the confusion of all common weales, to depend herevpon? What Prince may sit safely in the seat of his kingdome? What subiect may liue quietly possessing hys owne? What man shall be ruled by right of a lawe: if thys opinion may be perfectly placed in the heartes of the people? But to be short: thou seest here by example, the same which *Tullie* calleth *Series causarum*, the continuall order of causes appointed of God. And our men euen in like maner, call it the causes appointed of God, to leade vnto the same end which he hath ordeyned. Whereof followeth the force of cannot chuse, which is called *Fati necessitas*, Fatall necessitie, or the necessitie of Gods ordinance: for as you haue heard, *Fatum* is nothing else but a decree or ordinance of God. Which necessitie is set forth of some men vnder the name of Gods predestination, & now oftentimes the same thing is set forth also by thys word prouidence. Which name of prouidence likewise the Heathen Stoikes vsed for the same purpose, as *Cicero* sayth. *Pronoea anus fatidica Stoicorum, quam Latine licet prouidentia dicere.* Pronoea in Greke, saith he, the olde wyfe of the Stoikes that setteth forth theyr destinie, which in Latine was called *Prouidentia*, the prouidence of God. But let them call it prouidence, predestination

destination, preordainance, or what they will: this is (no doubt) the very Stoikes opiniō, that God hath so appoynted and preordeyned all thyngs, that of meere necessitie they come to passe. And what foueuer men do, whether it be good or euill: they can not chose but do it. Which necessitie *Seneca* also manifestly declareth in these wordes. *Necessitates omnium rerum quas nulla vis rumpat: fatum existimo.* The necessitie of all thinges, sayth he, which no force or violence can breake: that same I holde to be destinie.

Crowley.

Howe Cerberus can no longer keepe it in. He must needs breake out in an exclamation against the doctrine of prouidence, predestination & preordainance. For (sayth he) it is none other thing than the very opinion of *Stoikes*, call it what we will. Who seeth not the destruction of England: &c.

If God doe by his prouidence gouerne all things: If God haue predestinated or preordeyned all things, so that they shall come to passe in such time and order as God by his prouidence, predestination and preordainance hath appoynted that they shall: then must no man be so blinde as not to see, that Englands must be destroyed. Then must all Commonweales come to confusion. When shall no King sit safely in his kingdome, nor any subiect in his possession. Yea, no man shall be ruled by the right of a law: but if God do leaue the matter to mans discretion, to vse the matter as he shall see cause, and doe but put to his helping hand when he seeth that man goeth about to bring things to good effect, but in any case determine by: on nothing, tyll the same shall be by mans wisdom deuised and enterprised: then shall England and all other

R.ij.

Common:

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Commonweales flourish still, then shall all Princes safely sit in their Kinglie seates, then shall all subiectes quietly enioy their possessions, and enery man be ruled by the right of a lawe. Thus much followeth vpon the pityfull complaynt that Cerberus maketh vpon the doctrine of Gods prouidence, his predestination, or preordination: but I would gladly know, what Cerberus thinketh to be the cause, that in King Edward the fourthes dayes, Parten Swarth, Syr Richard Simon, and the rest, made such a styxe in England. Was it for that they were perswaded in this doctrine that Cerberus seemeth to make the cause of all such doings? Surely I suppose there was not one of them that did once dreame of any prouidence of God. For those that take such matters in hand, are commonly as great enemies to Gods prouidence, as is Cerberus himselfe. And shall Cerberus wordes make vs afraide, to say that God in his prouidence had predestinated & preordinated all those things to be done: yea, & that it could not other wise be, but that those things must then be done: Surely, I can see no cause why we should feare so to say: Let Cerberus and his fellows conclude what they wil. For I am sure S. Austen in the i. Chapter of his first booke *De Ciuitate Dei*: will take our parte herein. His wordes are these. *Si autem illa desinitur esse necessitas, secundum quam dicimus, necesse esse ut sit aliquid vel ita fiat: nescio cur eam timeamus, ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis.* What is to say. If we call that thing necessity, whereby we say of any thing that it must needs be, or that it must needs be so done, then do not I see why we should feare, least that should take from vs the libertie of our will. When we say therefore that of necessity Parten Swarth and the rest, must make such a styxe as they did in King Edward the fourthes dayes: do we take from them the libertie of their will: So sayth S. Austen. For they

*August. lib. 5
10. Cap. de
Ciuit Dei.*

they did whatsoeuer they did, with the free cōsent of their willes, and felt no contrapunt at all: But Cerberus is not so satisfied, he wyll be inquisitiue to knowe what shoulde be the cause why God woulde in his prouidence predestinate these men to doe these things. I wil answer with S. Austen, I can not tell. God doth knowe a cause: but he hath not made Cerberus and me priuie to it. *Ocult a causa esse potest, iniusta non potest.* What is. The cause may be secrete: but it can not be vniust. Is there any iniquitie with God? God forbidd. What Seneca thought of destinie, we passe not. But with S. Austen we saye. *Omnia verò fato fieri non dicimus, imò nulla fieri fato dicimus: quoniam fati nomen ubi solet à loquentibus poni, id est, in constitutione syderum, qua quisq; conceptus aut natus est: quoniam res ipsa inaniter asseritur, nihil valere monstramus. Ordinem autem causarum, ubi voluntas Dei plurimum potest, neq; negamus, neq; fati vocabulo nuncupamus, nisi forte vi fatum à sando dictum intelligamus, id est, a loquendo. Non enim abnuere possumus, esse scriptum in litteris sanctis: semel locutus est Deus, duo hæc audiamus: quoniam potestas est Dei: & tibi Domine misericordia: quia tu reddes unicuiq; secundum opera eius. Quod enim dictum est, semel locutus est: intelligitur immobiliter, hoc est, incommutabiliter est locutus, sicut nouit incommutabiliter omnia, quæ futura sunt, & quæ ipse facturus est. Hac itaq; ratione possumus à sando fatum appellare, nisi hoc nomen iam in alia re solcret intelligi, quo corda hominū nolumus inclinari.* What is to say. We say not that all things do come to passe by destinie: yea we say that nothing is done by destinie. For we do plainly shew, that the name destinie is of no value, in the place where men be to place it in speaking, that is in the constitution of the heauenlie signes, wherein euery man is concerned and bozne, bicause the thing it selfe is vaineely affirmed. As for the order of causes, wherein the will of God is of great force and power: we doe neither denie, nor call it

K. lxx.

by

*Epist. 59. ad
Paulinum.*

*Aug. De Ci-
uit. lib. 5. cap. 9*

Psal. 62.

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by the name of *destinie*, except it be so as we may understand *Fatum* to be deriued of the word *For feris*, that is of speaking. For we can not denie but it is written in the holie Scriptures: God spake once, these two sayings, I my selfe hearde it: that power belongeth vnto God, and vnto thee (*Q. 1. 2.*) belongeth mercie: for thou wilt giue vnto euery man according to his workes. And where as it is said, he spake once: we vnderstand that he spake vnmoueably, that is vunchaungeably, euen as he did vunchaungeably know al things that are to come, and that he himselfe will do. After this sort therfore, we may say that *Fatum* or *destinie*, is deriued *à fondo*, or speaking, if this name had not now bene accustomed to be vnderstanded of another matter, wherevnto we are not willing that mens hearts should be enclined.

Now if Cerberus haue ought to say against this, let him make so. Austen one of vs. For we are in this point all one with him.

Cerberus.

And as for that which the Heathen did attribute to the starres or planets, they meant none other, but that God ordeined the planets in nature to worke such things, as he before had decreed & appointed: Euen as we also iudge, that God vseth the operation of the planets in sending such rayne & tempest, faire weather or foule, as his pleasure is, let them say therfore what they can or wil. This meere necessitie which our men do teach, is the verie same which the Stoikes did hold, which opinion because it destroied the state of a common wealth, it was banished out of Rome, as Augustine declareth. *Lib. Quest. ret. & no. Tett.* Where he notably refelleth that opinion in these few

few words, saying. *Qua ratione nati dicuntur.* &c. By what reason (sayth Augustine) were they borne which banished *Mathematicos*, the setters forth of destinie out of Rome, which law was kept, and they were but Heathen, howe were those things done by destinie which make agaynst destinie? But surely if there be a destinie, it doth nothing against it selfe, saith Aug. For so were destinie, no destinie, or at the least, destinie fighting agaynst it selfe: Or to speake the same in those wordes, which our men by abuse take out of the Scripture, to maintain the very same matter. If it be Gods predestination that men should write and speake agaynst hys predestination, as they saye some men do, then is Gods predestination a Kingdome, not only deuided, but also fearcelly fighting agaynst it selfe. O miserable absurditie which any child may perceyue must needs follow, if all things come to passe with absolute necessitie by Gods predestination as they teach. Thys same doctrine also that all euill springeth out of Gods ordinance, or that Gods predestination was the cause of Adams fall and of all wickednesse, is plainly maintained in an English booke lately set forth and entituled agaynst a priuie Papist. &c. where among many open and plaine sentences vpon this matter. I find an argument made in these words: Whatsoever was in Adam was in him by Gods wil & ordinace: sinne was in Adam, *Ergo* sinne. &c. was in him by Gods will & ordinace. The *major* of which argument being vnderstand of Adam after his fall, is manifestly false, & therefore the cōclusion also is false, for if it may be sayd of Adam after his fall (as by the *minor* you wel perceyue that he so doth vnderstand it) then may it also be sayd now of any man, that what execrable wickednesse so euer
is

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is in any mā, that same is in him by Gods wil & ordinance. He goth about also to proue the same by another argumēt which he maketh speaking of the lying spirit, saying: God cōmaūded him to sinne, but God commaūded nothing which he ordeineth not, so he ordeined him to sinne. Which argument it was maruel that any man could be so blind as not to see how it might with more strength and force, and much more manifest truth be turned against him in this sort: speaking of Adam, yea and of all men saying, God commaūded Adam, and doth commaūde all men to absteyne from sinne, but he commaūdeth nothing which he ordeineth not. *Ergo* God ordeined Adam and all men to absteyne from sinne. If God then ordeyned Adam and all men to absteyne from sinne, than did he not ordeyne Adam or any man to commit sinne, so was not sinne in Adam, or in any man by Gods will and ordinance, nor Gods ordinance the cause of Adams fall, or of any mans sinne. And therefore their opinion is vtterly false: also if God in hys secret counsell do predestinate, appoint, and ordeine man to sinne, and yet gyue vnto him a straight law and commaūdement not to sinne: is not then his secret wyll contrary to his open word? and hys eternal ordinance, repugnant to his written law: All theyr sayre wordes and fine framed fetches can not auoide it.

Crowley.

Let vs say what we can or wyll (sayth Cerberus) the more necessitie that we teach shall be all one wyth that which the Stoikes helde, affirming their *Fatum*, or destinie. To this I haue sufficiently answered before, shewing plain:

plainly by *S. Austens* wordes, that we teach none other doctrine herein, than did *S. Austen* in the same booke *De Civitate Dei*, out of which *Cerberus* citeth matter against us.

But now *Cerberus* hath founde another authoritie of saint *Austen* against us, in his booke (as *Cerberus* sayth) which he wrote, and entitled : *Questiones ex utroq; Testamento*. In the question. 115. he sayth thus. *Qua autem ratione nati dicuntur, qui Mathematicos urbe Roma prohibuerunt, quod ius servatum non ignoratur? Et cerè Pagani fuerunt. Quomodo fato sunt quæ contra fatum sunt? Sed si est fatum, non facit contra se. &c.* That is to say. By what order shall it be sayd that those men were bozne, which did forbode the Mathematicks (that is to say) tellers of mens fortunes, or destinies to come within the Citie of Rome. And it is wel known that that lawe was kept. And doubtlesse these men were Heathen men. Howe are those thinges done by destinie, which are against destinie? But if there be a destinie, it worketh against it selfe. &c. sayth *Austen*. But say there Master *Cerberus*: and proue that *Austen* was Authour of that booke. So may it be of some authoritie with us. But *Erasmus* hath alreadye proued by sundrie good reasons, that *S. Austen* did neuer write it. As may appeare to as many as will reade his iudgement set forth before the beginning of this booke. Where writing of this parte of that booke, out of which *Cerberus* hath cyted the wordes aboue wyrtten, he sayth : *Disputat contra Mathematicos, quosq; alius ingreditur opus, hoc licentius ineptit*. That is to say. He disputeth against the Mathematicks, and the deeper he doth enter into the worke, the more outragiously doth he play the parte of a wole.

But *Cerberus* will not set a Loue by the iudgement of *Erasmus*. We will conclude vpon the wordes of *hys Austen*, that so destinie shoulde be no destinie, or at the

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least, deslinie fighting against it selfe. I say, he wyll not stay there, but as though deslinie and Gods predestination were all one thing: he wyll conclude, that it is also a Kingdome, not onely deuided, but also fiercely fighting agaynst it selfe. And then knytte by the matter with hys manner of exclaiming. O miserable absurditie. &c. Cerberus his heart would haue burst, if he might not haue resolved his fellowes bable to fetch one flourish wythall. Euery childe may see (sayth Cerberus) what absurditie must needes follow. And euery wise man may see (say I) that there can no absurditie followe vpon that necessitie that we teach. For it taketh away no freedom that mans will hath, or ever had. Neyther doth Gods predestination fight against it selfe, because Cerberus wyth his fellowes, were predestinated before the worlde was in this time of the worlde, thus to go about to deface those that doe truely teach, that Gods prescience, providence, and predestination is infallible. For what wise man wil say, that the Potmaker is contrarie to himselfe, because he maketh of his clay some vessels to serue in honourable vses, and some other to vses cleane contrarie? Or who wil say that God is contrarie to hymself, because he hath made, and doeth daylie make some of his creatures to be deuourers and destroyers of the rest: or that nature doth fight against it self: because it doth bring forth both helth: some fode and payson? Surely I thinke there is no man of that minde but Cerberus and his fellowes, and that Austen that Cerberus citeth for his purpose. But how worthy credit that Austen is: is afoze sufficiently declared.

But Cerberus hath found in an Englishe Booke entitled against a priuate Papist, two Argumenes: one in these words. Whatsoeuer was in Adam, was in him by Gods wil & ordinance: sin was in Adam: Ergo sinne. &c. The other speaking of the Holyng spirit, in these words.

God

God commaunded him to sinne: but God commaundeth nothing which he ordeyneth not: so he ordeyned him to sinne. Cerberus mispeth much with these two Arguments. The maior proposition in the first Argument is false, sayth Cerberus. Wherefore, the conclusion can not be true. But S. Austen in his *Enchiridion ad Laurentium*: sayth that the maior is true: Ergo it is lyke that Cerberus sayth not truely. Saint Austens wordes be these: *Hæc sunt magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius: Et tam sapienter exquisita, ut cū angelica & humana creatura peccasset. i. non quod ille, sed quod voluit ipsa fecisset: etiā per eandem creaturæ voluntatem, qua factum est quod Creator voluit, impleteret ipse quod voluit, bene viens & malis tanquam summe bonus, ad eorum damnationem, quos iuste predestinavit ad peccatum: Et ad eorum salutem, quos benigne predestinavit ad gratiam. Quantum enim ad eos attinet, quod Deus voluit fecerunt: quantum vero ad omnipotentiam Dei, nullo modo id efficere valuerunt. Hoc quippe ipso quod contra voluntatem Dei fecerunt: de ipsis facta est voluntas eius. Propterea namq; magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius, de miro, & ineffabili modo, non fiat præter eius voluntatem, quod etiam fit contra eius voluntatē. Quia non fieret, si non sineret: nec utique nolens finit, sed volens. Nec sineret bonus male fieri: nisi omnipotens etiam de malis facere posset bene. That is to say. These are þ great workes of God, sought out, according to all his wylls: and yet wyllsly sought out, so that when the nature both of Angels and man had sinned: that is, had done, not the thing that he wyllled, but that it selfe wyllled, even by the same wyll of the creature, whereby that thing was done, that þ Creature was not wilking should be done, he fulfilled that which he would haue done, euon as he that is best of all, vsing well, euon those things that are euill, to the condemnation of those whome he hath iustly predestinated to paine; and to the saluation of those whom he hath lo-*

*Enchirid. ad
Laur. cap. 100.*

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uingly predestinated to free mercy. As touching themselves, they did \S which God was not willing they should do : but as touching the almightie power of God, they were by no meanes able to bring that to passe. For euen in the verie same thing that they did contrarie to the will of God : his will was wrought vpon them. For that cause therefore, the workes of the Lord are great, & searched out according to all his willes. So that after a maruellous and vnspeakable maner, that thing that is done euen contrarie to his will : should not be done without his will. For if he would not suffer it, it should not be done : neyther doth he suffer it being vniwilling, but willing. Neyther would he that is god, suffer a thing to be euill done : except the same being almightie, were also able to worke a good effect of those things that be euill.

Thou maist see here, gentle Reader, how great cause Cerberus hath to mislike with this Argument. Austen sayth, that after a maruellous and vnspeakable maner, that thing that is done contrarie to the will of God, is not without his will. And thou mayst be bolde, rather to consent vnto that which was writtten against a priuy Papist, hauing Austen also on thy part : than by Cerberus his misliking to be perswaded that that writer hath taught an vntueth.

Of the other Argument, Cerberus sayth, that it was maruell that any man coulde be so blinde, as not to see how the same might with much more strength and force, and manifest truth be turned against himselfe that made it, in this sort. God commaunded Adam, and doth commaund all men, to abstaine from sinne : But he commaundeth nothing which he ordeineth not : Ergo God ordeyned Adam and all men to absteyne from sinne. But what hath Cerberus wonne by this : I account the Argument to be god. But that the conclusion is against vs

I demie. For we affirme that when man addaitheth to sinne; the same is done by Gods will and ordinaunce, as when he committeth sinne, the same is also by the will and ordinaunce of God: as by the words of Austen afore written doth plainly appeare. As for Cerberus his argument, and the conclusion that he inferreth thereupon: I referre to the iudgement of all wise men that will weygh the afore written words of S. Austen. Who shall thereby easily perceyue, that no such conclusion can stand upon such premisses. But to his, Also if God in his secret counsell, &c. I must say some thing. Else will Cerberus say that Gods secret will and eternall ordinaunce, is contrary to his open word and written law.

When Jonas was sent to Ninive, the open word & commaundement of God was, that he should say vnto the: Yet fortie dayes and Ninive shalbe destroyed. The effect doth declare, that his eternall purpose was not to destroy them, for they were not destroyed. Neyther was this commaundement contrarie to his eternall purpose: but he did vse it as a meane whereby to bring his eternall purpose to passe, which was to shew mercie in forgiving the sinnes of the Ninuites.

When Moses was sent to Pharaos, the open word and commaundement was thus. Say vnto Pharaos, let my people go, that they may offer sacrifice vnto me. But his eternall purpose was, that by the stubbornesse of Pharaos in refusing to do his commaundement, he might haue iust occasion to shew his power vpon him, in pouring out vpon him and his people, the manifold plagues that we reade of in the holie Scriptures, and that thereby his name might be made knownen in all parties of the earth. So that this commaundement was not contrarie to the eternall purpose, but did concurre & run together with it, to that ende, that in the eternall purpose was prestred.

S. Iy.

When

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When Iesus Christ began to preach, the open word was, *Repent and beleue the Gospell*: but the eternall purpose was, that for his doctrine & miracles, he should be hated of his countreymen and kinsmen (for the most part) and by them be deliuered to the Heathen to be crucified, and made a sacrifice for the finnes of the world. So that this open word was not against the secret purpose of God: *as S. Paule doth terme it* it was to them that perished, the saue of death vnto death, and to them that be saued, the saue of life vnto life: For in the one sort it did worke beleefe, and by beleefe saluation: and in the other it did manifest and make open the vnbellefe that was in their heartes before, and so make them utterly without excuse. As our Saviour himselfe sayth: *How haue they nothing to pretend for excuse.*

The Law and the Gospell are both written & preached, and the open word is, *do this, and thou shalt haue this*: but the eternall purpose of God is, that those that haue eares to heare, should heare and obey, and so enioy the reward promised: and that they which lacke such eares, should haue the iust condemnation of their owne consciences. These two therefore be not contrarie the one to the other, but doe concurre and runne together to one ende.

Such words might be said to this effect, without either faire words, or finely framed fetches: and so the inconuenience, that Gerberus would conclude, clearly auoyded. But I will content my selfe with one saying of Austen, writing vpon the ninth Psalm. His wordes be these: *Non in toto corde confitetur Deo, qui de prouidentia eius, in aliquo dubitat. Sed quia iam aperuit ocellus sapientie Dei, quantum sit inuisibile premium eius, qui dicit, gaudeamus in tribulationibus: Et quemadmodum aperit, cruciatum, qui corporaliter infernamur: aut exerceant conuersos ad Deum, aut vt conuertantur admo-*
neant,

neant, aut iuste damnationi vitium præparent obdinator : & sic
 omnia ad diuinæ providentiæ regimen referantur, quæ fultis quæ-
 si casus & temere, & nulla diuinæ administratione fieri putant,
 ait. Narrabo omnia mirabilia tua. &c. That is to say, That
 man which doth doubt of the pꝛouidence of God in anye
 thing : both not shew himselſe thankfull oꝝ praſſe God in
 all his heart. But becauſe he doth now ſay the ſecretes of
 the wiſedome of God, how great the inuifible reward of
 him is which ſayth, we reioyce in troubles : and how all
 afflictions which are brought vpon the body, eyther to
 exercyſe thoſe y be conuerted vnto God, oꝝ that they may
 admoniſh them to conuert, oꝝ that they may prepare to
 the laſt damnation, thoſe that be luſtly made hard hear-
 ted, and that ſo all thoſe things might be referred vnto
 the gouernement of Gods pꝛouidence, which ſoliſh men
 do ſuppoſe to be wrought by chaunce, at aduenture, and
 by no diuine pꝛouidence : he ſayth. I will declare all thy
 wonderous woꝝkes. &c. We maye be bolde therefore (I
 thinke) to ſay, that this which Cerberus hath done, in
 writing this ſpittellfull aunſwere to his friends Letter (if
 any ſuch were) was gouerned by Gods pꝛouidence. And
 yet we are not *Genethliaci*, oꝝ declarers of mens fortunes
 oꝝ deſtinies, ſuch as were baniſhed out of Rome : for we
 ſay not y it is Cerberus his fortune oꝝ deſtynie to be harr-
 ged oꝝ drowned, oꝝ that he ſhal die a natural death befoꝝe
 he ſhalbe as great a fauourer of Gods predeſtination, as
 he doth now ſhew himſelf to be a moꝝtall foe therof. But
 we knowe, that if God haue predeſtinated any of theſe
 things, the ſame ſhall vndoubtedly come to paſſe, in ſuch
 ſort as he hath appointed. And yet ſhal not Cerberus his
 will be enforced. But if he hang himſelfe, it ſhall be with
 the full conſent of his will. And if he ſhalbe a fauourer of
 our ſide, it ſhalbe with the free choiſe of his owne will,
 gouerned by the pꝛouidence of God. As there be ſome yet
 liuing,

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lining, that can testifie, that once they were of the same minde that Cerberus is now, and that with consent of will. And now they be of one minde with me; and that with assent of will also.

The league Cerberus and his fellows therefore to him that by his prouidence governeth al things. And yet do we our selues vse the meanes that God in prouidence hath appointed to be vsed, and we teach all other to do the same, committing the successe to him that knoweth what he hath determined to worke in all his creatures.

*Aug. De Ci-
uit. lib. 5. cap. 9*

And we conclude this matter with Austen, saying: *Quapropter, & voluntates nostrae tantum valent, quantum Deus eas valere voluit atq; presciuit: & ideo, quicquid valent, certissime valent: & quod factura sunt, ipse omnino factura sunt: quia valentius atq; facturus ille presciuit, cuius prescientia falli non potest.* Quapropter, si sati nomen, alicui rei adhibendum placeret: magis dicere satum, esse infirmioris, potentioris voluntatem qui cum habet in potestate, quam illo causam ordine, quem non resato sed suo more Stoici satum appellant, arbitrium nostrae voluntatis auferr, That is to saye. And therefore, this is the cause why our willes are able to doe, as much as God would & did know afoze hand that they should do, and therefore, loke what they are able to do, that are they most certainly able to do; and what so euer they shall do, they shall in deede do; because he whose prescience or foreknowledge can not be deceived, did know afoze hand that they should do it. And therefore if I could alowe the name of destinie to be giuen to any thing: I would rather say that destinie were a thing belonging to the weaker, and will to the stronger, which hath it in his power, than that the liberty of our will, should by that order of causes, which he set on foor, not after the common custome, but after their owne manner, be cal destinie. But Cerberus is not yet answered.

And thus yet selue him one other question. Which now

not to be will propone.

Cerberus.

Yet would I further aske them a question, seeing it is the decree, ordinance, and wyll of God expressed in his word, that man should not sin, how crepte they into that secret counceel, where God ordeined, decreed, and willed the contrarie: that is to say, that man should sinne. But I heare their answer already published in print: standing in the third leafe & seconde page, of the firste Blast in that traiterous trumpet, set forth agaynst the regiment of women, where Fol. 2. Pa. 2. briefly and couertly toucheth this close and priuie counsell of God in these wordes. The secreete counsell of God excepted. But in Fol. 3. Pag. 2. he sayth. I am sure that God hath reuealed to some in this our age, that it is more than a Monster in nature, that a woman shall raigne and haue Empire aboue man.

This may be the Apocalips of some men in thys our age: but sure I am, it is not the reuelation of S. Iohn the Euangelist, nor of any other olde Apostle or Prophet. These new reuelations which are reuealed vnto men of our age out of a secreete counsell, decree, and ordinance of God, contrarie to the open worde and commaundement of God, are meete for those which delight in the danable dreames of some doting destinie, and may well be called inspirations of olde Arrians, reuelations of blinde Anabaptistes, or vnwritten verities of superstitious Papists, rather than the secreete counsell of God, reuealed vnto men of our age. But to conclude: That Angell or spirite, which contrarie to the manifest word of God, hath

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reuealed vnto men of our age, that a woman being right inheritour to the Crowne of a Realme, ought not to be ruler thereof, that same spirit and Aungell of darknesse, hath reuealed vnto me of our age, that Caine was predestinate to murder his brother Abel, and the most wicked traytours, murderers, & theeues that lyue, are ordeyned of God, in his secreete counsell, contrary to his open worde, to be wicked, euen as they are, and to commit such murder, theft and treason, euen as they doe. The same conclusion and newe reuelation, is also playnly set forth in the other late printed English booke before named, translated out of French into English, where anon after the beginning, speaking of Gods wyll, he sayth: By the vertue wherof, al things are made, yea euē those thyngs whych are euill and execrable. Yet when he hath plainly affirmed that by the vertue of Gods wil euill and execrable things are made, least the horrible face of Sathan should be perceiued, in the burning flame of those terrible wordes: The matter is afterward trimly couered with a cloke of vnſauerie ſubtiltie, for he declareth his mind to be, that those euil and execrable things, which are wrought by the vertue of Gods will, are not euill and execrable, in that they are wrought by his diuine counsell. As if he should say, though they be in deede euil and execrable things, which the counsell of God worketh, yet are they not in that respect or therefore euill, bicause God worketh thē. But for asmuch (sayeth he) as they proccede from the Prince of ayre. &c. Or to speak it in more vsual termes, bicause the diuel or wicked men do work it, which neuerthelesse, as they plainly hold and affirme, are the instrumētes of God appointed herunto, & in doing the same, do nothing else

else but that which God hath ordeyned them to do,
& so ordeyned that they can not chose but do it, euē
as they do, which opinion *Prosper*, defending the sen-
tence of *Augustine*, writeth vehemently against, in
these wordes. *Prædeterminationem Dei siue ad malum siue ad
bonum &c.* That the Predestination of God (sayth he)
doth worke in all men eyther vnto good or vnto eu-
ill it is most foolishly sayd, as though a certaine ne-
cessitie should driue men vnto both, seying in good
things, the will is to be vnderstande not wythout
grace, & in euill things, the will is to be vnderstand
wythout grace. *Respo. ad obiect. Gal. cap. 6.* But that which
Prosper, and *Aug.* do here most truly call a most foolish
saying. The same do these men call the most hygh &
profoud wisdom, for God say they, predestinateth al
things, *Ergo* al things must come to passe of necessitie.

Crowley.

A man might maruell, what moued *Cerberus* to
moue that question, the aunswere wherunto, he himself
sayth is alredie published in print. But when I consider,
what spirit it is that hath moued him in this sort to aun-
swere his friendes letter: I leaue off that maruell. For
I see his purpose is, by this meane to entangle and trou-
ble vs with by matter, neyther pertinent to the thing
we haue in hande, no; tending to any good ende. What
haue we to do with the matter of the *Blasphemy* (which booke
I neuer reade of) or with *Revelations* or *Apocalypses*?
We haue the question of Gods *Providence*, *Prescience* &
Predestination in hande. To dispute of those matters
do neyther appertayne to *Cerberus* in hys aunswere,
neyther doth it appertayne to me in this *Apologie*. I wyl
therefore passe ouer both those questions: and shape him

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another maner of answer to his demaund than þ which he imagineth that he hath sene set forth in print. His question is, how we crept into þ secrete counsell, where God ordyned, decreed and willed, that mā should sinne: He imagineth that this can not be answered other wise than by an Apocalips or Revelatiō. But Cerberus shall well vnderstande, that we can answer him by playne Scripture, & proue that it is not against Scripture, that God shoulde ordaine, decree and will, that man shoulde sinne.

Rom. 9.

First, S. Paule wryting to the Romanes sayth thus. *An nō habet potestatem Figulus luti, ex eadē massa facere, aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliā?* What is to saye. Hath not the Potmaker power ouer his Claye, out of one lump to make one vessell to honoꝝ, and another to dishonoꝝ? And in the same place he sayth thus. *Nunquid dicit figmentum ei qui se furxit, quid me fecisti sic?* What is. Doth the earthen vessell say vnto him that made it: Why haste thou made me so? And the same S. Paule wryting to Timothe sayth. *In magna autem domo, non solum sunt vasa aurea & argentea, sed & lignea & fictilia: & quedā quidem in honorem, quedam autem in contumeliā.* What is to saye. In a great house, there be not onely vessells of Golde & of Siluer, but also of Timber and of Earth: some seruing to honoꝝ, and some to dishonoꝝ. These Alegories doth S. Paule vse, to shew that there is no iniquitie with God, though he do appoint his creatures at his godd will and pleasure, some to honoꝝ, and some to dishonoꝝ. So the same purpose doth S. Paule cite the wordes that are wrytten in the 33. of Eccle. *Miserebor, cuius miserebor: & misericordiam prestabo, cuius miserebor.* What is, I will haue compassion vpon him, on whome I haue compassion: And I will shewe mercy, to whome I will shewe mercy. It lyeth not in the willer noꝝ in þ runner, saith S. Paul: but

2. Timoth. 2.

but in God who taketh mercy. For the Scripture saith: unto Abraham : *Quia in hoc ipsum calumia te respiciendo in te potestatem meam dabo. et annuntietur nomen meum in omni terra* : What is : For this cause have I thyed this up, that I might theue my power vpon thee ; and that my name might be declared through the whole earth. And therefore I conclude thus : Ergo, cuius vultis fore domus et habitatio vestra : What is : Be whome it pleaseth him ; he taketh mercy ; & whome he lusteth ; he maketh hard hearted : I knowe the common answer to this : Whithers : God both not harden the hearts of any : but he hath suffred them to harden their stouid hearts. But if theye god for the more stande vpon this common answer, so shall I saye what so. And so I will speake concerning Gods suffering of things to be done. *Modo in istis diebus, et in istis locis de Deo dubitatum est Deum facere bonum, etiam si uult fieri quod uult. Non enim hoc nisi iussu iudicis fitis. Et profecto bonum est homini quod iustum est : Quamuis ergo ex qua uia sit, in quantum mala sunt, non sit bona. Namque in bonis solus bonus sed etiam sint et mala, bonum est. Namque est, hoc bonum est, ut essent et mala; nihil modo et si uideretur ab omnipotente et bono. Cui proculdubio, quam facile est quod uult facere etiam facit et quod non uult esse, non facere. Hoc nisi ex eadem causa : periculis in istis diebus nostrae fidei confessionis initium; quia nos in Deum patrem omnipotentem, credere confitemur. Neque enim uentit de ob aliud uideatur omnipotens, nisi quia a qui quid uult potest, nec uoluntate cuiuspiam creature, voluntatis omnipotentis, imperium effectus. What is to saye. It is not to be doubted that God doth well, yea, when he suffereth to be done, whatsoeuer things are euill done. For he doth not suffer this, other wise than by his iudgement. And surely, all that is iust, is good. Although therfore those things that be euill, in as much as they be euill, be not god : yet is it god, & there should be things, not onely that are god, but also that are euill. For et*

*Enchirid. ad
Laur. cap. 96.*

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cept it were good, & that should be things that are evil: & the almightie godnesse would by no means suffer them to be. To whom, no doubt, it is as easie a thing not to suffer that thing to be which he would not should be: as it is to doe that which he is willing to doe. Except we beleue this: & the very beginning of the confession of our sayth, to therein we confesse & yet beleue in God & Father Almighty, is in danger & like to be false & untrue. For he is not truly called Almighty for any other cause, but for that he is able to do what he will, & the effect of his will, being Almighty, is not by the will of any creature letted.

By these wordes of Austen it is playne, that God, being Almighty, cannot be sayd to suffer ought to be done, which he is not willing should be done. The hardening of hearts therfore, and that wickednesse that is wrought by the hard hearted, is not done without his will. And although those things be euill, in as much as they are done by those euill persons, yet in as much as the same are done by the will of God, it is god that they be done. By this it is plaine, that when God both ordeyne, decree, and will that man should sinne: he doth not contrarie to scripture, which doth witnesse, by the testimonie of St. Austen, that it is god that man should do euill, in such sense as St. Austen hath declared the same.

Primer. 16.

And moreover, Salomon in his Proverbes sayth thus. *Reuerſa propter ſemetipſum operatus eſt Dominus: impij quoque ad diabolum.* That is: The Lord hath made all things for himselfe: the wicked man also against the euill day.

Eſay. 10.

And the Prophet sayth *Nunquid gloriabitur Securus in eo qui excidit eam? & Serrum contrarium a quo ſtipicabit? Quam diu ſtiterit aſus contra uentum ſuis: & quomodo aſus uentus qui inſuſcitatur uis.* That is to say: Shall the Axe boast it selfe against him that beareth with it? Or shall the Saw set by it selfe against him that draweth it? What

What

What were as much as if the Rod should be lifted up against him that lifteth it, and as if the staffe that is but timber, should be swauanted. The vngodlie man, sayth Salomon, hath the Rod made for himselfe, euen against the euill day: that is, against the day of vengeance, where in the vngodlie shall haue there iust reward of Gods hand. By this, not onely the vngodlie is iustly punished for his vngodlinesse; but the goodie is also occasioned to acknowledge, that it is mercie alone that doeth preserve him from the like punishment: For he seeth in himselfe no cause why he should not suffer the same condemnation. Thus by the wicked, both the iustice and mercie of God are made manifest vnto man. But the purpose of the vngodlie is nothing lesse than that Gods iustice and mercie should be set forth by him: therefore he is iustly punished for his wickednesse. And Csaie the Prophet, comparing Nabuchodonosor to an Aze, a Saue, and a Rodde: both plainly teach, that it was God that wrought all the plagues and destructions that were by that wicked instrument brought, not onely vpon the people of the Iewes, but vpon other Nations also. And that that bloudie and ambitious tyrant, was but as an Aze, Saue, or Rod in the Lords hand. And therefore when he began to boast of his owne power and policie, as though he had by his owne wisdom and strength overcome kingdomes, and set himselfe aboue them: the Lord (to let his people know that it was not Nabuchodonosors power that could haue done, or that should doe those things to them, which the Prophetes did tell them should come vpon, by the Kings of Babilon) doeth tell them by the mouth of the same Prophetes, that the worke was his, and that the Kings of Babilon were but hye toles or instrumentes to worke withall.

But this can not Cerberus abide: God must be but a
lower

whether our sinne be both the king of these things. For if God
 should be a lier, he must needs be the Author of the
 sinne that is in the deede. For the old Cante hath his eyes
 so blinded with the smoke of the fume of Hell fire: that he
 can not see how God may be the Author of the fact, and
 not of the sinne that is in it. But when he heareth that
 saying: he crieth out, *Arande, Arande*; what is this? In
 Cerberus his judgement; either God must be a lier, or
 else God must be a thief. For when God came to Job
 that the Sabets had staine his seruantes, and taken a-
 way his cattle: he says, the Lord hath taken the away.
 But to take away Jobs cattle was felonie. *Ergo*; ey-
 ther God was a felon, or Job a lier, if Cerberus his
 opinion be true. *Allegand ad hoc quod dicitur in Job*
14. But how God doth worke in the heartes of euill and
wicked men; and vse them as his instruments; and yet
is not partaker of their sinne: is sufficiently declared a-
bove, out of St. Austen, De gratia & libero arbitrio.
 But Cerberus will like this: I shoulde say some
 thing to the words of Prosper. Either wil he wil make
 nothing that he hath the victory. For a little occasion
 maketh him to brag. The objection that the Frenchmen
 made against the sentence of St. Austen, in the place that
 Cerberus speaketh of, is this: *Quid liberum arbitrium in*
hominibus sit: sed sine arbitrio sine ad malum: predestinatio
Dei in bonum: ita dicitur. That is to say. That St. Austen
 shoulde holde that freewill in man is nothing: but that
 Gods predestination doth worke in men; whether it be
 to good or to euill. The answer to this objection is thus.
Librum arbitrium mihi habere vel non esse; perperam dicitur: sed
ante illam determinationem fides in carnis illud, & in malis uolens de
perire, non est in agitur. Quoniam per iniquam & damnationem Dia-
boli per Dei gratiam liberum est in illo profecto iacet; in quod se
sua libertate denegat. Amat ergo languores suos; & pro sanitate
habet,

habet, quod agrotare senescit, donec prima hac medela conseruatur agrotat, ut incipiat nosse quidam langueat, & possit opem medici desiderare, qua surgat. Iustificatus itaq; homo, id est, ex impio pius factus, nullo precedente bono merito, accipit donum, quo medio, adquirat & meritum: ut quod in illo inchoatum est per gratiam Christi, etiam per industriam liberi augeatur arbitrii, nunquam remoto adiutorio Dei, sine quo, nec proficere, nec permanere in bono quisquam potest. Predestinationem autem Dei, siue ad bonum siue ad malum in hominibus operari, ineptissime dicitur, ut ad utrumq; homines quedam necessitas videatur impellere: cum in bonis, voluntas sit intelligenda de gratia, in malis autem intelligenda sine gratia. That is. To say that free will is nothing, or that there is no free will at all, is euil sayd: but that the same doth wander in darknesse and in the shadow of death before it is illumined by faith, is not well denied. For before it is by the grace of God deliuered from the domination of the Diuell: it lyeth in that darke dongion, into which by it owne libertie it did cast it selfe. It doth therefore loue it owne sore sicknesses, and doth compt it helth, not to knowe that it is sicke, vntill this first medicine be ministred to it being sicke, that it may begin to knowe that it is sick, and be able to desire the helpe of the Physician, whereby it may aryse. When man therefore is iustificed, that is to say, made goodlie of vngodlie, without any god deseruing going before, he recepueth a gift, by which meane he maye also get merit or deseruing: that that thing which is by the grace of Christ begonne in him, may also by the industrie of free will be encreased, neuer without the helpe of God, without which no man can eyther go forward, or stay in that which is good. But it is most foolishly said, that the predestination of God doth so worke in men, eyther to good or to euil, that a certain necessitie may seeme to force men forward vnto both: seeing that in god, the will is to be vnderstanded to come

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of grace, & in euill, the will is to be vnderstanded with-
out grace.

Now (gentle Reader) thou seest what it was that the
French men objected against S. Austen. Thou seest also
what Prosper doth answere in S. Austens defense. Con-
sider nowe what occasion Cerberus hath to conclude a-
gainst vs as he doth.

The French men object, that S. Austen should hold
that freewill in man is nothing, but that Gods predesti-
nation doth worke in men, whether it be to good or euil.
Prosper answereth, that it is an euill saying: to affirme
that freewill is nothing, or that there is no freewill at al.
And that it is most foolishly sayd, that the predestination
of God doth so worke in the heartes of men, either to good
or euill, that a certaine necessitie may seeme to force men
forward vnto both. But we do neyther say that freewill
is nothing, or that there is none at all: neither that pre-
destination doth so worke in men, that a certaine necessi-
tie may seeme to force them forward both to good and euil:
No, we do not affirme that predestination doeth worke
in men any thing at all. *Ergo*, Prosper hath written no-
thing against vs.

Cerberus.

And further, Crowley in the sayd booke of confu-
tation before named, and the same article, vsing the
very same terme of driuing, he sayeth that Gods
predestination hath driuen them to it. And yet not
therewith content, anone after he sayeth: We are co-
pelled by the necessitie of Gods predestination, to
do those things for the which we are damned, but to
repeate the whole sentence. To this must we answere
(sayth he) in thys wyse. If God were an inferiour to
anic

anie superior power, to the which he ought to render an accompt of his doings, or if anie of vs were, not his creatures, but of another creation besides his workmanship, then might we charge him with tyrannie, bicause he condemneth vs, and appoynted vs to be punished for the things we doe by compulsion through the necessitie of his predestination.

Marke here by the way, how al rulers be charged wyth tyrannie for punishing of malefactors, first graūt thys proposition which he affirmeth: That al offenders, as murderers, theues and traytours, cōmit their offences by the compulsion of predestination. Secondly, this assumed *minor* (which he also affirmeth) that it is tyranny for one whych is an inferior power, and not theyr creator, to punish them which do commit crimes by such compulsion. Then must it needes follow, that al rulers are tyrants which punish malefactors, and are no creators, but inferior powers, bicause all malefactors could not chose but commit such wicked offēces, being driuen thereunto by compulsion, through the necessitie of predestination.

Wo worth the sinful generatiō of our age, which hath bred and brought forth such a noisome noueltie, and straunge Paradox, to whom the handes of Gods mercie are stretched out all the day long: and yet they are euer defying him to the face, as the Prophete sayth. Esay. 65. Consider I desire thee, not the persons of them that speake, be they neuer so high, neuer so wise, neuer so many, but marke the opinion it selfe: euen in thy conscience, and in the sight of God, whether any thing may be spoken more repugnant to the nature of God, more contrarie to the word of God, more defacing the iustice and mer-

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ie of God, than to say, that God punisheth man with the torments of Hel, in euerlasting fier, for doing those thyngs whych he himselfe hath predestinate, ordeyned, decreed, determined, appoynted, wyllled and compelled hym to do: and that whych a man can not choose but must needes doe, by the force and compulsion of hys predestination.

All which thyngs in those playne termes, they most euidently teach in diuers partes of theyr wrytings, but of all other this is most odious and horrible, where they affirme that men sinne by compulsion, through the necessitie of Gods predestination.

And the verie same sayth Knoxe in the 317. side of his booke, before named, affirming likewise in those playne termes: that the wycked are not onely left by Gods suffryng, but compelled to sinne by power, and he citeth it as the saying of Augustine agaynst *Iulian. Lib. 2. Cap. 5.* But very fallly (as I suppose) for I haue sought the same place in Augustine, and he hath neyther those words, neyther any such like, that import the same or any like matter.

Wherefore, till such time as they make better proufe: I must thinke that they haue forged a lye in Augustines name, supposing thereby to giue Authoritie to fallhode. But to cōclude, whether it were the saying of Augustine, or not, you see it is plainly their opiniō, not only that men can not choose, but do what wickednesse or mischief soeuer they do, but also they are compelled wyth the power, force, or compulsion of Gods predestination, to commit all those euils and wicked crymes, for the whych they are executed wyth the temporall sworde, or damned with euerlasting torment.

Crowley

Crowley.

It doth here manifestly appeare, that Cerberus hys chiefe quarrell is against Crowley. For though there be other that haue writtten as plaine, and as open matter for the necessitie of Predestination as I haue, and to say the truth moze plaine so: yet doth Cerberus lay the matter to no mans charge so often & so openly as he doth to mine. For this is nolwe the fift tyme þ he hath made playne mention of me in this his thort aunswere to hys friendes Letter. No maruell therefore, though the malice of his minde, doe sometimes cause him to miscounter my wordes and writings, as in this place he doeth, placing my wordes so in this his aunswere, that they seeme to haue a manifest meaning farre differing from that which they haue in þ place where I wrote them in mine aunswere to Shaxton. First he sayth, þ using the terme of drining, I haue sayde, that Gods Predestination hath driuen them to it. Now (Gentle Reader) I must make thee iudge of the meaning of these wordes, in the place where they stande writtten by me.

After I had declared, that the Administration of the common weale by publike Ministers, lawes and ordinances, coulde not be other than profitable, and alwayes rebounding to the glorie of God, notwithstanding that the hauing of such ministers and ministrations, is a thing that commeth to passe of necessitie and can not but be: I laboured to make the matter moze plaine by certain questions, wherof this is one. How could it haue bene, that so great and rude multitudes of barbarous nations, should haue submitted themselves, to be under lawes & rulers; had not Gods Predestination driuen them to it?

Here be the wordes in that order þ I first wrote them.

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Now

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Nowe Iudge (gentle Reader) whether Cerberus meant simply, when he cited them thus: He sayth, that Goddes Predestination hath damned the to it. Adding such wordes immediately after, that it might seeme that I had spoken these wordes in no such meaning: but rather, that my whole meaning had bene, to affirme y^e God doth by his Predestination, forcibly drine men to do the things that they are damned for. For he sayth, that I say: We are compelled by the necessitie of Goddes Predestination, to doe those things, for which we are damned. And then to set a shew of indifferēce vpon his doing, as though he meant nothing lesse than to applie my wordes otherwise than my meaning was, he sayth, that he will repeate y^e whole sentence, in this maner. To this must we aunswere. &c. As though the aunswere that I make, were but an aunswere to mine owne wordes, which I haue before affirmed.

But y^e thou mayst see (gentle Reader) what wordes they be that I doe there make aunswere vnto: I will set them before here in writing, as they stande in my booke against Sharpton. They are these.

¶ Well, here followeth yet another inconuenience, and that is this. If all things be done of necessitie: Why should any man be blamed for misdeeding? Why should any man be damned, sithens all they do is but the ordinance of God, and that more is, they can not auoide the necessitie, whereby they are constrained to do al that they do. ¶ Therefore if they should endeavour to refrain the euill y^e they do, it were but al in vaine, for they are predestinated eether to do it, or else to leaue it vndone. Justly therefore can they not be condemned, because the euill they do, is not of themselves, but of the ordinance of God.

And then follow the wordes that Cerberus hath cited. But when he cometh to those wordes that myght some thing shewe my meaning to be otherwyle than he would

would haue it seeme to be : he saith. I will therefore
 ser uo to those woordes which doe immediately followe,
 which are these. But so much as he is subiect to no su-
 perfour power, and we be all his creatures : so that to
 what ende soeuer he haue framed vs, we are his instru-
 ments to doe the work that he hath appointed to be done :
 why should we stand by and reason with him to know
 his purpose in creating vs, or why he made vs to this or
 that fashion : to this or that vse : to be precious or vile :
 For this one thing we may be sure of, that God hath by
 his eternall wisdom, created nothing, nor appointed
 nothing to be done ; but the same shall reuolue to his
 glory in the ende : saue it neuer to contrarie in any
 time. Let vs hearken to the words of *Paul* to the *Ro-*
manes in this matter. What if God (saith he) willing
 to shew, &c.

Rom. 9.

Here thou mayest see (gentle Reader) what malice
 may doe. I saye that so many barbarous and rude na-
 tions would neuer haue submitted themselves to liue
 vnder lawes, if Goddes predestination had not thrust
 them to it : meaning that God in his wisedome & eter-
 nalllasting prouidence, had appointed that all multitudes of
 peoples should be gouerned by lawes and orders, and to
 bring the thereunto, he bled such meanes, that they were
 driuen to chose rather to liue vnder lawes, and so to con-
 tinue and flourish, than to liue without lawes, and so de-
 cay and come to naught. But Cerberus doth maliciously
 conser my woordes, as though my meaning were, driuen
 to be vnder lawes, as shepe are driuen from the pasture
 to the fold. But I spake of men, and not of brute beasts.
 We vse to say that men are driuen, some by feare, some
 by friendship, some by affection, soine by misfortune, and
 some by pouertie and neede : and yet in all these cases,
 we meane not that man hath not a will which consen-
 teth

ted, to the thing that he doeth: but that the will of man
 is by these passions induced to chuse that which it consen-
 teth unto, and to leave the other which it refuseth to do.
 Againe, in answering the inconvenience that Cerberus
 & such as he is, do say will ensue upon the doctrine of ne-
 cessitie of Gods predestination: I sayd: If God were an
 inferiour to any superiour power, or if we were of ano-
 ther creation, and not of his making: then might we
 charge him with tyrannie; because he condemneth vs,
 and appointeth vs to be punished for the things we do by
 compulsion. But meaning (as Cerberus doth malicious-
 ly asurue that I do meane) that man is compelled by force
 without the consent of his will, to do those actions which
 God doth condemn him for, and appoint him to be pu-
 nished for: For that were to denie God to be God, and
 man to be man. For God is not God, vnlesse he be both
 iust and mercifull. But there shoulde appeare in him
 neyther mercie nor iustice: if he should vse such compul-
 sion, as Cerberus would haue me seeme to teach. And if
 man should be so spoiled of the libertie of his will, that
 he shoulde be compelled to do actions without all con-
 sent of will: then were man spoiled of his principall
 part, which is his reasonable soule, without which he
 is not, neyther can he thought to be man.

I am not so heady therefore, as to speake of such a
 compulsion. But I speake of the same that Knoxe speake
 of in the place that Cerberus citeth, I trow, for I dare
 not affirm vpon his word, neither haue I seene the booke
 my selfe. But the matter that Cerberus sayeth Knoxe
 hath cited out of *St. Austen*, I haue seene in *St. Austen*, not
 in the 2. booke and 5. chapter against *Iulian*: but in the 5.
 booke and 3. chapter against the same. Vp like Cerberus
 had little leysure and lesse lust to reade *St. Austen's* words,
 & therefore not finding them at the first chop, he thought
 it

It should be enough for him to say; that he must thinke that we haue forged a lie in S. Austens name. But to put the out of doubt, gentle Reader, that Cerberus hys thought is a lying thought: I wil set downe S. Austens wordes in writing, and request thee to reade the rest of that Chapter, wherein I haue sounde them written. And then I doubt not but thou wilt consent to that compulsion that I haue spoken of.

The wordes of S. Austen are these. *Quid est autem quod dicis, cum desiderijs suis traditi dicuntur, relictis per patientiam intelligendi sunt, non per potentiam in peccata compulsi: quasi non simul posuerit haec duo idem Apostolus, & patientiam & potentiam, ubi ait. Sic autem volens Deus ostendere iram, & demonstrare potentiam suam, attulit in multa patientia vasa irae, quae perfecta sunt in perditionem. Quid horum tamen dicis esse quod scriptum est? Et Prophetam si errauerit, & locutus fuerit, ego Dominus seduxi Prophetam illum, & extendam manum meam super eum, & exterminabo eum in medio populi mei Israel: Patientia est, an potentia? Quodlibet eligas, vel utrumq; fatearis: vides tamen falsa Prophetantis peccatum esse, poenamq; peccati. An & hic dicturus es quod ait. Ego Dominus seduxi Prophetam illum, intelligendum esse, deservi: ut pro eius meritis seductus erraret? Age ut vis. Tamen eo modo punitus est pro peccato, ut falsum prophetando peccaret. What is to say: What is the meaning of thy wordes, when thou sayest, that those men that are said to be giuen ouer to their owne lustes, must be vnderstande to be left by patience or sufferance, and not compelled or thrust into sinne by power: as though that same Apostle did not set downe both these two, both sufferance and power, when he sayeth. And so God being willing to shew forth his wrath, and to set forth his power, hath in much patience brought hyther the vessels of wrath, which were made meete for destruction. And yet, whether of these things doest thou say that that is which*

August. lib. 5

Cap. 3. contr.

Iulian.

Rom. 9.

Ezechi. 14.

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is written: And if a Prophet do erre and speake lies: I the Lord haue seduced that Prophet, and I will stretch out mine hand vpon him, and I wil utterly rote him out from amongst my people of Israel. Is this sufferance, or powter: Will hee soeuer thou doest chouse; or if thou graunt both: yet doest thou see, that the false prophetic is sinne, and the punishment of sinne also. Willt thou here also say, that where he sayth, I the Lord haue seduced that Prophet: it must be vnderstand, I haue left him, that being seduced according to his owne desertings, he he might erre: do as thou wilt. Yet is he in this sort punished for his sinne: that by prophesying a lie he might sinne.

Polwe, I trow, Cerberus will not say, that Knoxe hath forged a lye in S. Austens name, supposing thereby to giue authoritie to falsehood. And if Cerberus would take the paines to reade the whole Chapter wherein these wordes of Austen are written: I doubt not but he should vnderstand how God may by power cōpel men to sinne, and yet punish them iustly for their sinne, which they commit by such compulsion. For they are not compelled without the consent, yea the free consent, of their owne will.

But least Cerberus should thinke, that not being able to answer that which he concludeth vpon my wordes, I haue slyly slipped it ouer: I must say some thing to that wherewith he chargeth me. That is, the charging of all Magistrates with tyrannie, for that they, not being Creators, do punish men for those offences that they commit by compulsion. He frameth an Argumēt against me, the *major* proposition whercof is not affirmed by me (as Cerberus sayth it is) for I haue not in any place writtē, that theues, murderers, &c. doe commit theyr offences by the compulsion of predestination: but by compulsion, tho in the necessitie of predestination, meaning that compulsion

pulsion and necessitie that *S. Austen* speaketh of in the places that I haue before cited out of his workes, which is not without the free consent of the will.

The *minor* (which is, that it is tyrannie for one that is an inferior power, and not their Creator, to punish them that do commit crimes by such compulsion) I do not in any part of my writings affirme. Wherefore Cerberus doth me open wrong, to conclude that I charge all rulers with tyrannie.

The rulers are commaunded of God (who is theyr ruler, and to whom they shal render an account of their doings) that they shall punish the breakers of Gods commaundments, and to that ende hath God giuen them a sword. What vnto them therefore, if they do not punish such, and defend the innocent. And when they do punish the offenders, and defend the innocent: then do they their dutie. So far of do I thinke them to be from the fault of tyrannie. Rom. 13.

But Cerberus woulde sayne haue the Rulers angrie with vs, and especially with Crowley. And therefore he laboureth to make the beleue that Crowley saith that which he neuer thought. The words that Cerberus hath cited out of my booke against Shaxton, when they be indifferently weyghed, shall be found none other in effect, than are those wordes that I saie wrate in the 45. Chapter of his prophecies, where he saith thus: *Va*

contententis cum victore suo. Testa cum testis terra contendat. Esa. 45.

An dicet victori suo, quid facis? & opus tuum manibus destruitur. What is to say. What be to him that doth contend with his maker. Let the earthen vessel contend with the earthen vessels. Shall the claye say vnto him that made it: what dost thou make? and thy worke is not made with handes?

What other thing can I saie meane by these words:

I. ij.

but

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but that as it is a thing farre vnſeemely for a piece of clay to ſtand vp and reaſon with him that tempereth it with his fingers, and to ſay vnto him, why doeſt thou faſhion me after this ſort : ſo is it vnſeemely that man ſhould reaſon with God, concerning his purpoſe in making him after this faſhion or that, or to this uſe or that uſe : But if man will reaſon this matter : let him reaſon it with him ſe is a man as he is : ſo were there ſome reaſon in his doings. For although one man haue by Gods ordinance, authoritie ouer other men : yet may not that man do with the reſt what he liſteth, as God maye doe with his creatures.

Wherefore, I conclude, that Cerberus his exclamation, with twoe worth the ſinfull generation of our age. &c. is not worth the weighing, neyther would Cerberus if he had ſene thus much before, haue thought it worth the writing as I ſuppoſe.

Cerberus.

Againſt which errour crieth out the word of God in a multitude of places : manifeſtly prouing, that through the grace & helpe of God, me may chooſe, and are neyther driuen by abſolute neceſſitie, nor compelled by Gods Predeſtination, to commit murder, theft, treaſon or any ſuch flagitious offence, nor any maner of ſinne or euill, whatſoeuer it be. As for example : Moyſes ſayth : Therefore chooſe life. Deut. 30. And Iofua ſayeth, chooſe whome you will ſerue. And after when the people promiſed to ſerue the Lord only, he ſayth vnto them, you are witneſſes vnto your ſelues, that ye haue choſen the Lord to ſerue him. Iofua. 24. But afterward when the people forſoke the Lord agayne, and choſe other Gods: the Lord

Lord sayth vnto them. Goe, crie vnto the Gods which ye haue chosen. Iud. 10. Christ sayeth, Marie hath chosen hir that good part, which shall not be taken from hir. Luc. 10. Dauid sayth: I haue chosen the way of truth: and againe in the same Psalme: I haue chosen thy commaundements: Psalm. 119. But the Lord saith by his Prophet Esay: They did wickednesse before mine eyes, and chose the thyng that pleased me not. Esay. 65. and in the next chapter he sayth. *Et elegerunt que ego nolui*. And they haue chosen those things whych I would not. Esay. 66.

Thus it is playne, that as choose, and can not choose agree together, so doth their opinion agree wyth the Scripture, for such direct contrarietie is betwene choise and meere necessitie, betwene violēt compulsion and christian libertie, that blacke and white, may wyth more possibilitie, be coupled in a subiect.

But it is maruell to see, how scrupulous some men are in these wordes of choise. I doubt whether they dare read these & many such like places of scripture, which so plainly speake of choise: But perhap they alway skip ouer that word, or reade some other in steade therof, as the Iewes do *Adonai* in steade of *Iehovah*, for surely manie are so afrayde of freewill, that they fall as the Prouerbe sayth, out of the lime Kell into the cole pit, from high presumption into depe desperation, fiercelie following that olde spirite of wicked *Pelagi*, as before it is touched in the. ix. of his diuelish errors, where he affirmeth, that if a mā haue neede of Gods helpe, then hath he no freedome or choise at all: Thus do they breake theyr shippe vpon the perillous rocke, seeking to escape the dangerous Hurlepole. For an horrible presumption it

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was of *Pelagius*, to thinke that a man by nature, had such power to choosē good, and refuse euill, that he needed not the grace and helpe of God: and a desperate opinion is this of other, to say that the predestination of God worketh all things in man, whether it be good or euill, and that a man can not choosē, but do whatsoeuer he doth. For no doubt, thys opinion maketh a verie disordered *Chaos*, and an vtter cōfusion of al thyngs, as it were mixing & thrusting together, both heauen, earth and hell. Making one confused lumpe, of God, the Diuell and the world. Of sinne, grace, and nature, turning all doings into dreames, all trueth into traunces, all veritie into fables, all prayer and meditation into vaine imagination.

For if Gods predestination be the onlie cause of Adams fall and filthie sinne, and consequently the onely cause and worker of all euill, yea euen wyth compulsion & force, as they shamefully and plainly affirme, then will no man denie, that on the other side: Gods predestination worketh as violently in all thyngs that are good.

So then if Gods predestination work all, without all exception, both in euill and good, then all other things, whatsoeuer they be, although they appeare to worke, and doe some thing, yet doe they in dede vtterly nothing. So that the Diuell doth nothing, man doth nothing, lawes do nothing, doctrine doth nothing, prayer doth nothing: but Gods predestination doth altogether, & is the efficient cause, yea and the only cause of all thyngs.

Agaynst thys opinion, the worde of God is exceeding playne and manifest, not only in the places before rehearsed, but also in these folowing, here briefly

ly noted, yea and abundantly throughout the whole Scripture. Gene. 4. a. Reg. 24. b. 1. Para. 21. b. Pro. 3. d. Eccle. 15. c. 4. Esd. 7. b. d. & g. e. & 9. a. Luk. 10. d. & f. Ioā 1. b. Act. 5. a. 1. Cor. 7. g. & 9. a. & 10. c. & 14. f. 2. Cor. 13. c. Phil. 4. c. Heb. 11. Against this euill opinion, also doe all the auncient Doctors wyth one consent vehemently write, as they by themselves can not denie, except only Augustine, whych because of his exceeding obscuritie and darkenesse in diuers places, he is often alleaged of both partes.

Also against this opinion, writeth earnestly Philip Melancthon the chiefest and best learned of all the Germanes: In like maner doth Bullenger, the chiefest and most excellent of all the Switcers. The same doth also *Erasmus Cicerius*, and manie other of the best learned Protestantes, whose sayings were profitable here to rehearse, but that theyr iudgements in thys matter is well knowne to all the learned, and my determination is at this present, rather briefly and simplie, to declare what part of doctrine I and many other mislike, than wyth long discourse and manie authorities to disproue the same.

Crowley.

In a multitude of places (sayth Cerberus) the wordes of God cryeth oute against the doctrine of the necessitie of Gods Predestination: manifestly prouing that, through the grace and helpe of God, men may chose, and are neither druen by absolute necessitie, nor compelled by Gods Predestination, to commit murder, theft, &c. As for example, Moses sayth. Deut. 30. Chose lyfe. &c. Haue I sayde that man is druen by absolute necessitie: Or that he is compelled by the compulsion of Gods Predestination to

to commit murder, theft, &c. I am sure Cerberus is not able to shew it, in any of my writings. And I think he hath not sene it in anye of the writings of them that he writteth against.

But this is his manner, when we speake of such a kind of necessitie as followeth vpon the prescience of **G D D**, which can not be detoured: then will he make ϕ worlde beleue, that we affirme an absolute necessitie, wherein the will wresteling and struing to the contrarie, is enforced to giue place, and violently giuen to doe that it woulde not: And when we speake of that compulsion, that God bleth in deliuering the wicked and obstinate sinners into a reprobate sence, to commit things that are vnsanctified: that by sinning, their former sinne might be punished: then Cerberus woulde haue men to beleue ϕ we meane of a violent compulsion, which man strueth against, but is not able to resist the force & violence of it. **Well**, I doubt not but the indifferent Readers of this Apologie, will haue a better opinion of vs than so. For it both plainly appeare by the words hereof, that we teach no such necessitie, violent vsing, nor compulsion.

But we saie, with the Scripture, and auncient and all sounde Fathers: that Gods prescience, prouidence, & predestination, can not be disappointed, but muste needes come to passe, as he hath foresene, and in prouidence predestinated that it shoulde: and yet not without the consent of the will, in those towhome God did knowe before woulde consent, and in foreknowledge did appoint to consent, and in those the things which he knewe before that they woulde chose.

The Scriptures therfore, that Cerberus citeth out of Moses, Iosua, Iudges, Daido and Esau: are nothing against vs, for we confesse as much as is taught by them. We confesse also, that man may by the grace and helpe

of God chose to refuse murder, theft, &c. What is it then that Cerberus hath sayde against vs? He woulde faine haue men think that we teach, that God is not able with his grace and helpe to make men able to refuse & which is euill, and to chose to do that which is good. As though we should think no better of our God, than the heathen Poets did of their Iupiter. Whome they bring in, lamenting that he was by the destinies letted so, that he coulde not doe that good for his deare children, & he woulde gladly haue done so; for them. But we knowe, that our God is able to doe what he will doe, and that he is present in all places, and doth in all places al that he is willing to doe. Yea, we doe confesse with S. Paule, that by his helpe that doth comfort & strengthen vs, we are able to doe all things. So farre are we from thinking, that man is not, or may not be able by Gods helpe to refuse to commit murder, &c.

Phil. 4.

But Cerberus sayeth it is payne, that as chose and can not chose doe agree together: so doth our opinion agree with the Scripture. And then he setteth more necessitie and violent compulsion, against Christian libertie. That doctrine may be his owne. We refuse it as none of ours. But if Cerberus would come to talke; a man might aske him in what pointes the Christian libertie doth consist. Whether he meane that it consisteth in an absolute power to do what we will, because he maketh mere necessitie and violent compulsion, the contraries to it. If he meane so, then doth he not meane as S. Paule doth meane in his Epistle to & Galathias, where he exhorteth them to stande in that libertie wherewith Christ hath made vs free: As may well appeare to as many as will reade the Text. Well, I will leaue thys matter, tyl I may knowe Cerberus and talke with him mouth to mouth.

Gal. 3.

As.

As

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As for those that be so scrupulous in the wordes of choise, let them (if there be any such) answer for themselves. For my parte, I can be well contented to reade them and heare them too: but to apply them as Cerberus doth, I think no man can be so scrupulous, that will not agree with Corra, who would rather that God should not know of things before they came to passe, than that man should not haue free choise to doe what he will. And yet do I not follow the spirit of Pelagius: as I haue shewed before vpon that ninth Article that Cerberus speaketh of: neither haue I, in seeking to escape the dangerous Hurlepole, dashed my shippe against the perillous Rocke, as Cerberus would haue men to thinke: that I and such other haue.

But if Gods predestination be the cause. &c. Then, saith Cerberus. &c. This (if) is already answered. I will not therfore trouble the Reader with it any more.

But if Gods predestination worke all: then the Diuell, man, lawes, doctrine, and prayer, do nothing. This is the very reason that Corra and Cicero made (as for Austen declareth in his fyft booke *De Ciuitate Dei*. Cap. 9.) And in the tenth Chapter of the same booke, he doth answer this objection, declaring to what vse, lawes, doctrine and prayers do serue. His wordes are these: *Male*

*August. De
Cini. Dei lib.
5. Cap. 10.*

autem videtur, si de Deo non bene creditur. Unde, absit à nobis ciuium negare prescientiam, ut liberi esse velimus, quo adiuvante sumus liberi, vel erimus. Proinde, non frustra sunt leges, oburgationes, exhortationes, laudes, & vituperationes: quia & ipsas futuras presciuit, & valent plurimum, quantum illas valeturas presciuit: & preces valent ad ea impetranda, quæ se precantibus concessurum esse presciuit: & in ista premia bonis factus, & peccatis supplicia constituta sunt. Neque enim ideo peccat homo, quia Deus illum peccaturum presciuit: imò, ideo non dubitatur ipsam peccare cum peccat: quia ille, cuius prescientia falli non potest, non fatum, non fortunam

fortian, non aliquid aliud, sed ipsam peccatum presciuit, qui scilicet, omnino non peccat: Sed si peccare noluerit: etiam hoc ille presciuit. What is to saye. The life of man is euill, when his beliefe concerning God is not good. All heresore, be it far from vs, that we, to p end that we our selues woulde be free, should denie the prescience of him, by whome we are o: shalbe free. Therfore, lawes, reprehensions, exhortations, commendations, and sharpe rebukes, are not in vaine: bicause that both he did knowe before hand that they shoulde come to passe, and also they are of great force, euen of as great force as he did foreknowe that they should be. And iust rewardees are appointed for god woorkes, and punishments for sinnes. Repether doth man sin, bicause God did knowe before that he shoulde sinne. yea rather, it is therfore out of doubt that he doth sinne, when he doeth sinne: bicause he, whose foreknowledge can not be deceyued, did knowe before, that it was not desinie, nor fortune, or anie other thing, that should sinne, but he himselfe. All hich if he be not willing: he sinneth not at all. But if he should not be willing to sinne: God did also knowe that before.

Here may Cerberus see (as it were in a glasse) howe far vnlike S. Austen he is in this matter: and how liuely he doth resemble his olde friendes Cicero and Cotta. For feare of graunting anie necessitie to followe vpon his prescience and predestination of God: he will rather graunt that God may be deceyued, and that he is altogether carelesse, and predestineth nothing so certainly, but that man may by the power of his will alter and chaunge it. And this is in effect, as much as to denie that there is any God at all.

But the worde of God is exceeding plaine and manifest against this opinion (sayth Cerberus.) For Genes. 4. 2. King. 24. &c. are places most manifestly against it.

Aa. ij.

But

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But al those places I leaue to be weighed by þe Reader, who keeping in minde that which I haue written in the former part of this Apologie, may easily vnderstand how they make against that opiniõ that we hold. And to giue the Reader some occasion to conceiue a good opinion of Cerberus in the citing of his Scriptures for his purpose: I wil set do lone the iudgement of his owne Austen, in those questions *ex retroq; testamento*, that Cerberus and I haue spoken of before: wherein shall appeare how that Austen vnderstandeth the first of Cerberus Scriptures, which he citeth out of the fourth of Genes. His words be these. *Itaq; nõ quia obrulit reprehensus est sed quia indigna obrulit. Neq; ex eo damnatus est sed quia factum noluit emendare commouit. Ad te enim ait conuersus eius: Et tu dominaberis eius. Hoc est sine nõ accipiente ad tuum dominum conuersum est manus a te oblatum; et de cetero scires quid faceret.* What is to say? Therefore he was not rebuked, because he did offer a sacrifice: but because he did offer those things that were too vile to be offered: So; he was not condemned for that neyther: but because he would not amend his fact when he was told of it. For he sayth, thine offering shall return to thee againe, & thou shalt be Lord of it. That is, where as I do not receiue thine offering, it is returned againe to thine owne rule, so that he might know how he should vse the rest.

So we let the indifferent Reader iudge, howe this place may by the iudgement of this Austen; be applied as Cerberus would here haue it to be applied. And if Cerberus will haue this place serue his purpose, he must fight with his owne Austen be he neuer so loth to do it: But least this Apologie should increase too much, and passe the quantitie that I would haue it to growe vnto: I wil leaue the rest of the places that he citeth, to the consideration of the diligent Reader, assuring the same, that not
one

one of those places shalbe found to make against vs.

All the auncient Doctors also (sayth Cerberus) and the best learned of the Protestantes. &c. doe vehemently write against our opinion. And Austen only because of his exceeding obscuritie. &c. is alleaged on both parts. But when Cerberus shall cite their wordes that they haue so vehemently written against vs: there shall none of them be found to maintaine his opinion. Which is, that in Christ all mankinde is elected. As it appeareth in the former part of this Apologie. Neither shall any of them be found to write against that which we maintaine, whē their wordes and ours shal be well weighed, and our purposes perceyued, as all the learned may well vnderstand and know, though Cerberus be blinde on that side.

Cerberus.

Wherefore, to conclude. Take thys one note, in this matter of cannot choose, or of necessitie, both for the better vnderstanding of the thynge it self, and also of those which write therevpon.

They commonly speake of two kindes of necessitie. The one is, of necessitie absolute, and the other, of necessitie of consequence, or mere necessitie, and necessitie vpon condition, which diuision, all learned and good Authours do vse, and it is verie profitable to be considered. For touching the one, there is neyther reason, law, counsell or doctrine, neyther fayre promise, nor sharpe threatning, nor any other thynge whatsoeuer it be, which may helpe or hinder, adde or take away, hurt or profite. Wherefore, there is neuer any of al the aforesaid waies or meanes vsed in any of all those things, whych come to passe by absolute necessitie.

As for example: It is of meere necessitie, that the Diuell is and euer shall be damned, that the soule of man shalbe euerslasting, and not come to an end, like to the life of beastes; nor the life of beastes be immortall as the soule of man, and such like. Wherein it were more than madnesse, to endeavour, eyther by reason, law, or counsell, or anie other way whatsoeuer it were, to alter, chaunge, withstand or remoue any of those thyngs, seing of meere necessitie they must needs be so, and can not be altered.

For as Austen saith: *Omne enim quod prohibetur, idco prohibetur, quia potest fieri fiat. Si autem fieri esset, non posset fieri, non prohiberetur. Vt. Cyroni testamr. Quest. 115.* Whatsoeuer is forbidden (sayth Austen) therfore it is forbidden, bicause it might be done, and yet ought not to be done. But if it were of destinie, then could it not be done, nor should not be forbidden.

These wordes of Austen being few, containe much matter, if they be truly weighed.

Now to the necessitie of consequence, or necessitie of condition, wherof Melancthon sayth: *Nec enim hac consequentia libertatem voluntatis tollit.* Neyther doeth thys consequence take away the libertie of the wyll. And thys necessitie is not repugnant to diligence, prayr, lawes and doctrine. Fortherfore (that I may vse agayne the wordes of Austen) thyngs are forbidden to be done, bicause they might be done, but ought not to be done. And thys necessitie groweth vpon former causes, graunted or wrought. As it is of necessitie, or needs must be, that sectes and heresies shall growe in the Church, bicause the wycked seeke their owne glorie, and Sathan stirreth their hearties, to imagine & set forth abhominable errors, wherein they serue the Diuell, wyth all the diligence of

of their power. Wherefore, it must follow: that sects and heresies shall grow.

Neyther doth this necessitie proue, that they could not choose but commit such euilles: but seeing they do refuse the light, and embrace the darknesse, thys must necessarily follow, thys must needes be the end, that heresie & much mischief shal spring. Or as when a man presently beloldeth with his eyes murder, theft, drūkennesse, or any other wickednesse, it must needes be true, that such things are committed according to that whych a man doth see plainly before hye eyes. Yet doeth it not follow, that those wicked doers could not choose but commit those outrageous crimes. But seeing that they do commit such thyngs, it must needes be true by the necessitie of consequence, that such things are committed of them. These two kindes of necessitie, doeth Austen notably declare, how, & after what sort they spring out of Gods predestination. *Lib. De Predest. Dei. Cap. 2.*

First of all (sayth Austen) it is horrible iniquitie to say, that God doeth predestinate anie thing: saving only that whych is good. But of predestination, some be of bynding or of bondage, and other be of condition. These are of iustice, and those of power. And that it may be the more manifest, it shal be declared (sayth he) by example, which are of bynding and power: and whych are of condition and iustice. God created heauen and earth, sunne and moone: Furder, he did forcordeyne or predestinate that the heauen should euer be turned, and the vnmoueable earth should be in place of a center vnto the turning heauen. The Sunne and Moone should rule the day and night. The day & night should succede one another in certain times appoynted. These predesti-

e predestination is of power and of bynding: For
 e euerie one of those thyngs aforesayd: is so bounde
 e vnder hys worke, by the predestination of God, that
 e it can not be moued from the same. But God crea-
 e ted man, and did predestinate him, that if he were o-
 e bedient, and did absteyn from the tast of the forbid-
 e den apple: he should liue, but if he were disobedi-
 e ent, he should abide the sentence of death. Thys pre-
 e destination is of condition and of iustice. For God
 e before the fall of man, dyd not by the power of bin-
 e ding so predestinate him to die, that of necessitie he
 e must needs die, but vnder that cōdition, if he sinned.
 e Because therefore mā did sin, it was a righteous thing,
 e that he should die. If he sinned not, he should not be
 e bound to death by any chayn of Gods predestinatiō.

e All these are the wordes of Austen: And thys di-
 e uision is often repeated and commended, by the best
 e learned of the Protestantes.

Crowley.

e Solo Cerberus will shortly come to an ende. For he
 e will conclude with one note in this matter of can not
 e chose or necessitie. &c. And this note is of the two sortes
 e of necessitie, one absolute, and the other of consequence.
 e As mere necessitie and necessitie vpon condition. &c.
 e And to make men beleue, that all that we doe, is to
 e perswade me, that al things do come to passe of mere ne-
 e cessitie: he putteth for example the damnation of the De-
 e uill, the immortallitie of mans soule, and the mortallitie
 e of the brute beastes. As though the thoughts, words and
 e deedes of men were like vnto these. And therefore it should
 e as little auail, to be reason, law, counsell, doctrine, faire
 e promises or threatnings, to pull men from euill thought,

words

words & deedes, and so from damnation, which both necessarily follow vpon those doings, as it were by the same meanes to goe about to make the Diuell a saued spirit, mans soule mortal, & the life of a brute beast everlasting.

But we speake not of that necessitie which is merer absolute: but we speake of the other, which is of consequence or condition. And therefore his Austens wordes are cited out of place (I saye his Austens wordes, because they are the wordes of the same Austen that I haue noted before not to be the Bishop of Hippoe) for these wordes of this Austen are spoken of the thoughtes, wordes and deedes of men, which, though they do come to passe by a certaine necessitie, as God dyd without beginning foresee that they should: yet doth man vse the libertie of his will therein. For he doth neither thinke, speake, nor doe any thing without the consent of his will. And there is no impossibilitie in man, but that his thoughtes, wordes and deedes may be contrarie to what they are.

As for example. There was no impossibilitie in Cerberus but that he might haue refrained both from writing and publishing and casting abroad of this answer to his friends letter. Neither was it impossible for me to refraine from writing this Apologie. And Cerberus and I both haue herein vied the libertie of our will. And yet did God foresee & predestinate both his doings herein and mine. And as he did foresee that we should chuse to do as we haue done: so did he also predestinate our doings herein. So that chusing to doe as God did foresee and predestinate that we should chuse to doe: we haue done it by that necessitie that all learned Authours do call the necessitie of consequence or condition.

And God doeth foresee whether this Apologie shall perswade Cerberus to be of one minde with vs or not. And if it shall be so; then hath God predestinated my labours

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bought to that end. If not : then shall my labours serue to
some other purpose that God knew before . And yet do I
herein vse the libertie of my will , and so shall Cerberus
vse his . For neither of vs is o; that be enforced to do that
which our will would not haue vs do.

This is all the matter that the wordes of Cerberus
his Question do containe, when they be truly weighed.

As for the sentence of Apellanthon, it maketh nothing
against vs , so we speake of the same necessitie that he
speaketh of: and we affirme with him, that it taketh not
away the libertie of mans will.

The same Apellanthon, writing *De necessario* , in his
booke which he doth entitle *Proteratione dialectice* : sayeth
that there be foure sortes of necessities. One absolute. As
that God is true, libell, iust, &c. Another of definitions
or demonstrations : as a trike cornered stone must of ne-
cessitie haue three corners, and vertue must needs be a
thing that agreeth with the rule of Gods will. The third
is natural, in things which are so ordered in nature, that
they can not otherwise be, in and by that order. But this
necessitie may be altered at Gods pleasure, as by exam-
ples we see it hath. As at the redden sea when the water
stode still on heapes like hills, and when at the word of
Joshua, the same stode still and moued not. &c. The fourth
and last, is that which al the businesse is about. And Cer-
berus would faine make all men beleue , that we make
no difference betwene this fourth and the first.

Of this necessitie, doth Apellanthon write thus. *Quar-
tus gradus est mutabilitatis, quæ tamen vocatur necessaria, nec-
essitate consequentia, id est, quæ sunt quidem re ipsa mutabilia:
sed non mutantur, vel qui a sic à Deo decreta sunt, vel quia sequi-
tur ex causis, quæ non mutantur, cum tamen mutari possint, vel
quia cum suis, contradictoria simul vera esse non possunt. &c.*
That is to saye. The fourth degree of necessities , is of
those

those things which are mutable, which are notwithstanding called necessarie, by the necessitie of consequence. That is to say, which are in deede mutable: but are not changed, epyther for that they be so decreed of God, or else for that they doe follow vpon causes that are not chaunged, where as notwithstanding they might haue bene chaunged. Or else, for that when they be done, the flat contraries of them, can not at the same time be true.

What haue I written against Shaxton more than this? The thoughts, the wordes, and the deedes of men, are of themselves mutable: but as God hath decreed, so shall it come to passe, in all mens thoughts, wordes and deedes.

It followeth therfore, that though s teachers of sects, the murderers, the theues and the drunkards, might haue witholden the consent of their willes from those wicked doings: yet God hauing decreed to punish epyther them or others by that meane, the thing must fall out according to that decree: and yet God remaine iust, and mans wil unconstrained, as I haue befoze sufficiently declared.

As touching the Text of Austen, that Cerberus citeth out of his booke *De Predestinatione Dei. Cap. 2.* I will first note what Erasmus and the rest of the learned say, doe thinke of that booke. *Hoc opusculum de Predestinatione Dei, non esse Augustini, vel ipsa breuitas arguit. Deinde, hoc docet, quod Augustinus fortiter refellit, predestinationem esse ex operibus nostris. Videtur fragmentum alicuius libri, cuius studiosus quispiam, proemium & clausulam attexerit.* That is to say, This little worke of the predestination of God: is by the vertie shortnesse thereof, shewed not to be of Austens writing. Moreover, it doth teach that predestinatio is of our workes, which thing Austen doth mightely refell. It seemeth to be a scrap of some booke, whereunto some man, being desirous thereof, hath fastened a proeme and conclusion.

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Here thou mayst see (gentle Reader) of what authoritie this booke is, that Cerberus maketh so much of. I will not therefore spend any time in answering these words.

Cerberus.

Many things do offer themselves in this matter to be spoken, but my purpose of briefnesse causeth me to growe to an ende. I haue thought good therefore in few wordes, to note one point more of euill doctrine, which now a dayes is taught, and it springeth also out of this foresaid proposition, that Gods predestination causeth all sinne and wickednesse, & this it is, that sinne is not the cause of Reprobation, nor of Gods hatred towards the wicked which are damned, which thing in deede, to be short, I graunt must needs follow, if the former conclusiō be true, that sinne cometh of Gods predestination, or that Gods predestination was the cause of Adams fall, which was the originall of sinne. For if sinne, or the originall thereof came of God, or of hys ordinance, and from God cometh nothing but that which is holie, iust and good, then is sinne, no sinne, and cannot be the cause of Gods hatred towards them that perish, except we should saye, that God hateth them for that thing, which is holie, iust, and good.

And least I should be thought, through pretence of breuitie, to passe over, wythout plaine proufe of that which I say, that thys part of doctrine, is also set forth and taught. I will rehearse one sentence of theirs published in print, which is so open and manifest, that it may serue as well as a thousand: I read in the forenamed booke translated out of French into English, toward the latter end of the booke, vpon

pon this place, thus noted in figures, and these verie words follow. Rom. 9. c. 11. 12. 13. He sayth not onely that Esau was ordeyned to be hated, before he did any euil: for in so saying, he should not seeme to exclude any thing, but an actual sinne & incredulitie. But he saith expressely, before he was borne: whereby he excludeth originall sinne, and all that whych might be considered in the person of Esau by hys byrth from the cause of hate.

Touching the Text, whervpon it is spoken, assuredly Inke serueth not worlde to make luorie white: than these words, to open the minde and sence of the Apostle, as it were easy to proue, if shortnesse would suffer to make a digression, but touching that parte of doctrine: thou seest that he speaketh of two opinions: the one that actual sinne or incredulitie, should be the cause of Gods hatred toward the wycked: The other, that originall sinne, is the cause of Gods hate toward them. Thys man agaynst them both, taketh occasion vpon thy example of Esau: to exclude all that is in man, eyther outward sinne or inwarde, eyther originall sinne or actuall, from the cause of Gods hate, so that (if it be true which they say) God doth hate men: neyther for their outward wicked life, nor for their inwarde diuelish luste, but for hys owne pleasure onely.

Crowley.

The purpose to be brieue, causeth Cerberus to cut of many things that offer themselves to be spoken. Yet for all the hault, he must needs note one point more of euill doctrine. Which is, that sinne is not the cause of Reprobation. &c.

Sir, I would faine know how Cerberus could aunswere this Argument. All causes are in order before their effects : but sinne was not before Reprobation : Ergo sinne could not be the cause thereof. Cerberus will denie the *minor*. For he holdeth that sinne was before Reprobation. The *minor* therefore must be proued thus. Whatsoever was before Reprobation, is eternall : but sinne is not eternall, Ergo sinne was not before Reprobation. If Cerberus wil doubt of *h maior*, it shalbe proued thus. Whatsoever was before Electio, is eternall : but Election and Reprobatio are of like antiquitie. Ergo, whatsoever was before reprobation is eternall. The *maior* is manifest by the wordes of S. Paul to the Ephesians. Cap. 1. Sicut elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem. As he elected vs in him before the worlde was made. And if Cerberus will doubt of the *minor* (as perhaps he will) then let him shew vs, how there can be a choise where none are refused.

This might suffice for our defence in this matter that Cerberus both now charge vs withall. But because he sayth that this our conclusion is the sequelle of a proposition that we affirme, that is, that Gods predestination causeth all sinne and wickednesse : I must take some what more paine in the defence of that which we haue written.

First, I must say that Cerberus hath helped vs : For we saye not that Gods predestination doeth cause any sinne. When I must also denie, and haue already proued, that Adams fall was not the originall of sinne. Thirdly, we denie that the originall of sinne came of God : wherefore the conclusion that Cerberus maketh is not against vs.

But Cerberus hath found one sentence of ours so open and manifest, that it maye serue as well as a thousand. It is in the latter end of the forenamed English booke

booke translated out of French, vpon the wordes of Paul Rom. 9. c. He saith not only. &c. Cerberus can not see how this Text of Paul may by those wordes be better opened, than Iuozie may be made white with ynke. But for hast to come to an ende, he will not stande to proue this, although he might easely do it, as he sayth.

But touching the two opinions, one that actual sinne or incredulitie, the other that originall sinne, is the cause of Gods hatred to wardes men: this fellow (sayth Cerberus) taketh occasion vpon the example of Esau to exclude all that is in man. &c.

A little helpe woulde make this man of one minde with Origine, who writing vpon this parte of Pauls Epistle to the Rom. and these verse wordes, Jacob haue I loued, but Esau I haue hated: saith, that Jacobs soule being yet without a bodie, did purge it selfe, and when God saw the purenesse of it, he took it, and put it into that bodie wherein Jacob was borne, and Esau his soule which had not cleansed it selfe, he put into a bodie made out of the same lumpe, but not to honour as the other was, because the soule of Esau was not worthy of such a bodie. So he loued Jacob (as Origine thinketh) because Jacobs soule had cleased it selfe before it came into his body: & he hated Esau, because his soule had not cleased it selfe.

If a man should aske this question of Cerberus: why did God loue Jacob and hate Esau: what could he answer, if he wyl not say, *Quia voluit*? because he woulde, If he will saye, that God respected the actual righteousness and sinne that was in them: then shall he be found to loyne with Origine. If he shall saye that he respected originall sinne in Esau, and did therfore hate him: then may it be asked why he did not hate Jacob for the same. For both were defiled thereto alike. But if Cerberus will say, that God had respect to his workes that they should do
in

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in the time of their life : then doth he toyne with the papists: And that he would not seeme to do.

His best waye therefore, shalbe to toyne with vs, and say: That God loued Jacob and hated Esau, because it pleased him so to doe. And if any man shall stand vp to dispute the matter any further: then to aunswere with *S. Paule. O homo tu quis es, qui respondeas Deo?* O thou mā, who art thou, that darest take vpon thee to reason wth God?

Cerberus.

That verie same thyng sayth Knoxe in the 141. pag. of hys foresayd booke: where his wordes are these. Further I saye: that if Esau was hated for his euill deseruing, then must it needes follow, that Iacob was loued for hys well deseruing, by the Argument following: of the nature of contraries.

As well it might be said, it must needes follow by the contraries: that if a King or Prince hate one mā, whych hath well deserued his hate, by stealing from him his ring, his chain, or some great Iuel; the doth he not loue any other man, but he whych hath well deserued hys loue, by giuing to hym a ryng, a chain, or some great treasure, as though he should say: because iustice worketh on the one side, therefore mercie hath nothing to doe on the other side; or as though God were not both iust & mercifull: Iust in damning for their offence, those which are damned: and mercifull in sauing without their desert those which are saued.

And who seeth not that neyther *smile*, nor *dissemble*, neyther like thyngs; nor thyngs contrarie, do holde in all poyntes; for nothing is so like, whyttr in
some

Some thing is not unlike, neyther any thing so contrarie, whych doth in all things varie. Chriit is likened to a Lion, but did he euer rauish, or deuour, and shedde any innocent bloude? *Latimer* wyseth, that al Byshops were like Byshop Diuell in diligence, the ought not the Diuell and a Byshop to differ in all thyngs. And most specially and plainely, doeth the Scripture beate in our heads: aboue al other things, that the nature of contraries, doe not holde in both sides of Gods reward, & mans deseruing. For as they are inseparable relatiues in the one part, so on the other side, the one hath neuer any relation to the other, for as Gods hatred and vengeance, hath euer relation to mans deseruing: so hath Gods loue and mercie neuer any relation to mans merite. Yea, all the Scripture teacheth vs, that God neuer hateth, or punisheth man wythout his owne deseruing. For as the wyse man sayth: *Et cum qui nullam penam commertus sit condemnasse, a tua potentia indicas alienum.* *Sapient. 12.* And thou Lord (sayth he) esteemest it a thyng contrarie to thy power, to haue condemned him whych hath not deserued punishment.

What should be sayde of the Cananites and the Israelites, if the nature of contraries do alway hold, and haue such relation of the one to the other, must it not then necessarily follow (as he sayth) by the nature of contraries: that if the Cananites were cast out of the fortunate land that floweth wyth milke and hony, for their euill deseruing: that on the other side the Israelites were brought and planted into that same happie and blessed rest, for their well deseruing? But what sayth the Scripture? Speake not in thy heart, after that the Lorde thy God hath cast them out before thee, saying: for my righteous-

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nesse the Lorde hath brought me in, to possesse thys lande, naye, but for the wickednesse of those Nations, the Lorde doth cast them out before thee. So plainly speaketh the holie ghost here, that thou mayst easily perceyue, how grosse and vayne their saying is, which affirme: That if God hate an euill man for his owne euill deseruing, then must it nedes follow, that he loueth a good man for hys owne well deseruing. For the hatred of God and euerlasting damnation are iust rewardes of mans euil deseruing: but the loue of God and euerlasting life are free gyftes of God, for^e Christes sake wythout any part of mans owne deseruing.

Rom. 6.

Take therefore this saying of theyrs: No sinne neyther originall nor actuell, is the cause of Gods hate or eternal death, and put the same into the one side of the ballaunce, then take, and put into the other side, this saying of S. Paul to the Romanes: was that then that was good, made death vnto me? God forbid, but sinne was made death vnto me. Then wey both these sayings together with the hand of good aduise mēt, in the indifferent ballāce of vpright iudgement, and put not in aboue three graynes of wilful partialitie: thus shalt thou plainly see, that the Apostle agreeth farre better with the Maiestic of God, and hath a much more reuerent opinion of hys iudgements, than these men haue, yea, thou shalt easily perceyue (whatsoever they say) that neyther Gods pleasure, nor Gods ordinance, or predestinatiō, nor none other thing that is good, is made death, or the cause of Gods hatred, agaynst any man, but sinne is the very grounded cause, why God hateth, taketh vengeance, and punisheth man by death and destruction, according to that which the same Apostle sayth

Rom. 7.

saith : Death is the reward of sinne. And the wordes of Osee are also manifest & plaine where he saith : O Israell thou dost destroy thy selfe , but in me onely is thy helpe. In which words of the holie ghost, thou seest how manifestly God doth, as it were purge him selfe, from being the cause or worker of mans destruction, so that the perdition and destruction of man, is altogether to be attributed vnto hym selfe : And God being cleare , neyther accessarie , nor partaker thereof, as the chiefe and hygh Iudge of heauen and earth , vnsported and wythout blame , gyueth the sentence of euerlasting death vpon man, for his own wicked deseruing and offence.

But on the other side sayth God vnto man, in me only is thy helpe. In God onely, onely in God is our helpe and saluation, in him onely, and of him altogether, and not of our selues: commeth our saluation; and all whatsoeuer belongeth therewith. The same is also set forth by all those Scriptures, which are before rehearsed, to proue that sinne and euill, commeth not of Gods predestination, for vpon that conclusion dependeth also thys proposition, that sinne is not the cause of Reprobation, or of Gods hatred towards man.

Crowley.

Yet once againe hath Cerberus a snatch at Knoxe.
Whether he do reposit his words truly or not, I knowe
not: soz I haue not seene that booke of his, neither haue I
cause to thinke, y al is Gospel that Cerberus saith. Much
more aboe than needeth doth Cerberus make, to proue
that an Argument *a contrarijs*, *simile* and *dissimile*: doth
not alwayes concludenecessarilie. For as he sayth, who
C.q. saith

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saeth not, that they do not holde in all pointes: This therfore that Cerberus hath here written, is but dalliance, and as it were dauncing about the bushe. The questiō is, whether the sequels be good in the matter that Knoxe doth vse it in, or not. We must therfore consider the matter, and how Knoxe doth applie this maner of reasoning to this matter. The matter therfore, is a questiō moued concerning the cause why Esau shoulde be hated of God, and Jacob beloued, before any of them had done epyther good or euill, yea and before they were borne, and therfore, before there could be in them any deseruing at all. Now, Knoxe sayth, that if Esau were hated for his euill deseruing: then must it needes folloiw, by an Argument following of the nature of contraries, that Jacob was beloued for his well deseruing.

Nowe, I must thinke well of Knoxe, for I knowe hym to be not only learned but also godlie, and therfore not like to ouershoote himselfe so farre, that he woulde stretch an Argument, taken out of the place of contraries, further than the nature thereof will suffer. I must thinke therfore, that he meant, that if God do in choosing and refusing, in louing and hating, respect nothing but the well deseruing of one sort, and the euill deseruing of y other (as the common opinion of the Papistes is) then it must needes folloiw, by an Argument of the nature of contraries, that if he hated Esau for his euill deseruing, he must needes loue Jacob for his well deseruing.

If Cerberus be not satisfied with this, let him loke for further aunswere at Knoxes owne hand, for he is yet liuing and able to aunswere for himselfe.

As for the similitude of a King or Prince, that Cerberus vseth to deface Knoxes Argument withall: may serue him among such as know not that God is free from mens affections, and that he can not be moued to loue

be the better for the giftes that we bestow vpon him, nor the worse, for that we take from him and spoyle him of any treasure that he ought to haue.

The nature of God is not to hate but to loue. For St. John sayth, God is loue. And as the wise man sayth, he loueth all things that be, and he hateth none of the thinges that he hath made. Neither hath he ordeined or made any thing, hating the same that he ordeined or made. For in that he made or ordeined them, they are all exceeding good. Wherefore, when we say, or when it is sayd in the Scriptures, that God doth hate any of his creatures, (as it is said that he hated Esau) it is meant that he loued not Esau or those other creatures, whome he is sayd to hate, so well as he loued the others, of whome it is sayd that he loued them.

1. Iohan. 4.
Sapient. 11.

It can not be denied, but must needs be confessed, that God loued all his creatures, in that he would make them some thing, where as before they were nothing, and in that he would giue them some part of that which is proper to himselfe. For to be, is proper to God. And whatsoever hath any being, it hath the same of God. When God giueth a being to his creatures, he sheweth that he loueth them: but when he giueth them an euermouring and blessed being, then he loueth them so, that the other loue in comparison of that, seemeth but an hatred. And therefore it is sayd that he hateth them, whom he appointeth not to that euermouring blessed being, but leaueth them to themselves, that in them he may haue occasion to exercise his iustice, and by them to giue occasion to his deariely beloued to see and consider the exceeding greatness of his loue and mercie to wardes them.

But Cerberus seemeth to haue the whole Scripture on his side. For he sayth, that all the Scripture teacheth vs, that God neuer hateth and punisheth vs without our

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Sapient. 12.

stone deserving. Which saying, I graunt to be true, but not in that sense that Cerberus would haue vs to vnderstande it. For Cerberus would haue vs to thinke that God could not be tempted iust, if he should refuse any man in whome there were not sinne; that might moue God to refuse him; and to that ende he citeth the wordes of the wise man. For this is his opinion, as it appeareth before, that in Christ all mankind is cleared, and so consequently, that Cain was cleared in Christ. But by sinne he made himself a reprobate, and was not refused before he sinned.

But let vs see, how this place of the wise man maketh for his purpose. The wordes are these, as Cerberus citeth them. *Et cum qui nullam peccatum conuerit sit condemnasse: a tua potentia indicas alienum.* And thou I orde, esteemest it a thing contrary to thy power, to haue condemned him that hath not deserved punishment. All the Scripture is not so, by Cerberus, brought into a short summe. For it is him by in lesse than two lines, written in the xij. Chapter of the booke of wisdomes.

Of what authoritie that booke hath alwayes bene thought to be: I thinke Cerberus is not ignorant. And how diuers readings there be of that place which he c setteth: I suppose he knoweth. The Tyburne Bible is it that Cerberus followeth. Other translations there be, that differ from that, and from the olde also. The olde translation hath it thus.

Cum ergo sis iustus, iuste omnia disponis: ipsum quod, qui non debet puniri, condemnas, & exterum assimas a tua virtute. That is. Forasmuch as thou thy selfe art iust, thou dost dispose all things iustly: him also that ought not to be punished, thou dost condemne, and dost esteeme him as one erred from thy power or dominion. Unlike, when Cerberus cited this place, he supposed that no man should

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See his booke; but such as were not able to discern Chalk from Cheese. What place can make more manifestly against him and so vs, than this place doeth: For by these wordes it is plaine, that though God do condemne him, that hath not by any deedes deserved to be condemned: yet is God neuer the latter, iust, and doth dispose all things iustly.

And the circumstance of the Text doth shew that this translation is more nigh the meaning of the Iuxiter, thā is that which Cerberus followeth. For the sentence going immediatly before, is thus, *Nec Rex, nec Tyrannus in conspectu tuo inquirent, de his quos perdidisti.* What is: Neither King nor tyrant, will in thy presence make inquisition for them that thou hast destroyed.

And the sentence that doth immediatly follow, is thus, *Virtus enim tua, iustitie initium est: Et ab hoc quod omnium Dominus es, omnibus te parere facis.* What is. For thy power is the beginning of iustice, and because thou art Lord of all, thou dost make thy selfe to spare all.

But because there is such diversitie of translations in the Latine, and peradventure Cerberus will saye he hath looked in the Greeke, and findeth that the Tygurine translation, which he followeth, is most agreeable to the Greeke Text, out of which all our Latine translations are taken. It shall not be amisse therfore to set downe the Greeke Text, that suche as have any skill therein, may iudge betwixt vs.

Δίκαιος δε εἶμι, Δίκαιος τα πάντα διέπει, αὐτὸν τὸν μὲ οφείλοντα κολαῖσθαι, κατὰ δικάσαι αλλότριον ἡγούμενος τῆς γῆς ἀνάμειρος. That is to say (so far as I am able to understand it) Thou being iust, dost dispose all things iustly, commaunding to condemne straunge from the land of thy power, which is not to be iudged ignominious. If any can see any other meaning in this Greeke text: I will not

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not contende, for I see that many men of great learning, haue varied in opinion about the translation thereof.

But graunt that Cerberus haue cited that translation that is according to the true meaning of the Text: what hath he wonne thereby? Shall all the Scripture be on his side, because it is written in y^e booke of wisdom, that God esteemeth it a thing contrarie to hys power (or more truly after the Latine Text that Cerberus citeth) a thing straining from his power, to condemne him that hath not deserved punishment? I thinke not. For the booke of wisepome, is of that sort of bookes that must be made to agree with y^e Canonical bookes: the Canoncalle bookes must not be enforced to agree with it: For it is A^pokryphe, that is a booke permitted to be read privately, but not of such authoritie that we may build our sayth vpon euery sentence in it.

But graunt that this booke were of as great authoritie as any other booke of Scripture is: should we thinke that God might not iustly refuse such of his creatures as it pleased him not to chuse, vntill the same creatures had first by sinne made them selues unworthie to be chosen? We must not restraine God of his libertie, to doe wth his creatures what he himselfe will. Neyther must we say or thinke, that any thing that he doth, is or can be other than iust, albeit that we can not vnderstand howe the same shoulde be iust. We must therefore, wth reuerend feare, seeke another meaning of this place than Cerberus doth teach vs: let vs thinke therefore, that God speaketh here of the execution of his iudgement, and not of election. And it shalbe good for vs to say alwayes wth S^r. Austen, that the cause of Gods doings may be secrete, so that we can not know them: but vniust they can not be.

But Cerberus seemeth to himselfe to haue gotten a great aduantage by the example of the Cananites and Israelites,

*Aug. Paulino
Quest. 6.*

Israelites. The Cananites were driven out for they sinned, and this was iustice: but the Israelites were put in their place without deserting, and that was mercie. Wherefore in refusing, God worketh by iustice, and in choosing, he worketh by mercie. As though there were no difference betwene choosing and refusing of creatures, and the blessing of them when they be chosen or refused. God chooseth and refuseth without respect of good or euill desertings: but he maketh not his refusal known vnto men, till the refused haue by theyr sinnes shewed themselves worthe to be refused. And though the chosen sort, neyther do nor can shewe themselves worthe for they god workes to be chosen: yet before they receiue the great blessing promised, they shewe themselves by theyr workes, lesse worthe to be refused than the other.

And to this do the Scriptures that Cerberus hath cited out of Moses, Paule, Dīe and the rest: full well agree. But it followeth not hereof that therefore God had not refused the wicked sort before they sinned.

It is true, that death is the rewarde of sinne: but it is not true that euerie one that sinneth, receiue that rewarde, for Christ came to saue sinners, and the free gift of euertlasting life is bestowed vpon such sinners, as were elected in Christ before the beginning of the world.

It is true also, that man destroyeth himselfe, by the free consent of his will, to do contrarie to the commaundement of God, & that his helpe and succour cometh of God alone: & yet doth it not therefore follow, that no man is refused of God before he haue committed sinne, whereby he destroyeth himself. For when the elect were chosen in Christ, then were the rest refused. For other wise, it could not be an election, but a generall acceptation.

As for the saying that Cerberus sayth is ours, and would haue his friend to lay it in the one side of the bal-

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launce against S. Paules wordes to the Romaines : 3
leauue to him selfe to be weyed wyth the hand of god ad-
uiffement. &c. And let him put in as many graines of wil-
full partialitie as he will : for the saying is none of ours.
For we teach, that sinne is the cause of eternall death, in
those that be not Gods elect, and were it not that Christ
hath washed his chosen flocke in his owne heart blood :
sinne would be theyr destruction too.

It is but for his owne pleasure therfore, that Cerbe-
rus doth thus turne round after his owne taylor.

Cerberus.

And vpon the same Article dependeth also an
other part of doctrine, which they teach, worthy to
be millicked of all men, as wel for that it importeth a
sophisticall search of bottomlesse secretes, in the ve-
rie essence and nature of God, as also, for that it
clearly withdraweth vs from Christ, the only staie,
and comfort of our weake conscience, deliuered vn-
to vs in the word of God, for that they might be sure
to holde fast the former principle, that all things
come of Gods predestination, as running streames
out of a deepe fountaine. They affirme, that the free
mercie of God in Christ, is but an inferiour cause of
Election, and that we are taught to ascende vnto a
higher cause, as vnto the eternall purpose and pre-
destination of God, which he determined onely in
himselfe. So sayth the printed booke before named,
translated out of French into English.

That same thing we reade also, lately set forth in
English print, in the glose of the last translated Bible.
Rom. cap. 9. wyth these wordes. As the only wyl and
purpose of God, is the chiefe cause of Election and
Repro-

Reprobation, so his free mercie in Christ is an inferiour cause of saluation. &c.

But for my part, I trust in minde, neuer to ascēd vnto that high cause of Election, and in heart neuer to taste of that eternall purpose or predestination, which God hath determined only in himselfe, without or aboue his free mercie, which is in Christ. For surelie, that eternall purpose, whych cometh not of Gods free mercie in Christ, is to destroy, and not to saue. Agayne, if that eternall purpose spring out of Gods free mercie, then is that free mercie of God, the chiefe cause, and not an inferiour cause why he purposeth to saue vs, for a great dishonor it were to the mercie of God: to be put to an inferiour place, touching election and saluation of man: For if euer Gods mercie be aboue all, it is in the sauing of miserable man: and mercie there is not in God towarde man, bnt onely in Christ.

Therefore S. Paule Ephes. 3. b. calleth it the eternall purpose, which he purposed in Christ Iesus our Lord: In Christ therefore was this eternall purpose, and for hys onely sake, God the Father eternally purposed to elect and saue vs. Consider and marke it well, whence commeth thys purpose or wyll of God to saue vs: but of his free mercie? If hys purpose to saue vs, spring out of his free mercie, why is then his mercie inferior to his purpose, or how is the fountaine inferior to the springs that come therof?

Also, what may be sayd in God at any time, or in any respect to be higher or greater than his mercie, seeing it is written, that his mercie is as great as himselfe. Ecclesiast 2. d. Yea, and most specially it is so to be sayd, that his mercie passeth all, when we speak of this matter: For of thys it is written, that mercie

Iacob. 2. b.

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reioyceth agaynst iudgement, and why? all the iudgements of God in thys behalfe are not to be compared vnto hys mercie, for though it were not true, whych Dauid sayeth, that his mercie is aboue all his workes, yet were it cleare, that in Election and Redemption and saluation of man, Gods mercie in Christ, hath euer the highest place: and those which in the saluation of our soules, make the free mercie of God an inferiour cause, how base a rounge will they assigne vnto hys free mercie, in nourishing and preserving our bodies. Let them reach as hygh as they can, I trust to go no furder, but to hold me fast by the euerlasting mercie of God, and by the hemme of Christes garment, for the Scripture describeth God vnto me, wythout Christ as a wrathfull and moste terrible Iudge, but in Christ, and for hys sake, as a father whose wrath is pacified, and he well pleased, reconciled, agreed, and at one: and to speak of a hygher cause or purpose, to elect and saue only in God, beside or without this free mercie in Christ, or that Christ and Gods free mercie in hym, is not the chiefeest cause which worked and obteyneth the decree, and purpose of God, to elect and saue, it is plainely nothing else, but to deny the mercy of God in election, reconciliation, redemption and saluation, by Christ, in Christ, and for Christ: As easily it may be perceyued, if a man do but weigh and consider, what eternall purpose an Election, and a reconciliation is, seing Christ is our Aduocate, Mediator, Peace, Reconciliation & Atonement, as in these Scriptures following, and many other, it doth plainly appeare. Psal. 84. 2. Math. 1. 1. Ephē. 1. 1. 2. b. Rom 5. 1. b. Coloss. 1. c. 2. Corin. 5. d. 1. Ioā. 2. 2. Heb. 5. b. c. and. 7. a. b. c. d. e. 2. Timoth. 1. c.

And

And although it be true according to the Scriptures, that God so loued the worlde, that he gaue his onely begottē sonne. &c. yet did he neither loue the world, nor gyue hys sonne wythout the intercession & mediatio of his sonne, for if God loued the world without the reconciliation and mediatio, or before he was reconciled, intreated, and pacified by Christ, then is Christ in vaine come to late to be our mediator, seing God the Father is without him alreedy reconciled. But horrible false is thys opinion: For like as the sonne of a King might entreat his Father for the seruant, whom for hys offences, the King in hys displeasure, were ready to cast, not onely out of hys seruice, but also into perpetuall prison: euen so Christ our onely Sauour, and Gods only sonne, did offer vp himselfe, as a raunsome vnto his Father for vs, whereby he pacified the wrath of hys Father, and adioyned vs with himselfe, to be sonne and heyres of hys Fathers glorie. And this hath Christ done, not only now in tyme, but also euerlastingly in the most hygh and eternall purpose of God, before the foundation of the world was layde.

Thus I end, thinking it sufficient for this presēt, that I haue in these few wordes poured my selfe of those thigs which you lay to my charge, & set forth vnto your iudgement, the errors of *Pelagius*; that you may the better discerne, who they are, whych are worthie to be called after that sect: and also plainly declared, in what pointes my conscience differeth, from certayne teachers of our time: and vpon what ground, I am moued so to mislike some part of their doctrine, whych thyngs if you diligently weye and consider, readyng the same wythout partiallitie: shen haue I my desire.

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I am glad, that Cerberus is now come to an ende. Such adoe he had to let slip so manie things as offered themselves to be spoken off. But now he hath concluded, contenting him selfe with selfe wordes, in purging him selfe of those things that his friends charged him with, and setting forth the Pelagians errors. &c.

Yet, even in the winding up of this matter, he hath found one part of doctrine, hanging upon the Article of Gods eternal predestination, which is to be misliked of all men (if Cerberus be not deceived) and that is: That as the only will & purpose of God is the chiefe cause of Election and Reprobation: so his free mercie in Christ is an inferiour cause of saluation. &c. Here Cerberus doth of purpose leaue out the ende of that glose, shutting by the matter with his. &c. I will therefore set downe the words that follow, which are these: and the hardening of the heart an inferiour cause of damnation. Now this glose is some thing more plaine than it was before, as Cerberus hath cited it with his. &c. He thought belike, that the Bible wherein he findeth this glose, is not in euery mans hande, and therefore his. &c. should cause men to thinke that the rest of the glose must be as good stiffe as he thinketh the first part to be. That is, worthy to be misliked of all men, importing a sophistical search of bottomlesse secretes, and drawing from Christ. Such shifts doth Cerberus use, to make me mislike with that which he himselfe liketh not. But to proue this part of doctrine to be such as Cerberus affirmeth it to be: he useth two reasons. One is, that the eternall purpose of God, springeth out of his free mercie in Christ: wherefore that free mercie cannot be inferiour to Gods eternall purpose, more than the fountaine, from which streames of water do flowe, can be

be inferiour to the streames that flow from it. The other is of the mediation of Christ. For if God did in his eternall will and purpose, elect vs before Christ had appeared his wrath, by his mediation: then was it but a vaine thing for Christ to be a Mediatour, neyther had we any neede of his mediation.

Although I would gladly content my self, to haue defended mine owne writings, and other mens wherewith Cerberus findeth fault, euen with as fewe wordes as he bleth in purging himselfe and other, of that which his friend layeth to his charge: yet may I not so shortly slip ouer this matter wherewith Cerberus hath shut vp his answere.

For if Cerberus would haue sought how to haue set forth to be scene, his owne willfull ignorance, and errour in the chiefe pointes of our Religion: he could not haue found a better meane, thā he hath used in these two reasons that he maketh against the doctrine conteyned in the glose wherewith he mistaketh.

For what greater errour can there be, than to holde that with God there is time past, and time to come: and that any of the essentiall properties of God do spring out of other in time, as though there had bene or could haue bene a time, wherein God lacked those properties: Or that the sonne of God, the seconde person in Trinitie, should in his diuine nature in time, make mediation to God the Father, that thereby he might purpose to saue man, whom he was before purposed to destroy. For shewing against him that hath sayde, that the only will and purpose of God, is the chiefe cause of Election and Reprobation: and that his free mercie in Christ is an inferior cause of saluation. &c. He sayth that the purpose or will of God to saue vs, must needes spring out of the free mercie of God, and that therefore the will or purpose of God

God in sauing, must of force be inferiour to his mercie; euen as streames that issue from fountaines, are inferiour to the fountaines that they come from.

And to proue this, he citeth the words of Ecclesiasticus the 2. Chapter. *Secundum enim magnitudinem ipsius: sic & misericordia illius cum ipso est.* That is: Euen according to his owne greatnesse, so is his mercie with hym. He citeth also the saying of St. James, Cap. 2. of his Epistle, where he sayth, *Iudicium enim sine misericordia: illi qui non faciunt misericordiam. Glorietur autem misericordia aduersus iudicium.* That is: He that sheweth no mercie, shall haue iudgement without mercie. But mercie reioyleth against iudgement. And againe, he citeth the words of Dauid in the Psalm. 145. *Misericordia eius super omnia opera eius.* That is: His mercie is vpon all his workes.

All this ado he maketh, to proue that Gods will and purpose are inferiours to his mercie. But how well that is by these scriptures proued, I referre to the iudgement of the indifferent Reader. Sirach sayth, that those which feare the Lord will prepare their heartes, and humble their soules before the Lord. Let vs fall into the handes of God, and not into the handes of men: For euen as his greatnesse is, so is his mercy. Sirach his purpose is to set forth the effect of the feare of God, which worketh in a hartes of us, a true turning to God, with an assured hope of forgiveness at his hande, because they be perswaded, that he is no lesse ready to forgive penitent sinners, than he is able to punish the impenitent.

St. James sayth, that the mercifull shall finde mercie, intending to perswade all men to shew mercie one to another. Assuring themselves, that vnlesse they do so, they can finde no mercie with God, and on the contrarie, if they do shew mercie, they shall not neede to feare iudgement; for mercie shall preuaile against iudgement.

And Dauid the Prophet hath said, that Gods mercie is vpon all his woꝝkes, although it please Cerberus to cite his woꝝdes otherwise, foꝝ his purpose. Foꝝ he sayth, that Dauid hath said, that the Lordes mercie is aboue all his woꝝkes. Which woꝝds though they be true, yet hath not Dauid so sayd, neyther maye I suffer Cerberus, to cause the Prophet Dauid to speake as he woulde haue him, that his fantasie might be maintained by the Prophetes woꝝds. Dauids meaning is to teach that the Lord God sheweth mercie vpon all his woꝝks, so that there is not one of the woꝝks of God, that hath not cause to praise him foꝝ his louing kindnesse and mercie. Both þe Hebrue and Greeke Text, and al the translations in Latine, and English tw (so many as I haue seene) do giue thys sence of the Prophetes woꝝdes.

How can Cerberus proue then, by these Scriptures, that the mercie of God is the fountaine of his wil & purpose : All that he doeth therefore is nothing else but a setting forth of his owne wilfull ignorance, whereby he is fallen into the filthy error of them that imagine of God, as of a man, and that he is moued with affectiōs as men be. Whereas, in God : His vnderstanding, his vnmearurable power, his vnsearcheable wisdom, his mercifull godnesse, his truth and iustice, his chastenesse and freedome in all poyntes, to wyl what he lusteth, to do what it pleaseth him, and to purpose & appoynt what liketh him : are essentiall properties, without which he neyther is, nor can be God. To imagine therefore, that there was a time wherein God was purposed to destroy man, and that his mercie in Christ hath chaunged that purpose, and caused him now to purpose and will to saue mannis to imagine þe there was a time wherein God was not so mercifull as he is now, & so, not so perfectly God as he is now. And that by experieñce he hath learned some

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what more wisdom than he had at the first, and therefore, may be wiser hereafter than he is now. How great absurdities these are, I leaue to the iudgement of the indifferent Readers.

But Cerberus will saye, that though I haue sayde some thing against him, yet I haue sayd nothing for him whose wordes I haue taken in hande to defende: but in my wordes I seeme to fight against them both. I answer: I haue not taken vpon me to defend, eſther mine owne or other mens wordes, furder than in conscience I thinke them to be true. And if I did thinke that the writer of that glose did meane as grossely, as I perceiue by his open wordes that Cerberus doth: I would not spare him more than I haue spared Cerberus: but for as much as his wordes seeme not to me, to haue any such meaning as to teach that there was a time, wherein God was mercilesse towards mā, & that his mercy first sprang out of his will and purpose (as Cerberus doth plainly teach, that his wil and purpose sprang out of his mercie) I must not refuse to take that good meaning of his wordes, which may seeme to me to be according to the truth of Christian religion.

The wordes of Paule, wherupon this note is made, are these. I will haue mercie on him, to whom I wil shew mercie. Vpon this it is noted in the margine, that as the onlie will and purpose of God is the chiefe cause of Election and Reprobation: so his free mercie in Christ is an inferiour cause of saluation: and the hardening of the heart an inferiour cause of damnation. I vnderstand the meaning of these words to be, that as the only will & purpose of God is the chiefe cause, that there was an Election and choise of some, and a refusall of other some: so the shewing forth of his mercie in Christ, is an inferiour cause, that is, an instrumentall cause whereby saluation

is wrought in the elected, according to Gods will and purpose, and the hardening of the hearts of the reprobates, an instrumentall cause of damnation, in the reprobates, according to the same eternal will and purpose.

He therefore that sayth we must ascende to an higher cause of Election, than that which appeareth in the execution of Gods mercie in Christ, doth not teach to set by the essentiall properties one above another, as though one were fountaine of another, and that God lacked the one till it sprang out of the other: but he teacheth that the same mercie that we see executed in Christ in time, was decreed in the eternall will and purpose of God before all time, and so was the refusall of the whole heartes we see hardened in time. If any man do see cause to iudge other wise of this glose: I am well pleased that the same vse his owne iudgement in enterpreting the meaning therof. And if I may perceiue any mans iudgement herein to be sounder than mine, I trust I shalbe ready to condescend to that.

And least any man should thinke, that herein I doe follooe mine owne fantacie, without example of any thing that I see in the auncient Fathers: I will sette downe the wordes of S. Austen, that haue bene a meane to confirme me herein.

In his 14. booke, De Ciuitate Dei, l. 11. Chapter: S. Austen writeth thus. *Sed quia Deus cuncta presciuit, & ideo homines quos peccaturum ignorare non potuit: secundum id quod presciuit, atq; disposuit, ciuitatem Dei debemus asserere, non secundum illud quod in nostram cognitionem peruenire non potuit, quia in Dei dispositione non fuit. Nec enim homo peccato suo, diuinum potuit perturbare consilium, quasi Deum, quod statuerat, mutare compulerat: cum Deus presciendo utrumq; preueniret, id est, & bono quem bonum ipse creauit, quam malus esset futurus, & quid boni, etiam sic de illo esset ipse factururus: Deus enim etsi dicitur, statu-*

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ta mutare : Vnde tropica locutione in Scripturis sanctis, etiam panituisse legitur deum, iuxta id dicitur quod homo sperauerat, vel naturalium causarum ordo gestabat : non iuxta id, quod se omnipotens facturum esse prescinerat. That is to saye : But because God did know all things before hand, and therefore could not be ignorant that man should sinne : we must teach that the holie Citie is such a thing as he did foresee and appoint that it should be, not such as we could not come to the knowledge of, because it was not in that disposition or order that God made. Neither was man, by his sinne able to disorder the purpose of God, as though he should haue constrained God to chaunge the thing that he had once decreed : seeing that God by his foresight did prevent both, that is to say, both how the euill man should become (whom he had created good) and also what thing he would make of him, euen when he should be in such wise become euill. For although it be sayd that God doth chaunge his purposes (whereof it cometh that by a figuratiue speach, it is reade in the holie Scriptures, that God did repent) the same is spoken according to that which man hoped for, or that which the order of naturall causes did import : not according to that, which the almighty did know before hand that he himself would do.

Againe, the same Austen in his booke *De diuersis questionibus*. 33. and the. 15. 16. 17. questions sayth thus. *Deus omnium que sunt causa est. Quod autem omnium rerum causa est : etiam sapientie sue causa est. Nec unquam Deus sine sapientia sua : igitur sempiterna sapientie sue, causa est sempiterna, nec tempore prior est quam sua sapientia. Deinde, si patrem sempiternum esse inest deo, nec fuit aliquando non pater : namquam sine filio fuit. Omne preteritum iam non est. Omne futurum non aliter est. Omne igitur & preteritum & futurum non deest. Apud deum autem nihil deest : Nec preteritum igitur nec futurum, sed omne presens est apud deum.*

That

That is to saye : God is the cause of all those things that be. And in asmuch as he is the cause of all things: he is the cause of his owne wisdome. Neyther was God at any time without his owne wisdome : therefore he is the euerallasting cause of his owne euerallasting wisdome, neyther is he in time moze auncient than his owne wisdome. Furthermoze, if to be an euerallasting Father , be a thing that is in God , and that he hath not at any time not bene a Father : then hath he neuer bene without a sonne. Whatsoever is past, is not now. Whatsoever is to come, is not yet. Therefore , whatsoever is past or to come, is wanting , but with God there is nothing wanting. There is with God therefore nothing past or to come, but all present.

These sayings of Austen do seeme to me sufficient to state a man in that minde that I am of , concerning the cause of Gods Election and Reprobation. His will and purpose which could neuer be wanting in him , neyther can by any meanes be altered, chaunged or letted, maye well be called the cause why he hath chosen some, and refused some other some. And this Election is in him euerallasting as he himselfe is : neither may it be thought that there was euer any time wherein he had not elected those that be elected, and refused those that be refused. But we holde not that this is done without Christ, and therefore Cerberus laboureth moze than needeth to proue by Scriptures that our Election is in Christ. For we account Christ to be eternall as his Father is , and his incarnation to be alwayes present with God. And therefore, that the Election that is in Gods purpose and will, is not without Christ the mercysseate and mediatur betwixt God and man. Thus much for the first of Cerberus his two reasons.

Now a fewe wordes to his second reason, and so an

Ec. iij.

end.

An Apologie of Crowley

end. First, Cerberus doeth in this reason flatly affirme, that God did not loue the worlde, nor giue his sonne for the worlde, before his wrath was appeased by the mediation of his sonne. Wherupon it followeth, that there was a time, wherein God was wrath with the worlde, and not pacified by his Sonne. Which doctrine is as muche as to denie Christ to be a mediator. But in the closing vp of the matter, he overthroweth that againe, affirming that Christ hath pacified the wrath of his father, not onely vowe in tyme, but also euerlastingly in the most highe and eternall purpose of God before the foundation of the worlde was layed.

Hitherto he hath sought against vs: but now in the conclusio he ioyneth with vs, calling the purpose of God eternall and most high. And what is that but to affirme all that we teache concerning the cause of Election and Reprobation.

As touching the mediation of Christ: we holde that which *A. Aussen* wyrteth in his *Homelie, De omnibus. Non mediator homo præter Deitatem; Non mediator Deus præter humanitatem. Ecce mediator. Diuinitas sine humanitate non est mediatrix. Humanitas sine diuinitate, non est mediatrix. Sed inter diuinitatem solam, & humanitatem solam, mediatrix est, humana diuinitas, & diuina humanitas Christi.*

Span without the Godhead, is not mediator. God without the manhode is not mediator: For here is the mediator. The diuinitie without the humanitie is not mediatrix. The humanitie without the diuinitie is not mediatrix: but the humane diuinitie and the diuine humanitie of Christ, is the mediatrix betweene the diuinitie alone and the humanitie alone. And this mediation doe we holde (as in his conclusion, at vnwares I think, Cerberus hath confessed) to be euerlasting in the eternall and most highe purpose of God: according to the saying

saying of Saint Iohn in the seconde of his first Epistle. We haue an Advocate with God the Father, which is Iesus Christ the righteous. To whome with his Father and the holy Ghost be all honour and glorie. Amen.

Thus in as fewe wordes as I could: I haue defended that doctrine of Gods Prouidence & Predestination, which I and others, haue taught, and as occasion sermeth, doe teach, both in preaching and wryting. Beseeching the Christian Reader to call vpon God, for the ayde of his holy spirite to assist vs, and to make vs able to continue in the teaching of true doctrine, in this and all other Articles that concerne Christian religion, that by vs, as the ministers of God, the congregation of Iesus Christ maye be edified.

And if the Authour of the answer, doe finde himselfe grieved for that I haue talked of him vnder the name of Cerberus: my desire is, that he woulde make his right name knowne to me eyther by worde or wryting, and if he thinke himselfe able to disproue ought that I haue wrytten in this defence, he shall eyther finde me able to mayntayne my wryting by good authoritie, or else ready to yelde to better. But if he will lurke still in secret, and cast abroade suche libelles as is this answer to his friends letter: I wil not trouble my selfe any moze in defending my selfe & others against him that dare not shew his face. Farewell. If thou profite in reading, I haue the gayne that I sought in wryting.

*Seene and allowed according to
the order appoynted.*